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ABSTRACT
SOUNDINGS: MUSICAL AESTHETICS IN
MUSIC EDUCATION DISCOURSE
FROM 1907 TO 1958
by
Jeremy M. Kopkas
In this dissertation I examine the discourse of music educators as it relates to
musical aesthetics in the United States from the creation of the Music Supervisors’
Conference in 1907 to the year of the publication of Basic Concepts of Music Education:
The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1 in
1958. The purpose of this dissertation is to show that philosophical discussion, especially
in relation to musical aesthetics, was much more comprehensive than previously
acknowledged. The conventional view that the arguments supporting music education
were primarily utilitarian is a limited interpretation of the discourse prior to 1958. In
actuality, arguments about music extended beyond its practical social, economic, and
political utility. Additional aesthetic theories guided the field and girded ideas of musical
understanding and informed instruction. A better understanding of the discourse of this
period contributes to more informed conversations about musical aesthetics and its
relation to music education. Utilizing philosophical analysis and archival research, I
argue in this dissertation that the philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics
was rich, varied, insightful, and pervasive. The evidence in this dissertation refutes the
standard interpretation which eschews the possibility of discourse on aesthetics taking
place prior to 1958. I show that there was deeper philosophical analysis than what is

currently acknowledged by those who presently make the claim that what was intended to
happen generally in the field of music education and during instruction was solely guided
by utilitarian philosophy. In other words, it expands the current understanding of
philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics in music education before the
Music Education as Aesthetic Education movement that is argued to begin with the
publication of Basic Concepts.
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CHAPTER 1
OVERTURE: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
An examination of the writing and research on the subject of music education
from the time of music’s official sanction in the public schools in the United States
during the first half of the nineteenth century to the present reveals a consistent theme of
justification for music’s inclusion as a course of study in the curriculum. Leading public
figures in United States education and music education history from the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries such as Horace Mann, and numerous music educators including
Charles Aiken, Luther Whiting Mason, Frances Elliott Clark, Osbourne McConathy, Will
Earhart, Peter Dykema, Lilla Belle Pitts, Russell V. Morgan, and Robert Choate supplied
a variety of arguments supporting the instruction of music in schools. In 1836 the Boston
Academy of Music, of which Lowell Mason was a member, issued a report that argued
for music education’s importance on the grounds of its intellectual, moral, and physical
benefits in addition to the Academy’s assertion that music was an important recreational
diversion from more “laborious” academic work.1 Since these early years research has
been conducted and opinions given with the goal of showing the ways in which music
does indeed improve the intellectual, moral, and physical capacities of the student and by
extension society. The prevailing logic of this largely utilitarian philosophical

1

Edward Bailey Birge, History of Public School Music in the United States (New York: Oliver
Ditson Co. 1928; reprint Washington D.C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1966), 40 – 43. 1838 is
the date often given as the point at which public school music received public support. It was on August
28, 1838 that the Boston School board voted to place music side by side with arithmetic and grammar in
several of the public schools in the city.

1

2
perspective is that if music can be shown to improve the student and society, then it ought
to continue to be an important part of the school curriculum and valued as integral to a
student’s educational experience at public expense.
Confronted with the dynamic nature of politics, public opinion, and economic
conditions, music educators have relied on traditional rationales focused on intellectual,
moral, and physical benefit as justification for music’s inclusion in the curriculum.
Music educators rely on this type of justification because of music’s historically
marginalized status as extra curricular. Music’s marginalized status in schools is due in
part to its abstract nature and the view that it is not a necessary means of satisfying the
needs of a society whose notions of success and usefulness are based largely on material
concerns. Therefore, music educators have made utilitarian arguments so music would
be perceived by the public as more than just an aside. The common view of music as
merely educational “icing” contributed to music education historian Michael Mark’s
assertion that prior to 1958 music educators employed utilitarian philosophy to justify
music’s existence.2 Mark’s analysis, however, is problematic because of the limited way
in which he interprets the writings of music educators prior to 1958 as focusing solely on
the defense of music education using utilitarian philosophical perspectives.
That music educators have argued for music’s importance using utilitarian
justification is not in question. What is questionable is the view that utilitarianism was
the singular perspective held by music educators from 1907 to 1958. Mark’s other
arguments relating to the views of music educators prior to 1958 are also problematic. In
addition to his primary argument that utilitarianism was the sole perspective of the time,

2

Michael Mark, “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic,”
Journal of Research in Music Education 30, no.1 (Spring 1982).
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he also states there was nothing written by music educators prior to 1958 that was
philosophical, or there was only rationale—not philosophy—given on the importance of
music instruction.3 Nevertheless Mark’s views, especially as they relate to utilitarianism,
are valid because music educators are required to appease many masters – music,
students, society, and education itself. The field of music education is faced with the
challenge of reconciling music with and in the realm of wider human experience.
Furthermore, external and broader educational concerns regarding the nature of music
education, or for that matter any so called school subject, necessarily involves promoting
goals such as clear thinking, empathy, and being “able to detect when a man is talking
rot.”4 Although Mark’s analysis is valid, it is ultimately limited.
While music educators have infused broader educational goals, they have also put
into practice ideas rooted in philosophy prior to 1958 that had fidelity to their subject
matter, specifically musical aesthetics. Mark, however, asserts this happens after 1958.
Mark specifically argues in “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from
Utilitarian to Aesthetic” that the movement of MEAE began in 1958 with the publication
of an article in Basic Concepts of Music Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the
National Society for the Study of Education, by Allen Britton titled “Music in Early
American Public Education: A Historical Critique.”5 Scholars also support the idea that

3

Michael Mark , “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy” in Michael Mark, ed.,
Music Education: Source Readings from Ancient Greece to Today (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002).
Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 33, no. 4
(Winter 1999), and Mark, “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic.
See also Michael Mark and Charles Gary, A History of American Music Education, 3d ed. (Lanham, MA:
Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2007), 417 – 422.
4
Jan Morris, ed., The Oxford Book of Oxford (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978),
331.
5
Mark, “Evolution,” 18. Henceforth, Basic Concepts is a reference to Basic Concepts of Music
Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1, ed.
Nelson B. Henry (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
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the MEAE movement was furthered in the following year with the publication of Charles
Leonhard’s and Robert House’s, Foundations and Principles of Music Education. Mark
also makes the same claim in, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” and
again in “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy.” More recently
Marie McCarthy and J. Scott Goble echo Mark’s interpretation in “The Praxial
Philosophy in Historical Perspective.” These authors also assert that “prior to the 1950s
music education had been associated with a variety of functional values…in post-World
War II years…a number of scholars…began to work toward formulating a new
philosophy built on principles drawn from Western aesthetics.”6 Supporting Mark’s
general argument, McCarthy and Goble go on to state “Basic Concepts in Music
Education (1958)…was a landmark in formally launching the philosophy of music
education as aesthetic education.”7 Mark’s analysis, echoed by McCarthy and Goble, is
so generally accepted that I will henceforth call it the standard interpretation or
conventional view.
What is not generally accepted is that philosophical discourse relating to
aesthetics existed prior to this time. I argue the term musical aesthetics and its core
principles which focus on the nature, meaning, and value of music are embedded in the
discourse of music educators between 1907 and 1958. Justification for my argument is
forthcoming in chapters three, four, and five. A concern of the present work is the
narrow, confusing, and restrictive views of what existed on the topic of musical aesthetics
prior to MEAE philosophy of music education. As such, a central issue is what is

6

Marie McCarthy and J. Scott Goble, “The Praxial Philosophy in Historical Perspective” in
Praxial Music Education: Reflections and Dialogues, ed. David J. Elliott (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 19-20.
7
Ibid.
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considered philosophical. Scholars such as Mark, Leonhard, House, and music education
philosopher Bennett Reimer insist that philosophical work is systematic.8 Specifically for
Reimer, “a philosophy of music education should be a systematic statement of music
education’s nature and value.”9 I am not suggesting that philosophy cannot be a system
or does not at all contain a systematic analysis in the style of writing, but the idea that
philosophy encompasses just this is limited. There is more to philosophy than the
creating of a system or simply writing systematically.
Philosophy broadly conceived is an attitude toward the world as Quentin Lauer
asserts in his work titled The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry. Lauer acknowledges that
philosophy is difficult to define because “it [philosophy] is more like a way of life, an
attitude that human beings bring with them in approaching reality—both the reality they
themselves are and the reality in which they live.”10 In Lauer’s statements there are
echoes of Ludwig Wittgenstein who asserts “all philosophy can do is destroy idols. And
that means, not making any new ones – in the ‘absence of an idol.’”11 In the case of
Wittgenstein part of his point of philosophy is to destroy systems. Additionally, Marie
McGinn states that “Wittgenstein himself emphasizes over and over again that it is a
method or a style of thought, rather than doctrines, that characterize his later

8

See Mark, “Historical Interpretation,” 11 and Charles Leonhard and Robert House, Foundations
and Principles of Music Education (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), 83-84.
9
Bennett Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1970), 1. Emphasis added.
10
Quentin Lauer, The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University
Press, 1989), 27.
11
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, vols. 1 & 2, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe
(Macmillan College Publishing Company, Inc, 1953) quoted in Anthony Kenny, ed., The Wittgenstein
Reader (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1994; reprint 2000), 267.
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philosophy.”12 A purpose of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, according to
McGinn, “is to bring about a change in our attitude, or in how we see things…[it is]
aimed at working on the individual’s style of thought.”13 In order to achieve this “the
Investigations requires us to accept that it sets out to bring about a shift in our
understanding which cannot be conveyed to a passive audience in the form of ‘results’ or
‘conclusions.’”14 Because of the nature of Wittgenstein’s thought and objectives,
McGinn asserts, the Philosophical Investigations “cannot be communicated in the form
of a statement of systematic doctrines or theories.”15 Invoking the thrust of
Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy, Lauer goes on to describe philosophy as a process
that involves active doing.16 His point is best exemplified by the description of his book
entitled G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher without Portfolio. Lauer asserts “by no stretch of
the imagination could one call Chesterton a professional philosopher, and yet his writings
are replete with what has to be called philosophical wisdom.”17 In relation to musical
aesthetics there is also more to examine than surface notions of music’s nature and value.
Philosophical analysis, then, is not in place to put restrictions and limits on what
philosophy is because the discipline is much more than a loose grouping of systems; it is
also an attitude, a way of life, a process, and how one approaches and sees problems.
Specifically related to musical aesthetics it is more than saying what music’s value for the
field of music education is. It is also considering the numerous ways scholars have
examined its nature and meaning to help students better understand this abstract art. My
12

Marie McGinn, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical
Investigations (London, UK: Routledge, 1997), 10. Philosophical Investigations is part of Wittgenstein’s
later philosophy.
13
Ibid., 31.
14
Ibid., 30.
15
Ibid.
16
Lauer, The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry, 16.
17
Ibid., 24.

7
point is that a limited view of philosophical thinking and musical aesthetics by music
education historians and philosophers is problematic because it creates a monistic view of
the field of philosophy and musical aesthetics, which in turn stultifies philosophy of
music education.
The result of a limited interpretation of what philosophy is has generated a limited
view of the kinds of conversations on philosophical topics that occurred in music
education prior to 1958 as being merely socially based, absent altogether, or simply
justification. In other words, as Michael Mark suggests, the writings of music educators
prior to 1958 are not philosophical. Another problem with Mark’s view is the idea that
writings dealing with music education are provided by scholars outside the field for the
support of music education.18 This narrow conception of philosophical discourse by
contemporary music education historians and philosophers does not take into account
evidence that suggests music educators in the early twentieth century actively discussed
topics and shared ideas central to aesthetics and music.19
This dissertation examines the discourse of music educators as it relates to
musical aesthetics in the United States from the creation of the Music Supervisors’
Conference in 1907 up to the year of the publication of Basic Concepts in 1958. The
purpose of this dissertation is to show that philosophical discussion, especially in relation
to musical aesthetics, was much more comprehensive than previously acknowledged.
18

Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” asserts “those people who left
writings about the role of music education, who explained to us why music education was important to
their societies, were not music educators….It is here that the overlooked significance of aesthetic education
as an historical turning point comes into play. There are two relevant points. First, music educators
became the major spokespersons for their own profession….Second, some intellectual leaders, notably
Bennett Reimer and Abraham Schwadron, began the serious study of philosophy and became philosophers
themselves;” 8, 13.
19
In Bennett Reimer’s preface to A Philosophy of Music Education, xi – xii there is a hint that
there were aesthetic aims, albeit secondary to utilitarian ones, for music education in the past but the idea is
not developed.
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The conventional view that the arguments supporting music education were primarily
utilitarian is a limited interpretation of the discourse prior to 1958. In actuality,
arguments for music’s inclusion in the curriculum extended beyond its social, economic,
and political utility. Additional aesthetic theories guided the field and girded ideas of
musical understanding and informed instruction. A better understanding of the discourse
of this period contributes to more informed conversations about musical aesthetics and its
relation to music education. Utilizing philosophical analysis and archival research, I
argue in this dissertation that the philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics
was rich, varied, insightful, and pervasive. The evidence in this dissertation refutes the
standard interpretation which eschews the possibility of discourse on aesthetics taking
place prior to 1958. I show that there was deeper philosophical analysis than what is
currently acknowledged by those who presently make the claim that what was intended to
happen generally in the field of music education and during instruction was solely guided
by utilitarian philosophy. In other words, it expands the current understanding of
philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics in music education before the
MEAE movement that is argued to begin with the publication of Basic Concepts.
The fact that contemporary scholarship in music education continues to explore
intellectual currents in philosophy and history indicates that there is sufficient interest in
these areas of music education to warrant further analysis of specific matters relating to
philosophy and music education in history. Generating a better understanding of the
nature, meaning, and value of music in music education history will lead to more
informed debate and discussion in the field. By examining evidence in music education
discourse from the perspective of theories in aesthetics that focus on the nature, meaning,

9
and value of music, this study revises some elements of the standard and conventional
views of what music education looked like philosophically before the MEAE
movement.20
Significance of the Study
Mark argues, “although they often used the word ‘philosophy,’ there is little
actual philosophy in this body of literature, as we might define it today. For the most
part, what has been referred to as philosophy were actually rationales.”21 He also asserts
philosophy prior to MEAE rested on the claim that previous philosophy “was not actually
about music education.”22 Furthermore, although music educators in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries built a body of music education literature, material from the
pre-MEAE time is labeled as “justification,” not philosophy.23 The standard
interpretation asserts that the writers and thinkers mentioned in the pre-MEAE period
write about “the benefits of music education and reasons why it should be supported in
schools.”24 That pre-MEAE philosophy was utilitarian and as such emphasized
extramusical aims suggests that the pre-MEAE arguments were limited to justification,
not philosophy.25
Mark’s interpretation of music educator’s pre 1958 writing vacillates. Generally,
however, he implies there is a gradation of sophistication between justification, rationale,
and philosophy. While I am not taking issue with this general notion of graded
sophistication, it is nevertheless necessary to draw distinctions between the concepts of

20

I do not examine the MEAE movement in this dissertation.
Mark, “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy,” 145.
22
Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” 8.
23
Ibid., 9.
24
Ibid.
25
Mark, “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy,” 145.
21

10
view, justification, rationale, theory, and philosophy. Giving basic descriptions here is
important because these terms are seen in a variety of locations in this dissertation. For
the purpose of this dissertation I take the term view to mean a particular perspective a
scholar takes when advancing or critiquing an argument or stating a belief. Justification
is the specific support given to defend a position or a basic reason for holding a belief.
Rationale is a further developed explanation and argument that presents more elaborate
reasons for taking and defending a position based on a belief or a particular principle.
Theories are well developed statements from a particular perspective, usually generated
by abstract thought, that involve a sophisticated analysis of material relating to a topic of
study. Finally, philosophy is very difficult to define and can be a number of things.
Some see philosophy as systems or doctrines developed by particular schools of thought.
Platonic idealism is one example. Others view of philosophy as systematic approaches to
the study of problems not answerable by science, math, or history. In that vein John
Hospers suggests philosophy fundamentally deals with three “areas of thought…: the
study of reality…the study of justification; it is concerned with how we justify the claims
we make…[and] the analysis of various concepts that are central to our thought.”26 And
as previously stated, philosophy is also an attitude, a way of life, a process, and how one
approaches and sees problems. I include elements of each of these notions of philosophy
in this dissertation.
This study is significant because it revises the conventional view that pre-MEAE
discourse was limited to utilitarian justification. By expanding the existing notions of
philosophical discourse in music education before 1958, the end in view is threefold.

26

John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis 4t ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1997), 5.
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First, the study reveals a better understanding of what music educators discussed from
1907 to 1958 in the area of musical aesthetics. Second, the relationship between a
utilitarian justification of music’s value to aesthetic theories is clarified.27 Third, more
informed discussion on music education history and musical aesthetics takes place. This
dissertation argues that philosophical discourse existed in the field of music education
prior to the late 1950s, and it was rooted in aesthetics, its problems, and its place in
classroom instruction.
Problem Statement and Research Question
Prior to the formalized movements of MEAE and praxialism, the historical and
philosophical interpretations of the period prior to 1958 in the works of Mark, Reimer,
McCarthy and Goble, and David Elliott suggest philosophical discourse was nonexistent.
Aesthetics is argued to have only entered into the discussion after 1958. Since the
conventional view has been accepted by the field, discourse on musical aesthetics from
1907 to 1958 is not an area of research that has received widespread attention. This may
be due to a lack of highly formalized philosophical work written before 1970. While
providing a rationale for music’s inclusion in the general curriculum, much of the
available research mentioning philosophy and music education focuses on philosophy’s

27

It is interesting that the argument for music education to move beyond utilitarian justification is
similar to the one used by scholars such as Charles Leonhard, who embraced the notion of music education
as aesthetic education in the first place. My challenge is to the current conventional view that aesthetic
theories were not a concern at all until the late 1950s. The MEAE view of its purpose to educate for
music’s values is still ultimately a justificatory claim but no longer one exclusively along the lines of
relating music to solely extramusical values. The emphasis shifted, but the goal was still for arguing that
music should be part of the general curriculum. The difference was, again, one of emphasis; one was
seeing music for its value in relation to what society needed for stability and progress whereas the other, the
post 1958 aesthetic view, argued that music was valuable because of its merits as music. Perhaps it is not
possible to completely move away from all types of justificatory claims since by its very nature music
education seeks to educate students in music, but this type of education exists in a larger context. There is
an unavoidable overlap between musical practice and musical understanding. For another explanation of
the purpose and development of MEAE see Mark and Gary, A History of American Music Education, 3d
ed., 417 – 422.
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role in support of the goal of utilitarian justification. To my knowledge, no research
exists that has as its focus the philosophical work of music educators relating to musical
aesthetics prior to the MEAE movement. The historical and philosophical research that
does exist asserts one of three conclusions: first, there was an absence of philosophy;
second, there was no true philosophy, only rationale given on the importance of music
instruction;28 and third, the philosophical perspective was utilitarian, that is, music is a
justified part of the curriculum because of its practical use.
Although it would be beneficial to look at philosophy of music education from its
inception in the school curriculum in 1838, the scope would be too broad. The same can
be said for choosing the year 1876 when the Music Teachers National Association
(MTNA) was formed. This dissertation, therefore, investigates the history of
philosophical discourse of music education beginning in 1907, the year of the founding of
the Music Supervisors’ Conference.29 It would not be a stretch to suggest the
overlapping qualities of the two groups—MTNA and MSC/MSNC—render the choice of
one date instead of the other as trivial. For example, as John Molnar states,
The carryover of the discussion from the MTNA to the MSNC was caused by the
fact that the relationship existing between these two organizations was similar to
that between the MSNC and the music section of the NEA. The leaders of the
MSNC were the same persons who assumed an active leadership in school music
affairs in the other two groups.30
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Even though some of the leadership and other parts of the membership were the same,
there is an important difference between the two groups. The MTNA had a large
contingency of private music teachers whose main interaction with public school students
was in the one-on-one lesson in their studios. On the subject of the MTNA compared to
the MSNC, John Beattie refers to the MTNA as representing the interests of the “outside
music teacher” while the MSNC represents the “school music teacher.”31
The field of music education also began to achieve a greater degree of unity and
cohesion by creating another forum in which ideas were explored, exchanged, and
debated by those who were considered “teachers and musicians,”32 and matters that may
have transcended those that had been discussed by the Music Teachers National
Association which had formed in 1876. Additionally, Mark and Gary suggest the efforts
of the MSNC “brought social, musical, educational, and organizational development to
the music education profession.”33 Finally, 1907 is around the time that the music
curriculum expanded in schools, and classes such as appreciation and harmony were
added. These additions were important because the very nature of these courses was
based in examining the elements of music – the end goal was not the performance of a
particular piece of music but to reach a better understanding of music. The content of
matters in musical aesthetics discussed by music education scholars is at the heart of this
research. It is central to this dissertation because music educators of the period not only
transcended the practical rationale of utilitarianism in their writings but also used ideas
from aesthetics for the purpose of informing instruction. The work focuses on the field of
31
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music education in the United States from 1907 to 1958. The central question is: Is there
compelling evidence to show that scholarly work of the period reflected and advanced
theories of musical aesthetics that focused on the nature, meaning, and value of music
with the intended purpose of guiding practice and informing the field at large?
Objectives of the Study
The period of history that includes 1907 to 1958 in the United States was one of
educational and philosophical ferment. The span of time from the formation of the MSC
to the dawn of the MEAE movement is embedded in the progressive era.34 During this
time there was an emphasis on improving society via efficient and practical means, all of
which coincides with the interpretation that philosophy of music education, if it existed
prior to 1958, was utilitarian. I do not claim that the utilitarian philosophy did not exist
or was not discussed by music educators. I think for the purpose of better informed
music education policy, however, it is necessary to find out if it was the only
philosophical view held in the discipline, especially relating to practice.
One of the concerns of this study, specifically relating philosophy to the practice
of music education, is rooted in an idea put forth in John Dewey’s The Child and the
Curriculum. He argues for reconciliation between subject matter and the interests and
experiences of the child. For Dewey, the role of the teacher is to figure out “how his [sic]
own knowledge of the subject-matter may assist in interpreting the child’s needs and
doings, and determine the medium in which the child should be placed in order that his
growth may be properly directed.”35 Dewey continues:
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Somehow, somewhere motive must be appealed to, connection must be
established between mind and material…if the subject-matter of the lessons be
such as to have an appropriate place within the expanding consciousness of the
child, if it grows out of his own past doings, thinkings, and sufferings, and grows
into application in further achievements and receptivities, then no device or trick
of method has to be resorted to in order to enlist “interest.”36
Dewey’s ideas emphasize the importance of both subject matter and the interests of the
child. Therefore, in relation to the subject of music in the Deweyan sense, it is improper
to connect music to some distant and externally imposed notion of civic responsibility or
goal of higher achievement scores. What is necessary is for the teacher to use knowledge
of music to assist in the growth and expansion of the child’s consciousness and
experiences. By leaving the idea of “proper direction” undefined, Dewey leaves open
possibilities that do not exclude music in relation to practical purposes, but neither does it
rule out the development of musical experiences for the purpose of experiential growth
and the expansion of consciousness.
Educative experiences are central to the process of a child’s education. Another
particular manifestation of progressive thought in education was the integration
movement. Integration took many forms, but the basic idea was to expose a child to
multiple areas of thought and experience while attempting to draw on common themes
among what appear to be disparate groupings. For example, a social studies teacher
studying the ancien régime might include works and writings of Mozart to illuminate the
tensions existing between traditional bases of socio-economic power and the rising
merchant class. Another example could be the physics and music classes studying the
properties of sound in the school’s auditorium. In music education the integration
movement prompted music educators to take a hard look at the nature, meaning, and
36
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value of music. Music educators asked themselves questions such as, “Should music be
integrated into the larger curriculum or should it remain a standalone subject because of
its alleged uniqueness?” This period was rife with musical aesthetics arguments from
music educators, yet there are gaps in the existing research that give credit to those in the
field discussing such matters. This research fills in some of the gaps.
Another gap in existing research on the philosophical writings during this period
has to do specifically with aesthetics. An important example is Eduard Hanslick’s
seminal work titled On the Musically Beautiful, first published in 1854.37 Hanslick’s
book sparked a lively debate which continues today on the subject of meaning in music.
Music educators of the time had heard about Hanslick’s ideas and incorporated his
theories on some level into their discourse for the purpose of relating it to their pursuits of
more informed music instruction. In other words, Hanslick had adherents to his ideas in
the field of music education, and as a result Hanslick’s aesthetic position entered the
discourse of early twentieth century music educators. Another example is Dewey’s Art
as Experience, which explores artistic meaning through interaction with art.38 These two
works are examples that philosophical dialogues in the area of aesthetics and music
continued unabated since aesthetics became popular in the eighteenth century.39 With
works such as these generating discussions in the general fields of music and education,
the historical record of the MSC, MSNC (later MENC)—groups that consisted of
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“musicians and teachers”—reveals numerous aesthetic perspectives that have not been
adequately accounted for in research. An objective of this research is to show that
aesthetics was very much a part of the conversation in music education from 1907 to
1958.
One problem that surfaced, however, is in how these music educators interpreted
the term aesthetics and used it. I seek to elucidate what was said by music educators in
relation to musical aesthetics. In so doing the murkiness of the language within the
literature of the common interpretation on the topic of utilitarianism is clarified, but more
importantly clarification on the larger topic of musical aesthetics in the discourse of the
time is achieved in my analysis of the evidence. One definition of the term aesthetics in
relation to the music is that “musical aesthetics is the study of the relationship of music to
the human senses and intellect.”40 Another very basic approach is to consider aesthetics
as “the philosophy of art and beauty – a subdivision of philosophy that deals with
fundamental questions about the arts which the arts themselves are not able to answer, or
are not entirely able to answer.”41 Dewey asserts aesthetic theories deal with the “general
significance” of art.42 Like Dewey, Gordon Graham asserts, aesthetics is “an attempt to
theorize about art, to explain what it is and why it matters.”43 Again, my argument
contests the conventional view’s assertion that the period prior to 1958 was
philosophically barren. Musicians and leading music educators during this period were
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well aware of matters relating to musical aesthetics on some level and thereby included
such contemporary topics in their own dialogue.

CHAPTER 2
EXPOSITION: (AESTHETICS)
Part I – Aesthetics
This chapter clarifies what aesthetics is in order to show how the discourse of
music educators coincided with the problems and theories of this branch of philosophy.1
Dabney Townsend writes, “if one were speaking strictly historically, the history of
‘aesthetics’ would cover only the period from the mid-eighteenth century when the
modern idea of aesthetics first appeared through the last two thirds of the twentieth
century.”2 In a similar vein, Carl Dalhaus characterizes aesthetics as an immature field
only being reconstituted in the eighteenth century and still only being attached to music
in the nineteenth century.3 Perhaps due to its immaturity Dalhaus suggests that
All attempts to define it, whether as a theory of perception or as a
philosophy of art or as a science of beauty, suffer from dogmatic
narrowness, one-sidedness, and arbitrariness…to do justice to this
phenomenon requires recognizing that it is not so much a distinct
discipline with a firmly limited object of inquiry, as, rather a vaporous, far
flung quintessence of problems and points of view that no one before the
eighteenth century could have imagined coalescing into a complex with its
own name.4
1
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A basic approach is to consider aesthetics as “the philosophy of art and beauty – a
subdivision of philosophy that deals with fundamental questions about the arts which the
arts themselves are not able to answer, or are not entirely able to answer.”5 Stemming
from the nineteenth century, musical aesthetics, however “narrow, one-sided or
arbitrary,” is often recognized as something distinct.
The idea of musical aesthetics as a distinct field of study is given by Wayne
Bowman who argues musical aesthetics is a narrow term that is subsumed by the
philosophy of music.6 For him, music philosophy is the more appropriate term because it
“explores areas musical aesthetics often regards as musically incidental: matters
epistemological, ethical, social, cultural, and political.”7 Bowman confines musical
aesthetics to an “effort to describe what is distinctive about music and musical
experience.” 8 In contrast Edward Lippman writes “aesthetics as traditionally defined is a
philosophy of art in an empirical sense: it considers art as it is revealed in perception and
in practice.”9 Later, Lippman asserts
We cannot really take issue with the retention of the term musical
aesthetics. Its meaning has expanded, for one thing well beyond the
sphere of actual auditory impressions and their effects, and although
philosophy of music is doubtless a more accurate designation for our
increasingly diversified world of musical thought, musical aesthetics has
the advantage of an established use that will probably overcome its
disrepute.10
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Finally, Willi Apel defines musical aesthetics as “the study of the relationship of music to
the human senses and intellect.”11
Whether it was a focus on the listener’s response or the form and content of the
music, the basis of what was studied in musical aesthetics in the nineteenth century and
much of the twentieth century was rooted in ideas relating to Western Art Music.12
Music from other cultures or the jazz that would become popular in the twentieth century
were not often considered worthy topics for serious study. For that matter music
emanating from what is labeled Modernist generated plenty of controversy within the
field of musical aesthetics, but the Modernist tradition, at least from the perspective of the
critic, had emerged from the tradition of Western Art Music. Even though aesthetics had
existed as an area of study since the mid-eighteenth century, its relative immaturity had
the effect of lacking exhaustive development of what the object or essence of the study
was. There simply was not the time for the field to develop a multiplicity of counter
arguments to be formed or reworked. This is contextually important because the
historical development in the field of musical aesthetics in the nineteenth century left
legacies that influenced subsequent approaches to what was at the core of the discipline.
That is, although a twentieth century aesthetician might reject an idea advanced in a
particular theory from the nineteenth century, the two writers still worked from
11
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assumptions primarily grounded in Western Art Music. The notable exception to this
idea of musical aesthetics being based solely on Western Art Music is what Graham calls
the “sociological or sociohistorical approach”13 and what Lippman describes as
“socioaesthetics.”14 Each scholar suggests that in the twentieth century certain
aestheticians and theorists such as Theodor Adorno argued musical production had a
cultural connection. Sociological approaches notwithstanding, aesthetics remains
difficult to discern.
The challenges of defining the term echoed in Dalhaus’ previous statement about
aesthetics being a “vaporous, far flung quintessence of problems and points of view” are
compounded by historical transformations. Dalhaus argues “nineteenth century writers
on music…were fascinated by the problem of esthetic judgment and its philosophical
basis, in the twentieth century discussion rather focuses on technical questions.”15
Lippman sees the transformation as much the same. For him there is a move from
subjective content of feelings and moods where much attention is given to the emotional
realm to one where a major concern in the twentieth century is reactive and holds that
meaning is based on the objective form of music, that is, how compositions are to be
analyzed intrinsically.16 These delineations between the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, however, may not be strict. Overlap is common in the articulation of theories
where one theory often is the basis on which another theory emerges. Theoretical
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transformations are nevertheless necessary for building a general framework, which is
important because theory provides one way of organizing the evidence.
Contextually, the study of aesthetics that informs this research is primarily from
the mid-nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries. More specifically, I focus on
problems and theories from this time that examine what music is (nature), how music is
comprehended and interpreted and what it allegedly reveals (meaning), and musical
judgment and why music matters (value). This framework is based on the work of both
Monroe Beardsley and T.J. Diffey. In Diffey’s essay titled “A Note on Some Meanings
of the Term ‘Aesthetic’” he asserts that
Whatever discipline…aesthetics finds itself to be a branch of, the same problems
tend to recur, such as the nature and defining characteristics of art, the meaning
works of art are said to have, how they may be judged, valued, or interpreted, the
nature of imagination and of creativity, the kinds of experience offered by art,
&C.17
The version of Diffey’s explanation used in this paper substitutes the words
music/musical where he uses the term art. Therefore, a la Diffey, whatever discipline
musical aesthetics finds itself to be a branch of, the same problems tend to recur, such as
the nature and defining characteristics of music, the meaning musical works are said to
have, how they may be judged, valued or interpreted, the nature of imagination and of
creativity, and the kinds of experience offered by music. And from Beardsley’s
Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, I rely on both the structure and
content of his 1958 work which is divided into three basic sections that correspond to the
domains I have labeled nature, meaning, and value. The philosophical work of Roger
Scruton, Andy Hamilton, Wayne Bowman, Morris Weitz, and Graham as well as the
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historical work of Lippman, and a number of others, also informs elements of this
chapter.18 The primary analytical tool for this section, however, and what forms the basis
of much of the remaining analysis comes from Beardsley, who writes, “The problems of
philosophical aesthetics…fall into three main groups…the problems raised by descriptive
statements…the more debatable problems raised by interpretive statements…[and] the
problems raised by the critic’s value judgments.”19 What are the characteristics,
differences, and similarities seen in the general organizational concepts of nature,
meaning, and value? Although the quality of unity or wholeness exists with these
organizational concepts because each informs how we think about and experience music
every one simultaneously has distinct boundaries, which is akin to the notion of partwhole relations.
The notion of the nature of music is one in which the fundamental issue is
explaining what music is. In other words these theories seek to describe the essence of
music and focus on music as a concept, and fall within what is often referred to as
philosophical aesthetics. More specifically, Graham asserts the task of philosophical
aesthetics is “to arrive at a definition, conception, or characterization of art that makes
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explicit the necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being a work of art.”20 In
a subsequent section of this paper, the problems and theories that focus on the nature of
music will be addressed; this is also the case for meaning and value. The next concept to
define is meaning.
Again, in its simplest form meaning is how music is comprehended and
interpreted. Or, to put it another way, what is allegedly revealed by music. The
articulation of this category comes from Lippman’s argument of the difference between
nineteenth and twentieth century musical aesthetics. As mentioned above, for him there
was a move from subjective content of feelings and moods where much attention is given
to the emotional realm to one where a major concern in the twentieth century is reactive
and holds that meaning is based on the objective form of music, that is, how
compositions are to be analyzed intrinsically.21 Beardsley is, again, particularly helpful
in explaining one way I am using the term meaning. He writes, “A critical
interpretation…is a statement that purports to declare the ‘meaning’ of a work of art…I
use the term ‘meaning’ for a semantical relation between the work itself and something
outside the work.”22 The difficulty of articulating meaning lies in the relations between
composer, musical work, and the percipient. Are we to comprehend and interpret music
for its alleged expression of emotion, or how it may represent an external idea or symbol,
or are we only able to analyze the structural form of the composition? Although there are
no simple solutions to these questions, these questions are the very ones at the core of the
20
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idea of meaning. And more often, as suggested by Lippman, meaning is based on
analysis of the composition.
Meaning is distinct from the notion of nature because, as Graham explains, there
are problems with descriptive theories. He poses the following question: “is a
[descriptive] theory of art about the kind of human judgment and/or perception that arises
when we are confronted with a work or art, or is it a theory about actual objects –
paintings, poems, plays, pieces of music, and so on?”23 Likewise it is distinct from ideas
of value because the primary focus is not one that contains the same emphasis on the
extramusical as certain normative theories do. This is not to say that normative theories
are only concerned with the extramusical but to simply state that the importance of
internally constituted understanding is not the only aspect of the idea of value. The idea
of meaning is closely related to Immanuel Kant’s perspective on aesthetics. Graham
writes, “Kant has a philosophy of art as well as an account of the aesthetic judgment.
That is to say, he is concerned both with the artifact of art and the attitude we bring to
them.”24 Kant argues “in all beautiful art what is essential consists in the form, which is
purposive for observation and judging.”25 Or as Donald W. Crawford explains
Experiencing beauty is thus, for Kant, a doubly reflective process. We reflect on
the spatial and temporal form of the object by exercising our powers of judgment
(imagination and understanding), and we acknowledge the beauty of an object
when we come to be aware through the feeling of pleasure of the harmony of
these faculties, which awareness comes by reflecting on our own mental states.26
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Meaning has at its core the uncovering of the artistic process by examining the musical
work and our interpretation/understanding/comprehension/ of it or what is revealed by it;
in the twentieth century, according to Dalhaus and Lippman, the analysis of the
composition is the way in which we are to better understand how we make sense of it,
which leads us to the concept of value.
Value-based theories are concerned with why music matters (music’s intrinsic,
inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian worth) and how it is possible to make an
evaluation.27 These theories, as described by Graham and Beardsley, are called
normative. Should we care about music and if so why? Graham claims normative
theories “see what values music, or painting, or poetry can embody, and how valuable
this form of embodiment is.”28 Graham’s explanation, however, is not wholly satisfying.
There are significant and subtle differences between different types of value, especially in
relation to music educators’ attempts to justify music’s inclusion in the curriculum based
on certain notions of the value of music.
The problem I brought to light in the previous chapter on the difference between
justification and philosophy has at its core the issue of value. Justification for something
can be achieved in a philosophical manner; it depends in large part on what types of
arguments are used to support such justificatory claims. One specific aspect of the use of
27
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justificatory claims for music education comes from differences associated with the
general heading of extrinsic value. Under the general label of extrinsic value lie the
terms instrumentalism and utilitarianism. The latter term has frequently been the
philosophical view used to support music’s value in the schools. Writers on the topic of
value have positioned themselves in numerous ways regarding their view on the utility of
music. One example is Gordon Graham’s description of Benedetto Croce’s expressivist
position on value in the latter’s Guide to Aesthetics. Graham writes that Croce “denies
that art has anything ‘utilitarian’ about it…to understand its [art’s] meaning and value we
need only look at the work itself and can ignore the world beyond the work,” 29 Ancient
Greek thinkers had a different view of music’s utility by citing its effect on the character,
known as ethos theory. The differences between the various theoretical perspectives on
the value of music lie in how the theorist uses, sees, and understands differences between
intrinsic, instrumental, inherent, and utilitarian value. Making a distinction among these
types of value is important because many music educators looked to the arguments from
utilitarian theory in an attempt to place school music on par with other subjects.
Philosophically speaking the term utilitarianism shares overlapping characteristics
with instrumentalism. The two terms, sometimes used interchangeably, are not
identical.30 The chief difference is that the theory of instrumentalism, as used in
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discourse on the arts, places value and importance on the experiencing of the object
where the possible ends-in-view are not fixed, final, or necessarily practical.
Utilitarianism, on the other hand as used in discourse on the arts, sees particular and
practical ends-in-view that include social, political, moral, and/or economic effects being
generated from the experience between the aesthetic object and percipient. The social,
moral, political and/or economic effects are said to influence the individual and society.
An additional difference is that instrumentalism relies on the so-called doctrine of
immediacy which posits that “aesthetic value is something that is immediately
experienced and known; it does not have to be calculated or inferred, but is open to direct
inspection—consummatory, if anything is.”31 Utilitarianism does not rely on the
necessity of the immediate experience but rather on the consequences which follow the
experience or are somehow indirectly related. The overlapping quality is that both
incorporate extramusical or extrinsic elements—those that may not be exclusively related
to music—in determining value. Beardsley describes the instrumentalist position on
aesthetic value as such, “if it be granted that aesthetic experience has value, then
‘aesthetic value’ may be defined as ‘the capacity to produce an aesthetic experience of
some magnitude.’”32 He continues by arguing using the instrumentalist position that “To
say that an object has aesthetic value is (a) to say that it has the capacity to produce an
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 8, Modern Philosophy: Empiricism, Idealism, and
Pragmatism in Britain and America (New York, NY: Image Books, 1966/1994); John Dewey, “What Does
Pragmatism Mean by Practical?” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5, no. 4
(February 1908): 85-99; Ernst Moritz Manasse, “Moral Principles and Alternatives in Max Weber and John
Dewey,” The Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 2 (January 1944): 29-48; William Meyer, “Democracy: Needs
over Wants,” Political Theory 2, no. 2 (May 1974): 197-214; Chaïm Perelman, “Pragmatic Arguments,”
trans. A.J. Ayer, Philosophy 34, no. 128 (January 1959): 18-27. For descriptions and differences between
pragmatism and instrumentalism and experimentalism in relation to music education, see Foster
McMurray, “A Pragmatic Approach to Certain Aspects of Music Education,” Journal of Research in Music
Education 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1956): 103-112.
31
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aesthetic effect, and (b) to say that the aesthetic effect itself has value.”33 Notice in
Beardsley’s explanations there is evidence of the importance of the experience but
nothing beyond that immediate happening. To put it another way, using the
instrumentalist line of reasoning one is not necessarily expected to become a better
mathematician as a result of playing the saxophone, but the believer in utilitarianism
would make the argument that the value of music is that it does.
Beside the differences between the instrumentalist and utilitarian positions there
are also distinction made between intrinsic, inherent, and instrumental value. Beardsley
defines each as follows:
To say that a value of an object is an instrumental (or extrinsic) value is to say
that the object derives its value from being a means to the production of some
other object that has value…to say that a value of an object is an intrinsic (or
terminal) value is to say that the object has that value independently of any
means-end relation to other objects.34
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Ibid., 510. Beardsley takes time to analyze each of these positions and shows the weaknesses of
each. For something to have intrinsic value, according to the rationalist, the effect or quality of the object
or experience is self-evident “and without any indirect or covert appeal to human experience.” Therefore,
the truth or beauty in an object or event would be self-evident regardless of any prior contact or experience.
Trying to imagine something that has no reference to our experience is very difficult, especially for the
empiricist. Beardsley makes note of the difference between the empiricist and the rationalist and one can
infer from his analysis that the empirical position pushes the intrinsic theory of value very close to, if not
completely in, the instrumentalist camp. His analysis of instrumentalism includes the criticism that “it is
said to be self-contradictory…[and] meaningless.” To put it another way, if you can only judge whether
something has value in relation to other things or actions, how can anything ever be said to be of value?
Where does the value really lie? To this question the instrumentalist might reply using support from the
doctrine of immediacy, but this type of response leans toward intrinsic value, something the instrumentalist
rejects. In relation to the idea of meaninglessness he is a bit unclear, but if I understand his example it is
that for something to be a value instrumentally it must be in relation to something that has value, so never
getting to anything that has value is not only self-contradictory but also makes the position meaningless.
Even though he critiques both positions, he also provides examples in his analysis of how each position can
be valid. It is not, however, important to consider the supporting arguments for each theory here.
Beardsley, Aesthetics, 540 – 543.
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Relying on the work Values of Art by Malcom Budd, Matthew Kieran in his essay titled
“Value of Art” describes the difference between instrumental value and intrinsic value.35
Kieran writes that
If we value a work instrumentally, it is merely a contingent means to a particular
end. To value Bach’s Cello Suites just because they cheer me up implies that they
are replaceable by something that performs the same function as well or
better…however, to find intrinsic value in a work is to appreciate the imaginative
experience it properly affords, which may be beautiful, moving, uplifting,
pleasurable, insightful or profound. But it is the particular nature of the work that
guides our active mental engagement and responses to it. Hence there is
something about the experience of a particular work, if it is intrinsically valuable,
that cannot be replaced by any other.36
The difference between the two, as Kieran argues, is “for something to possess inherent
value it must not only be the means to a valuable end, but also the means must partly
constitute and thus be internal to the ends involved.”37 Kieran suggests “that the primary
value of art concerns the ways in which works enrich how we understand ourselves and
the world.”38 By asserting music is infungible, its value comes from creating a unique
experience where important insights are gained about ourselves (individually and
collectively) and the world, emotionally or otherwise, which is just one example of the
way value is used. My use of the term value not only includes the intrinsic and
instrumental perspectives on the concept but also inherent and utilitarian views as well as
the aspect of evaluation/judgment which in some cases overlaps the aforementioned
terms on value. Music’s intrinsic value is simply one where “any experience enjoyed as
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an end-in-itself or as complete in itself.”39 Intrinsic value is a term occasionally
substituted for inherent value, but like instrumentalism and utilitarianism there are
differences.
Kieran leaves a middle ground between his explanation of the difference between
instrumental value and his description of intrinsic value mentioned above.40 This middle
ground hinges on the word inherent. Beardsley describes inherent value as “the capacity
of aesthetic objects to produce good inherent effects—that is, to produce desirable effects
by means of the aesthetic experience they evoke.”41 In the same section on inherent
value Beardsley argues “aesthetic objects differ from… directly utilitarian objects in that
their immediate function is only to provide a certain kind of experience that can be
enjoyed in itself.”42 Therefore, as I echo Beardsley’s use of instrumentalism, inherent
value inclines toward intrinsic value while still clinging to the basic precepts of
instrumental value theory. Beardsley’s assessment of Clarence Irving Lewis’ An Analysis
of Knowledge and Valuation further clarifies the relationship between intrinsic, inherent,
and instrumental value as a way to delineate the terms.43 Beardsley states,
Note that my term “instrumental value” covers the same ground as his term
“extrinsic value,” but is defined in a more neutral way: where as I say simply that
if Y has value—whether this value is itself intrinsic or instrumental—and X is a
means to Y, then X has instrumental value, Lewis puts into the definition of
“extrinsic value” that the object having it is a means, directly or indirectly, to the
realization of intrinsic value. Lewis holds that only experiences or their qualities
can have intrinsic value; when an object directly, or immediately, causes an
experience having intrinsic value, the extrinsic value of the object is said to be
“inherent”; when an object is a means to the production of an object with inherent
39
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value, its value is said to be “instrumental.” Thus inherent value and instrumental
value are, for Lewis, subdivisions of extrinsic value.44
In addition to the idea of value being connected with intrinsic and/or extrinsic
explanations of why music matters there is another aspect of the domain and that is
evaluation.
Beardsley’s explanation of normative statements are “critical evaluations…that
apply to works of art the words ‘good’ or beautiful,’ their negatives, or other predicates
definable in terms of them.”45 Assessments on the merits of a work either in isolation or
in relation to others are just as important to musical aesthetics as gaining insights about
ourselves. Discussions regarding base music, good music, and great music have existed
at least as far back as the ancient Greeks. And these types of value judgments are made
using informed analysis, but how the judgments are made and the justification for such
assertions are key problems in musical aesthetics—one of the tasks of musical aesthetics
is to generate ideas as to how these types of assessments can be made. Interestingly,
these notions of value also relate to each other. The very act of evaluating tells us
something about our humanity. That we can experience an aesthetic object and provide a
reasoned explanation and engage in dialogue regarding its quality and significance is
uniquely human. The challenge of explaining the distinctions between these notions of
the nature, meaning, and value of music is difficult because these ideas contain many
overlapping characteristics that create a quality of unity.
In terms of unity, assertions regarding the meaning of music in the evidence also
take into account notions of why music matters, just as arguments focusing on music’s
value may result in a better understanding of the characteristics of music. For example,
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though dealing with the arts generally as opposed to music specifically, R.G.
Collingwood in Principles of Art explains the process of imaginative discovery and the
expression of emotion, which lead him to conclude that art is a process of self-discovery
for both creator and percipient.46 While asserting art’s peculiar value Collingwood
concurrently argues that a defining characteristic of art is that it involves emotional
experience. This is similar to both Tolstoy, who, in his What is Art?, argues art is “a
medium for the transmission of feelings” [of the artist] and for Croce who claims art is
intuitive expression.47 In the case of these theorists the value lies in the variety of
insights art provides while each establishes necessary requisites for art. Additional
examples that display the quality of unity are given by Dewey.
Dewey connects the ideas of why art matters with those of interpretation and
comprehension (meaning). For him meaning is connected with experience, and more
specifically in Art as Experience, with “aesthetic experience.”48 Dewey describes the
aesthetic experience as connecting both artist and percipient in an active process of
“doing and undergoing,” involving “outgoing and incoming energy” where there is
“perception organically, sensory satisfaction, external embodiment, and dynamic
organization.”49 Additionally, Dewey asserts “that which distinguishes an experience as
esthetic is conversion of resistance and tensions, of excitations that in themselves are

46

The ideas of self-knowledge and self-discovery in relation to the artist as individual and the
community in which the artist functions are discussed in great detail in chapters thirteen and fourteen of
R.G. Collingwood, Principles of Art (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1938/1960).
47
Stephen Davies, “Definitions of Art,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, eds. Berys Gaut
and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 227-239, 228.
48
Dewey, Art as Experience.
49
Ibid., 50-53, 57.

35
temptations to diversion, into a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close.”50
Furthermore,
In art as an experience, actuality and possibility or ideality, the new and the old,
objective material and personal response, the individual and the universal, surface
and depth, sense and meaning, are integrated in an experience in which they are
all transfigured from the significance that belongs to them when isolated in
reflection.51
Meaning is achieved through experience in the undergoing and doing, and art, therefore,
offers a unique way of experiencing. For Dewey this active process is what makes art
valuable, particularly in the social sphere. Again, each of these examples shows the
quality of unity between nature, value and meaning of art generally, though it is possible
to transpose these ideas to music specifically. Concurrently, these examples show
apparent distinction of how the nature of art can be isolated from its interpretation and
comprehension. And in the discourse of music educators similar threads appear. Rarely
if ever did a music educator address the meaning of music without also addressing its
value, for example. There is unity through distinction.
Defining what music is, for example, has been and undoubtedly will continue to
be an important part of musical aesthetics. However, examining the characteristics of
music is not the only way music has been examined in aesthetics. Therefore, rather than
being focused solely on the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be called
music—its nature— the subsequent chapters also focus on notions of meaning and value.
Taking a wider view of what aesthetics examines—nature, meaning, and value— enables
the nuanced language from the discourse of music educators relating to aesthetics in the
first half of the twentieth century to be better understood. In other words, if leading
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proponents of the conventional view take aesthetics to be consumed with the idea of
articulating necessary and sufficient conditions of music or one version of the
instrumentalist position on value, then their position might make more sense. It would be
a worthwhile endeavor to further research the assumptions present day music education
scholars make about aesthetics. Although research examining the assumptions of present
day music education scholars regarding the discipline of aesthetics might be valuable, it
is not the focus of this work. This dissertation may, however, act as a catalyst for
subsequent analysis of contemporary discourse in music education philosophy.
As a way of showing what is meant by looking beyond the scope of aesthetics just
converging on the nature of art, the work of Collingwood is again a good example.
While Collingwood states emotional experience and imaginative discovery are necessary
and sufficient properties for something to be called art, this point is not the sole aim of his
Principles of Art. For Collingwood, the idea of imaginative discovery and emotional
expression lead to self-discovery and self-knowledge.52 Collingwood’s assertion is more
in line with what is referred to as the cognitivist notion of value rather than with a
necessary and sufficient property of art.53 That is, his assertion is tied more closely to
normative theory than to descriptive or conceptual theory, although he makes arguments
that are appropriate to each group of theories, the emphasis is simply on the normative
side. Therefore, the most appropriate course of action in terms of organization of this
complex field of aesthetics is one which holds that a distinction of its parts is necessary
52
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for the sake of clarity while simultaneously accepting a quality of unity in the relations of
distinct parts.
The parts (nature, meaning, and value) of musical aesthetics, while inextricably
linked with the whole (how we think about and experience music), provide a clear way of
organizing the evidence, which influences the structure of the remainder of the
dissertation. Music’s nature, meaning, and value as seen in the problems and theories of
musical aesthetics discussed by music educators brings into relief the rich, varied,
insightful, and pervasive perspectives of this group. This organizational structure also
allows for key problems and theories to be addressed without having to go into great
detail on every development in the field from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Additionally, it allows for the examination of particular key problems and theories that
focus on music. Finally, this organizational structure acknowledges the basic principles
of musical aesthetics while also recognizing the complexity of the discipline. Proceeding
this way, however, will not be easy since the discipline is “a vaporous, far flung,
quintessence of problems and points of view.” However, in order to carry on there must
be some form of organizing the material so the numerous problems and theories make
sense to both the writer and reader. After all, these scholars who claim that aesthetics is
difficult to define and explain wrote books and papers on the subject that are organized
along the themes those authors found important, which typically are developmental
accounts of specific theories and ideas in time. So, even though Dewey suggests the
abundance of aesthetic philosophies makes it “impossible to give even a résumé of them
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in a chapter,”54 the work marches onward in what I see as one approach to organize the
material that helps answer my question.
While musical aesthetics specifically plays a predominant role in this analysis
because of its explicit connection to music, it cannot be the sole means of coming to a
better understanding of the philosophical discourse in general aesthetics among music
educators in the first half of the twentieth century. So, before elaborating on the various
aesthetic problems and theories that are contained within the tripartite mode of
examination, it must be understood that while musical aesthetics is of primary importance
in my work, it is not exclusive. It would be myopic to assume that the early writers and
thinkers in the field of music education only exposed themselves to scholarly work
specifically relating to music. It is just as likely for these writers and thinkers to have
read general aesthetic theorists like Tolstoy, Santayana, Croce, or Collingwood, and
apply the ideas of these philosophers and their comments on music and the arts as it
would have been for them to have read Hanslick, Busoni, or Adorno. Just as I have
borrowed from Beardsley’s general arguments on aesthetics (with a few examples from
music), these music educators borrowed heavily from general aesthetics and applied the
ideas to their discussion of music and music education. Now that aesthetics has been
explained in general, and a workable definition of musical aesthetics as a way to interpret
music education discourse has been given, we move to the next step. The next part of the
dissertation is a detailed explanation of the substance of each of the categories of musical
aesthetics within the context of aesthetic problems and theories.
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Part II – Problems and Theories in Aesthetics
Morris Weitz argues, “each of the great theories of art –Formalism, Voluntarism,
Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Intuitionism, Organicism—converges on the attempt to
state the defining properties of art.”55 Gordon Graham agrees and states, “philosophical
aesthetics has been concerned with the definition of art, of trying to say what art is, rather
than why it is valuable.”56 Weitz and other critics have pointed out the failure of many
definitions dwelling on necessary and sufficient properties. Such difficulty leads me to
believe there is simply more to understanding art than is able to be accounted for in a
limited definition. That definitions of art fail because of the emphasis on necessary and
sufficient properties of art is really at the heart of what Weitz is doing. My critique of
Weitz, however, is that what he proposes is still largely within the bounds of what is
labeled as philosophical aesthetics. He merely broadened the definition of art to include
nearly everything. 57 Rather than stating how this or that definition is incomplete for the
whole of aesthetics, I look at aesthetics in a way that tries to capture the complexity of the
“far flung, vaporous, quintessence of problems and points of view.” I do not, however,
try to offer my own definition of what art generally, or music specifically, is. Instead the
work in the rest of this section is an examination of how others have defined and
problematized musical aesthetics. I do this to establish a basis on which to judge the
55
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extent to which problems and theories relating to the nature of music are part of the
conversation of music educators. I suggest that studying music education discourse
through the lens of aesthetic problems and theories better captures the variety of
philosophical perspectives of music educators. Problems in aesthetics are necessarily
attached to the various theories that seek to explain the nature, meaning, and value of
music. That is, without the problems there would be no development of theory, and these
music educators were in a position to understand problems inherent to the nature,
meaning, and value of music every bit as much as they were capable of citing a specific
theory and its proponents. One aspect of recognizing problems or theories in musical
aesthetics is in regard to how the necessary and sufficient conditions of music are
examined and explained. Trying to define music creates a number of problems and
numerous theorists provide examples of the characteristics of music.
Explanations and Problems on the Nature of Music
The first domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems and
theories is the nature of music. Key problems are rooted in questions such as what is
music? How is music described? What are its characteristics? It is in this domain that
the aesthetic object is studied and analyzed. Beardsley’s description of analysis involves
“distinguishing, discriminating, and describing in detail…first, what is true of the parts,
and, second, how the parts contribute to the peculiar qualities of the whole.”58 Later in
his chapter Beardsley elaborates on numerous terms that are important for this
investigation since each sheds light on ways in which music educators talked about music
with each other and devise plans to relate the perception of music in practice. The
material below aids in the interpretation of aspects of discourse among music educators
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from 1907 to 1958. The basis of Beardsley’s establishment of categories for aesthetic
analysis is the part-whole relationship. Simply put the parts are the “obvious and
emphatic features, its dominant patterns or qualities”59 that emerge when perceiving the
object, and in combination make up the whole. Subordinate to the fundamental partwhole category of aesthetic analysis are additional categories for further aesthetic
analysis Beardsley calls complexes, elements, local qualities and regional properties
(summative and emergent).60 Although these terms might seem cumbersome at first, they
are helpful when attempting to analyze music aesthetically. These terms are important
points of departure from which the meaningful discourse of music educators is analyzed
in order for teachers of music to more clearly describe what is often considered the most
abstract of the arts, music.
Though not flawless Beardsley’s assertions about the necessary and sufficient
conditions of music, and his application of these and other categories of aesthetic analysis
to music provide a solid framework from which music education discourse can be
examined in the area of the nature of music. The extensive quotation below shows his
application of his notion of part-whole relations specific to music, and these views are
seen—in chapter three—in the discourse of music educators on the nature of music.
Beardsley asserts that
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a musical composition, or auditory design, is a complex event, and its elements
are smaller events, little—though sometimes momentous—changes that are
occurring simultaneously and successively…these changes can be described by
their termini, for a change is always from something to something-from loud to
soft, from low to high, from sweet to harsh. The termini of musical changes are
sounds, and these we shall here regard as the elements of music. Sounds have
many properties, all of which can be of musical significance, but like the
properties of visual areas they are conveniently divided into two groups: basic and
dependent. Every sound has (1) a certain duration, that is, it lasts a certain length
of time, (2) intensity, or degree of loudness and softness, (3) timbre, or quality—
for example, shrillness, smoothness, scratchiness, hoarseness. Some sounds also
have (4) pitch, that is they are high or low; and these sounds are called tones, the
rest noises…Not every random collection of sounds, however, is music—not even
every collection of tones…the essential quality of music…is a special auditory
movement…Certain sounds or sound complexes seem to call for, or point toward,
other sounds to come…The series of sounds fuses into a single process, and
exhibits direction and momentum…When a series of tones becomes a melody it
acquires some further regional qualities that are of the greatest importance in
music. First, it acquires direction: it moves upward or downward or remains
steady, grows louder or softer, and tends toward an implicit goal…And second, it
becomes a whole, in which the parts, without losing their identity, fuse together.
The wholeness of the melody seems to depend upon two other regional qualities,
cadence and contour.61
Beardsley goes on to explain rhythm and tonality, and describes harmony as “two or
more tones sounded together: the resulting chord fuses into a whole with a quality of its
own.62 He discusses many other related points in detail, but I think the point has been
made that his explanations include many of the necessary and sufficient conditions of
music and are foundational to any meaningful basic aesthetic analysis.
Beyond the basic categories of aesthetic analysis outlined by Beardsley that
pertain to the nature of music are the more sophisticated concepts of form, structure, and
texture, and the relations between them. These terms make up the last points in this
section relating to the nature of music. While texture is “anything going on at a given
moment that can be described in terms of relations among the nearby parts,” structure is
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“classified by reference to the number of their main parts, or sections,” and it is here
Beardsley begins to highlight some problems that surface with this understanding as well
as the problem that emerges from the relation between form and structure.63 First, “what
constitutes a section, or main part, or a musical composition?”64 Second, “can either
[texture and/or structure] occur without the other?”65 But the most important problems
deal with what Beardsley calls kinetic pattern and musical expectation.66 Kinetic pattern
is “the pattern of variation in its propulsion, or intensity of movement,” and he relates
these ideas to the “regional qualities of the musical process.”67 For Beardsley musical
expectation is divided into two parts, and the first of these parts is tied to the subjective
listener. The first part of musical expectation is explained as an experience in which “the
listener’s feelings are constantly guided and aroused.”68 The second part is more
intellectually focused and “based on generalizations from past experience of certain types
of music.”69 And with each of the aforementioned parts, the important problem that
emerges, and one debated by philosophers, musicians, and music educators for hundreds
of years, is “what is it that arouses our expectations about music?”70 The answers to
these problems are given by a number of philosophers espousing this theory or that, but
these will be addressed in a subsequent section. For now the last item to determine is
form.
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Beardsley uses the term form, again, in two ways. The first way he uses the terms
is to make a distinction between aesthetic objects, and in using it in this manner he
acknowledges there is “a distinction between its form and its other aspects,” which causes
problems. For example, “can form be separated from content? Is the form of an aesthetic
object more, or less, important than its content, or its meaning?”71 The second way he
uses form is as a way of asking “how well formed it is.”72 And it is with this latter
designation he sees the ideas of complexes, elements, and regional qualities as being
categories converging in the concept of unity, which is the term Beardsley substitutes for
this second notion of form.73 Beardsley asserts that
When we speak of the unity of an aesthetic object, or say that one object is more
or less unified than another, we mean to refer to a quality that different objects
can possess in different degrees…we could say that an object has organic unity if
and only if it is a complex – in other words, reserve “organic unity” for unity that
is a regional quality…In critical discourse, we are not concerned with the unity
possessed by elements of aesthetic objects, but only of complexes; in this context
unity, if it is a quality at all, will always be a regional quality.74
Discussions focusing on determining whether one piece of music is more unified than
another based on the regional properties of melody, harmony, rhythm, and tonality and
the concept of kinetic pattern, and of these relations in the complex are the basis of what
happened in harmony and theory classes like those outlined by Thomas Tapper and put
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into practice by Brock McElheran.75 A related problem is “what makes a group of
movements, as in a sonata or suite, constitute a coherent whole?”76 Though by no means
an exhaustive list of all categories of analysis or list of problems, these introductory
statements are a good starting point from which to examine music education discourse
from 1907 to 1958 relating to the first area of aesthetic enquiry, the nature of music. The
following section under the category of the nature of music shows various aesthetic
theories and their attempts at working through these specific types of problems in musical
aesthetics.
Theories on the Nature of Music
The material for this section comes largely from Weitz’s essay titled “The Role of
Theory in Aesthetics” and his book Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of
Readings.77 Other material is based on selections from The Routledge Companion to
Aesthetics edited by Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, Lippman’s A History of
Western Musical Aesthetics, and Bowman’s Philosophical Perspectives on Music, as well
as a few other sources.78 As mentioned above Weitz’s purpose in his essay is to critique
“each of the great theories of art,” with the aim of opening up the concept of art rather
than relying on restrictive definitions that limit what art can be. His critique provides the
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names of the leading proponents of each theory as well as concise and appropriate
definitions for “Formalism, Voluntarism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Intuitionism,
[and] Organicism.”79 Prior to the more modern “great theories” listed by Weitz,
however, were definitions proposed by Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. The descriptions of
art given by these ancient thinkers served as a foundation for the field of aesthetics.
Furthermore, although the work of these authors is far removed from the period covered
in this dissertation, it is difficult to locate modern discussions that neglect to mention
their descriptions or fail to critique their ideas, in fact, music educators of the period were
no strangers to these classical thinkers, even citing them on a number of occasions.
Because music educators made use of the work of classical thinkers a brief overview of
the perspectives of these forerunners of modern aesthetic thought are mentioned below
before getting to the other theories listed by Weitz.
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Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus give descriptions of art that are metaphysical and
“all three are deeply concerned with art as imitation.”80 For Plato, art is imitation of an
ideal form, which to him is real. But the artistic object, according to Plato, is twice
removed from the ideal/real form. For Plato the artist relies on secondary mimesis. In
other words the artist imitates a representation of the form made physical, such as a chair.
Plato’s idea of form is more problematic for music than the visual arts, but according to
Plato in his Laws, music is mimetic for the good.81 Frederick Copleston argues “that to
make music imitative implies a widening of imitation to include symbolism.”82 Similar
to Plato, Aristotle argues, art “like natural objects in general, embodies universals or
Forms, it is not…metaphysically suspect, but a revelation of reality.”83 Copleston relates
Aristotle’s theory to music by suggesting Aristotle believes “musical tunes contain in
themselves imitations of moral moods.”84 Aristotle’s version of mimesis differs from the
Platonic view because he does not see the mimesis as twice or thrice removed but rather
as manifested in the art form itself. Last, Weitz suggests art for Plotinus
is one aspect of the truly Real, which is also the truly Beautiful. It is the
embodiment of the One in the materials of this world, engendered by the activity
of the artist’s soul. Indeed, art is more real than the natural object it may
represent because of this participation in it of the artist’s soul.85
Traces of the definitions of art proposed by these three ancient philosophers are seen in
the more modern theories of expressivism and German idealism. Descriptions of the
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modern theories and how each defines the nature of art, and by extension, music are also
intriguing.
Formalism is the first theory addressed by Weitz in his essay “The Role of Theory
in Aesthetics.” He relies on the work of Clive Bell and Roger Fry to assert “its defining
property is significant form, i.e. certain properties of lines, colors, shapes, volumes—
everything on the canvas except the representational elements—which evokes a unique
response to such combinations.”86 Weitz continues by suggesting “the nature of art, what
it really is, so their theory goes, is a unique combination of certain elements…in their
relations.”87 Rather than writing about the visual arts, which is what Bell and Fry did,
Eduard Hanslick wrote about music and is the prototypical formalist on the topic.
Hanslick’s On the Musically Beautiful is seminal in the field of music.88 The importance
of his work for the field of music and aesthetics is due to his assertion that music is
beautiful in and of itself, descriptions and definitions of music ought to focus only on the
essence of music, nothing outside the music itself. His ideas are the basis of the notion of
music for music’s sake. He argues the beauty of a musical composition is
a specifically musical kind of beauty. By this we understand a beauty that is selfcontained and in no need of content from outside itself, that consists simply and
solely of tones and their artistic combination. Relationships, fraught with
significance, of sounds which are in themselves charming—their congruity and
opposition, their separating and combining, their soaring and subsiding—this is
what comes in spontaneous forms before our inner contemplation and pleases us
as beautiful…a musical idea brought into complete manifestation in appearance is
already self-subsistent beauty; it is an end in itself, and it is in no way primarily a
medium or material for the representation of feelings or conceptions.89
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The overlap with meaning and value is apparent in the above explanations. In
terms of meaning, musical analysis is self-contained and is defined more easily in
negative terms. That is, instead of stating what formalism is, it is more convenient to
argue what it is not. According to the formalist music is not analogous to language,
politics, or feelings. Relying on the work of Moritz Lazurus, Edward Lippman writes
music cannot represent a conceptual content…nor is it an imitative art since it
cannot properly be directed to the imitation of natural sounds. Even definite
feelings and affections…cannot really be represented by it. In short, music can
represent nothing other than itself, that is, measured tones in relations that are
beautiful.90
It follows, then, that in connection with the category of value the formalist argues it is
intrinsic. R.A. Sharpe asserts “a formalist is somebody who thinks that the value of
music lies in its formal properties of design and line and not in its expressive
capacity…what matters is beauty and that beauty is a matter of form.”91 The linking of
formalism’s nature with its meaning and value returns us to the basic idea that it “is a
view of music that finds the distinguishing or most significant aspects of the art to be its
form, the property in fact, that defines its essential nature.”92 The formalist’s notions of
the nature of music are different from the so-called emotionalist.
Emotionalism, according to Weitz, is a theory where art is not to be defined by its
“significant form but rather the expression of emotion in some sensuous medium.”93
Emotionalism is also referred to as Expressivism, which is the word used in the
remainder of the dissertation. Gordon Graham, who like Weitz cites Tolstoy as the
prototypical emotionalist/expressivist, defines the latter term as the view that art “is
90
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essentially a form of expression, and what is more, the expression of feeling.”94 This is
to say “that artists are people inspired by emotional experiences, who use their skill…to
embody their emotions in a work of art, with a view to stimulating the same emotion in
an audience.”95 The theory of emotionalism sees meaning and value in the emotional
experience and the act of expressing and reacting. The problems associated with
emotionalism as well as intuitionism, in relation to the meaning of music, are mentioned
in the section below.
The term expressivism as defined by Graham also contains ideas of what Weitz
calls Intuitionism—the next term defined in this section. Weitz says
Art is identified not with some physical, public object but with a specific creative,
cognitive and spiritual act. Art is really a first stage of knowledge in which
human beings (artists) bring their images and intuitions into lyrical clarification or
expression. As such, it is an awareness, non-conceptual in character, of the
unique individuality of things; and since it exists below the level of
conceptualization or action, it is without scientific or moral content.96
The similarity between the terms expressivism and intuitionism is based on Graham’s
quoting of Croce’s Guide to Aesthetics, originally published in 1920. Graham describes
Croce’s argument that art is intuition by stating “what lends coherence and unity to
intuition is intense feeling. Intuition is truly such because it expresses an intense feeling
and can arise only when the latter is its source and base.”97 Beardsley suggests “in
intuition we are in direct communion with the object; since our grasp of it is not mediated
by symbolic devices, intuitive knowledge is ineffable, and conveyable, if at all, only be
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nonverbal aesthetic objects.”98 According to Croce, intuition and feeling are bound to
each other, which is why I believe Graham combines the ideas Weitz views as distinct,
namely the latter’s understanding of emotionalism and intuitionism. Expressivism and
intuitionism are also similar in that each position asserts art’s non-conceptual character.99
The difference between Weitz’s emotionalism and Graham’s expressivism is located in
the distinction Graham makes between “being an expression of and being expressive
of.”100 He argues that
Where a specific emotion can be assigned to a work of art, the work is an
expression of that emotion and appreciation of the work consists in feeling that
emotion itself. If now we say that the work is not an expression of, but rather is
expressive of, the emotion, appreciating would seem to consist in being brought to
a heightened awareness of that emotion. However, this does not involve
undergoing any element of that emotion.101
The language of expression and expressive is common among music educators discussing
music’s relation to feeling, which is seen in chapter four. Another important perspective
on expressivism is the thought of Dewey.
Dewey’s view put forth in Art as Experience bears mentioning not only because
this book was published in the midst of the years covered in this study but also due to the
fact he was a leading philosopher working in the United States whose writings had
received attention in the field of education. For Dewey
What has been said in general about the power of an art to take a natural, raw
material and convert it, through selection and organization, into an intensified and
concentrated medium of building up an experience, applies with particular force
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to music. Through the use of instruments, sound is freed from the definiteness it
has acquired through association with speech. It thus reverts to its primitive
passional quality. It achieves generality, detachment from particular objects and
events. At the same time, the organization of sound effected through the
multitude of means at the command of the artist…deprives sound of its usual
immediate tendency to stimulate a particular overt action. Responses become
internal and implicit, thus enriching the content of perception instead of being
dispersed in overt discharge.102
So, for Dewey a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be called music is
for it to be a particular kind of experience, more specifically, an aesthetic experience,
which is privileged over the aesthetic object. The aesthetic object is simply “the product
of an interaction between the living organism and its environment, an undergoing and a
doing which involves a reorganization of energies, actions and materials.”103 The next
theory on the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be called art is from
the Organicist.
Organicism, according to Weitz, is the view that “art is in its nature a unique
complex of interrelated parts,”104 which is akin to Beardsley’s description’s of the
necessary and sufficient elements included in his description of music seen above. Since
much of this theory was alluded to earlier in the chapter it is hardly necessary to develop
the ideas further here.105
The last example Weitz gives is of Voluntarism. The leading proponent of this
definition of art is Dewitt Parker.106 Weitz paraphrases Parker’s theory defining art as the
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“embodiement of wishes and desires imaginatively satisfied, language, which
characterizes the public medium of art, and harmony, which unifies the language with
layers of imaginative projections.”107 The definition of Voluntarism brings to an end the
list of Weitz’s “great theories of art.” Beyond the “great theories” listed by Weitz are a
few additional theories that Lippman and others mention which specifically have to do
both with the general field of aesthetics and musical aesthetics.
Idealism, which has its roots in Platonic thought, is transformed in the late
eighteenth and through the nineteenth century by German thinkers such as Kant, Hegel,
Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Schiller where it becomes German idealism. Although
each thinker represents a particular strand of idealism, the similarity of each rests, like
Plato, on metaphysical descriptions of art. It is not necessary here and there is not the
space in this dissertation to explain the differences, for example, of the critical idealism
of Kant and the transcendental idealism of Schopenhauer. What is important, however, is
to locate similarities among these thinkers in terms of their discourse on aesthetics, more
specifically, musical aesthetics. Dale Jacquette asserts the similarity among
Schopenhauer, Schiller, and Schelling “is a commitment to the problem set by Kant of
trying to reconcile the fundamental opposition between freedom and necessity.”108 He
continues by suggesting there are two levels of this struggle. The first is the “will
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struggling tragically or heroically against the forces of moral and political authority,
social conformity and the regimentation of artistic styles in the world of art.”109 The
second is metaphysical. Here Jacquette argues “it is the same battle for the supremacy of
the human spirit and its sense of freedom in conflict with the necessity of natural forces
represented by the rigidity of natural scientific law.”110 The ideas Jacquette describes
lead to a description of art, specifically music, then, as an idea. In more sophisticated
terms, Bowman says “idealism often attributes to music extraordinary significance as a
surrogate for something beyond its own phenomenal existence.”111 Because of music’s
alleged surrogate nature, the task of these nineteenth century idealists was to “wrestle
with music’s ephemeral, felt nature, seeking to explain how such ephemerality relates to
the realm of ideas, and to show how music differs from the baser, sensory experience in
which it obviously originates.”112 Last, Bowman writes that music to the idealists is
at once autonomous and heteronomous; important for what it is and for what it
reveals; expressive without expressing anything definite; feelingful, yet not
concerned with feelings-felt. Music is not a referential or representational affair,
yet it affords intuitions or insights of profound transcendental significance. Music
is at once an end in itself and a means to spiritual elevation, at once fundamentally
mindful and fundamentally felt.113
The idealist is someone who sees importance in the extramusical, such as morality, while
also looking to intramusical elements, such as the mindful construction of harmonic
phrases.
The next theory on the nature of music is Symbolism, which has similar features
with idealism. Beardsley, who lumps symbolism and semiotics together under the term
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signification theory, says the significationist argues “music is an iconic sign of a
psychological process. It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does
so by presenting auditory equivalents to some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”114
Bowman, who argues that symbolism has similar characteristics to idealism because of
its emphasis on the thoughtful and feelingful, explains the theory as one where music
signifies, inclines toward, and/or refers or represents something extramusical.115 Leading
thinkers on symbolism/semiotics/significationism, are Ernst Cassirer, Charles Peirce, and
Ferdinand de Saussure, with the work of Cassirer having significant influence on Susanne
Langer who specifically addresses and spends much time on the topic of music. Because
of Langer’s influence on the philosophy of music education, which is described in the
forthcoming section of this chapter, her take on symbolism is of particular importance.
For Langer, music is a symbol which is “non-discursive or presentational,” and
“unconsummated.”116 To put it another way, music is symbolic not for how we think
linguistically but rather as insight into “how feelings go.”117 Additionally, music is
“unconventionalized, unverbalized freedom of thought.”118 For her, “we cannot know
the world as it ‘really’ is…only those aspects that get refracted for us by symbols and are
114
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thus rendered conceivable.”119 In Langer’s view music has a very important function for
humankind because of its symbolic presentation. Not all, particularly the next group of
theorists called the Objectivists, agree with the perspective of
symbolism/semiotics/significationism.
Lippman argues the objectivists “examined music in its own right, seeking a
rationale for the musical work without looking beyond the music into any attendant
circumstances or extramusical influences. He continues by suggesting the disagreements
between symbolism/semiotics/significationism contrasted with those of objectivism, a
formalist legacy.120 Two well known thinkers on objectivity in musical aesthetics are
Heinrich Schenker and Ferruccio Busoni. In relating the work of Schenker, Lippman
writes
Schenker takes issue in particular with Schopenhauer’s claim that the composer
reveals the innermost core of the world. What he really reveals is the organic and
absolute nature of the life of tone. The intrinsic laws of tone are like the laws of
the cosmos: they rest on only a few fundamental forces.
Like Schenker, Busoni argues “representation and description are not the nature of music;
herewith we declare the invalidity of program-music.”121 Later he says of music “let it be
pure invention and sentiment, in harmonies, in forms, in tone-colors.”122 Lippman claims
for the theorists of objectivity that there was an emphasis on “simplicity… forms, styles,
and stylistic features of the past…Simplicity in itself somehow fosters musical
objectivity, which is thus connected with both historicism and the social motive of
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accessibility.”123 His latter statement on simplicity is pertinent because the objectivity of
Busoni and other thinkers of the so-called Young Classicist and “Neue Sachlichkeit (new
objectivity, new matter-of-factness)”124 movements were in relation to tradition.
Busoni senses the new trends in music happening in the early twentieth century
and, according to Lippman, writes about “artists that cling to the tradition that is currently
in favor and those who seek to free themselves from it.”125 One indication from Busoni
on what Lippman is trying to express in relation to tradition comes from a letter to
Busoni’s son Raffaello on June 18, 1921. In it Busoni writes “every recent or new
means, should it be capable of expressing something which cannot be expressed in any
other way, ought to be adopted and employed; intentional disdain of effective new
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achievements strikes me as unreasonable and impoverished.”126 At the same time, in
explaining his doctrine of Young Classicity as related by both Lippman and Della
Couling in Ferrucio Busoni “A Musical Ishmael,” Busoni calls for
a return to what he conceived to be the true purpose of music: a return to
harmony, to melody, to “the most highly developed (not the most complicated)
polyphony,” and away from what is “sensuous,” music as description, not
“profundity and personal feelings and metaphysics, but Music which is absolute,
distilled, and never under a mask of figures and ideas which are borrowed from
other spheres.” He certainly did not mean by this a return to the styles of the past,
but faithfulness to what he conceived as the higher purpose of music, “the
conclusion of previous experiments.”127
This material on Busoni’s Young Classicality says two things. First, the doctrine of
Young Classicality is connected with the tradition of Hanslick’s formalism, which is
evidenced by Philip Stoltzfus, who asserts, “Busoni helped renew scholarly interest in
Hanslick and Mozart.”128 This connection between Busoni’s philosophical position and
formalism reinforces Hanslick’s influence in the twentieth century. Second, the Young
Classicist and Neue Sachlichkeit movements, as elucidated by Erich Dolflein, who was a
critic of the time and participant in the Neue Sachlichkeit movements, led to another type
of objectivity.129 What Dolflein suggests in his “Die Neue Musik des Jahres” in 1926, as
cited by Lippman, is “along with this acquisition of a self-evident quality and a relaxation
into objectivity and playfulness, the public of modern music has fundamentally
changed.”130 Lippman correctly takes Dolflein’s idea to mean “there was a change in the
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social situation of music.”131 Reinforcing the change Dolflein proposes in the situation of
music and aesthetics at the time, Lippman includes another excerpt from Dolflein’s
article in Melos titled “Über Grundlagen der Beurteilung Gegenwärtiger Musik” in 1928.
Here Dolflein argues
this orientation to use and the style connected with the use is the real outcome of
the Neue Sachlichkeit….Thus a closer tie of music to the human being and to
human beings among one another in their relation to music, a human resolution,
was yielded by the idea of objectivity.132
Lippman’s analysis of Dolflein’s writings shows the connection of a social component to
music.133 What happens historically and philosophically, suggests Lippman, is the
“social influence and social explanation [of Neue Sachlichkeit] are replaced here by
social interpretation and by an incisive criticism of the social order.”134 The
philosophical transformation of objectivism now focusing on social critique, called
socioaesthetics here, is exemplified by Theodor Adorno.135
Socioaesthetics is tied to objectivism by Lippman. Furthermore, because of the
theory’s connection with modernism and its examination of the relation of society and
music, a natural association existed for music educators to discuss. Marxist views on
music of the time also resemble the place of music in society. Adorno, one of the leading
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philosophers on musical aesthetics in the twentieth century, wrote a number of works in
the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s on topics covering aesthetics and music’s relation to
society.136 Discussions regarding socioaesthetic and/or Marxist themes taken up by
music educators with the aim of influencing practice were limited. As a theory, however,
it shares some basic tenets with modernism (a topic mentioned in music education
discourse), which brings the conversations about contemporary music into clearer
focus.137 Music educators occasionally explored socioaesthetic concepts and even
brought some of them to the attention of other conference members. More specifically,
in the words of Lippman interpreting Adorno, the socioaesthetic perspective is one where
“music reflects society.”138 Furthermore, and elaborating on the Marxist perspective,
Beardsley argues the “Principle of Nonneutrality…is the statement that every aesthetic
object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency to promote, or to
interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.”139 The notion of
reflecting society is a bit simplistic which is why Hamilton rejects Lippman’s claim
regarding Adorno’s work. Instead, Hamilton argues that Adorno thinks “music is not
136
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simply a reflection of society, and so he does not subordinate aesthetic values to social
and economic ones as classical Marxism does.”140 To Hamilton, Adorno saw music as an
important component of society, not merely a reflection of it. Hamilton’s assessment is
closer to Adorno’s definition of art, which is “concentrated social substance.”141 As such
it “contains within itself the contradictions of social reality. Its material is a sediment of
social relations and is ‘historical through and through.’”142 According to this view, art is
very much an embedded part of social relations and the historical process and as such
occupies an interesting position. First, in relation to the social nature of art Hamilton
cites directly from Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory:
Art…is social not only because of its mode of production…not simply because of
the social derivation of its thematic material. Much more importantly, art
becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as
autonomous art. By crystallising in itself as something unique to itself, rather
than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as ‘socially useful’, it
criticises society by merely existing…through its refusal of society, which is
equivalent to sublimation through the law of form, autonomous art makes itself a
vehicle of ideology.143
Second, Wayne Bowman points out the relation between modern music and its social
context in the philosophy of Adorno:
Truly “modern” music has the capacity to undermine the sense of organic
wholeness that lulls people into the false belief that all is well. Thus though
music often functions ideologically, it can also function redemptively. It may
function as an instrument of propaganda or as a bearer of truth. Music can sever
the status quo, but it can also resist it…music in modern society is situated
between two dialectically opposite poles: as commodity, it perpetuates false
consciousness; as social critique, it subverts ideology and serves authentic
consciousness…it is capable of revealing with utmost clarity “the contradictions
and flaws which cut through present-day society”…because music is itself a
social fact, it cannot directly resolve the problem of its own alienation. The most
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it can do is “portray within its own structure the social antinomies which are also
responsible for its own isolation.”144
Since art is part of the historical process in the view of theorists of socioaesthetics
and in terms of philosophical aesthetics, music is both social critique and social force.
From Socioaesthetics and Objectivism to Formalism, Idealism, and Expressivism
the many theories in aesthetics and musical aesthetics presented here each posit a unique
definition of art and/or music. Whether a necessary and sufficient condition for
something to be called art or music is intuition, experience, or idea, it is clear that what
music is is an actively debated topic now and in the history of musical aesthetics.
Another contested area in musical aesthetics is explanations and problems on
Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension.
Explanations and Problems on Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension/Revelation
The second domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems
and theories in musical aesthetics is the meaning of music—how music is comprehended,
interpreted, and what is revealed by music. The idea of meaning is approached in part by
analysis of the relations between composer, musical work, and the percipient as well as,
depending on the theory, each of these independently. Generally, key problems are
rooted in questions such as “does music have a meaning, in some noteworthy sense? If
so, how do we know what that meaning is?”145 More specifically, other key questions
generate debate by asking if we are to comprehend and interpret music for its alleged
expression of emotion; how it may represent an external idea or symbol, or; are we only
able to analyze the structural form of the composition? One of the most familiar
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problems of musical aesthetics falls in this domain, the problem of music as a language,
and/or its relation to words. It is in the category of meaning where uncovering of the
artistic process by examining the musical work and our response (interpretation and
comprehension) to it is central.
Beardsley’s notions of meaning are divided in ways where interpretation and
comprehension may be informed by the composer, composition, and listener individually
and/or collectively. In this section, however, problems are combined with theories to
show how the theories address the problems. The two main groups of theories are
expressionist and significationist, which he writes about with the purpose of proving each
is false while admitting “a large part of discourse about music consists of just such
statements.”146 These theories give insight to musical meaning and interpretation, and
from a philosophical standpoint they lead only to further speculation. The arguments that
take place among the theorists espousing one theory over another, for example the
formalist versus the expressivist, are some of the most charged in musical aesthetics
because meaning necessarily involves interaction between subject and object. Beardsley
writes
When descriptions are put into the form of descriptions, they back up their claims
by the music itself, and they lead attention to the music. When they are put in the
form of statements about signification they lead away from the music, very often
either into biographical internationalism disguised as musicological expertness or
affective free-associationism disguised as semiotical profundity.147
The difficulty given above might be one reason the proponents of MEAE have
had such a difficult time trying give direction to the movement let alone justify music’s
place in the curriculum. This is because the debates, although fruitful and healthy for the
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field, led to no certain philosophical conclusions of meaning and understanding in all
instances of music. Good cases have been and will continually be made arguing the
position of expressivism over formalism, or for some middle ground between the two, but
for now the problem of definitive and certain meaning in all music continues to beguile
the field. Furthermore, the debate between expressivism and formalism is just one
element of aesthetic discourse, and as I suggested earlier, this is a reason to more
thoroughly examine the discourse of the first half of the twentieth century through the
lens of a more complete definition of musical aesthetics. These arguments over the
meaning and comprehension of music have existed in musical aesthetics since the
beginning of the discipline and continue in the field of music education today. My work
establishes that the period from 1907 to 1958 was not a philosophically barren place but
rather one where musical aesthetics and its accompanying problems and theories were
being actively discussed and meaning is one area where there was little concensus.
Therefore, even though Beardsley attempts to dismiss the expressive and signification
theories, the debates that occurred surrounding these two leading theories generated
important progress in both musical aesthetics and music education of the period,
especially in relation to notions of the language of music.148
Expressive theories in musical aesthetics advance the idea that the music is
expressive of some quality, emotion, or feeling. Again, it is not the explicit task here to
critique or to prove this or that of the various theories within this category as false but
rather to show, with the aim of better understanding, how expressivism explains meaning
in music or presents a problem for aesthetics. Beardsley asserts that expressive theories
148
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are explained using the formula “X expresses Y, where X is the musical work, or some
part of it, and Y is a psychological state or quality.”149 Theorists who support
expressivism deal with problems that relate to examining how a piece of music expresses
the composer’s state of mind, the state of mind of the percipient, or some combination of
the two in relation to the music.150 For example, how was the composer’s supposed state
of melancholy at the time of the composition of the piece shown in the work? Or, is the
composition, as a whole or at least in part, written to evoke melancholy in the listener?
Beardsley suggests the heart of the expressivist theory espouses the embodiment or
objectification of emotion rather than a mere venting of emotion.151 According to him
the notions of “embodied” and “objectified” as explained by an expressivist using the
first sentence below are as follows:
“The composer has objectified (embodied, expressed) joy in his scherzo” means
“(1) he has been moved by a feeling of joy to compose the scherzo; (2) he has
given the scherzo a joyful quality; and (3) the scherzo has the capacity to give him
the same feeling of joy when he hears it again, and consequently to give it to the
listeners, too.”152
Even if the composer could embody or express the emotion of joy in music, problems
arise with the standpoint of the listener to comprehend the so called joy. Additionally,
the subjective quality of the interpretation creates difficulties in determining whether it is
joy, delight, contentment, or serenity. However, Beardsley goes on to argue that
expressivism points to “an important fact about music—namely, that it has human
regional qualities.”153 These human regional qualities are in relation to the idea of
regional qualities mentioned above. According to Beardsley, there is similarity “to
149
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qualities of human behavior, especially to mental states and processes: somberness,
serenity, frolicsomeness, determination, calm, voluptuousness, [and] indecisiveness.”154
So, distinguishing between what music allegedly expresses and what it means is an
extremely difficult task.
The second theory for examination is signification. In the two decades
surrounding the center of the twentieth century there was much attention being given to
the work of Langer’s Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite
and Art.155 Her ideas in Philosophy in a New Key and the follow-up work Feeling and
Form are integral components in the writings of such leading lights of the MEAE
movement as Reimer.156 Her work is also cited in Basic Concepts and Foundations and
Principles of Music Education. As mentioned in the previous chapter Basic Concepts
and Foundations and Principles are credited by contemporary music education historians
and philosophers as launching the MEAE movement. In these works, especially the
latter, there is an emphasis on expressivism and signification a la Langer.157 The
attention she as a significationist and the expressivists have received is important and
justifiable. This attention, however, has limited the degree to which aesthetics in music
154
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education is seen as anything other than the reification of the phrases “music is the tonal
analogue of emotive life”158 or music as “non-discursive symbolism.”159 Dwelling on
this single facet of aesthetic discourse has limited the understanding of how aesthetics
was, and might currently be, used in music education practice. Regardless of whether
one agrees or disagrees with signification theory, these ideas are important developments
in the philosophical discourse in music education. But, again, her theories and
signification are just one aspect of aesthetic discourse.
Signification theory posits that “music does have a referential relation to things
outside itself, and [significationists] propose to analyze this relation in semiotic terms,
that is, using the concept of sign.”160 Beardsley separates this group of theorists from
expressivists because, in his words, “signification theorists set aside the venting and the
evoking of emotions as not properly a matter of meaning at all,” furthermore, “they do
not think statements about musical meaning can be reduced to descriptions.”161 More
precisely, “music is an iconic sign of psychological processes. It ‘articulates’ or
‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does so by presenting auditory equivalents of
some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”162 This theory, Beardsley argues, rests on
the following propositions: “(1) A musical composition can be iconic with a
psychological process, that is, it can be similar to such a process in an important way. (2)
By virtue of its iconicity, the composition is a sign of the psychological process.”163 He
also says that music shares similar aspects to what has been previously referred to as
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“kinetic patterns” or “kinetic qualities.” That is, there can be overlap between such
musical and mental features as “tempo, variations of intensity, impulsiveness, relaxation,
and tension, crescendo and diminuendo.”164 For Langer, meaning in music is “as a
formulation and representation of emotions, moods, and mental tensions and
resolutions—a ‘logical picture’ of sentient, responsive life and a source of insight into
it.”165 Furthermore, Lippman writes that Langer asserts “the content of music is
symbolized, and what it invites is not emotional response but insight.”166 Also in relation
to signification theory in terms of meaning, interpretation, and revelation Bowman asserts
What music does…is enable conception. This act of coherence making is…the
common foundation of thought and music; this achievement of coherence, not the
logical operations by which it is subsequently manipulated and ordered is the root
of humankind’s distinctive mental power. In other words, thought and music are
each ways—albeit contrasting ways—of ‘transforming reality symbolically’.167
But, although plausible and defensible, signification, like expressivism, generates the
challenge of specifically determining if the accurate meaning is derived through the so
called sign. Here Beardsley uses an example: “One chair may be exactly like another,
but that does not make it signify the other.”168 For him, “we cannot decide among the
innumerable possible qualities, so that if the music is a sign at all, it is ambiguous.”169
Whether we accept or reject signification theory is not the issue. The point of the brief
explanation of the theory, and its merits and defects, is that it shows a way of seeing the
discourse of music educators presenting, elaborating on, and possibly defending an
important theory in aesthetics. However, making the historically developmental
164
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associations and connections from the conclusions drawn in this dissertation to
contemporary music education philosophy and musical aesthetics is not what is
undertaken in this work. Links between the past and present can be topics of further
study, especially in relation to the next problem in musical aesthetics, the relation of
music to words and/or language.
This section on the relation of music to words and/or language has three main
components. The first two, music’s uses of words in song and the idea of program music,
are talked about by Beardsley, and the third, the relation of linguistic structure and
musical structure, is addressed by Scruton from The Aesthetics of Music.170 Beardsley
poses two questions on the relation of words and music: “How is music related to the
sound of the words? And how is music related to the sense of the words?”171 For him
these questions are superseded by the problem of “the connection between the sound of
the music and the meaning of the words.”172 Regarding the first two problems Beardsley
presents what he calls Fusion Theory as way to see the degree to which music and words
might be associated. For Beardsley, Fusion Theory rests on the principle that
A musical passage is coherent with—appropriate to—a verbal discourse sung to it
if it has some fairly intense human regional qualities that are either qualities
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designated by the words or qualities of the events or situation described by the
words.173
With this theory the reader can most likely remember his or her beginning chorus teacher
instructing the group on calmly singing a lullaby or giving an enthusiastic rendition of
Happy Birthday. In relation to the idea of word meaning and musical sound the issue is
complex because in program music the composition “depends on its own musical unity
and continuity upon purely musical relations among its parts: it calls for development,
for recapitulations, for variations or thematic combination.”174 On the other hand a story
follows a path which is not necessarily similar, and it must achieve other aims such as
“character-development and conflict resolution.”175 Although the problem above of word
meaning in relation to musical sound begs the question to an extent, Beardsley’s assertion
“where the music is large and symphonic, and the story must be recalled from an earlier
reading that has no perceptible connection with the music itself, the correspondence of
music to words will probably remain a mere correspondence”176 is warrantable. His
argument is justified based on the main problems related to meaning and interpretation
given at the outset of this section, namely how can we be certain that intentionally and
particularly organized musical sounds mean something such as farm, flying, fantastic, or
furor. Showing specific relations between words and music is a common but suspect
practice by aestheticians and some music educators. Another relationship, no less
common or suspect, was presented by aestheticians and music educators who argued that
organized sound had a closer association with language.
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The notion of music as a language is based upon the ideas that music and stories
do have special structures. And it is within this idea of structure that Scruton analyzes
the similarity between the structure of music and the structure of language and linguistic
and musical rules. But while analyzing and comparing the structure of each may give
some clues about how we might begin the process of interpretation, where does it leave
us regarding insights into meaning? Attempting to move closer toward solving the
music-as-a-language problem, Scruton examines what language is and the elements that
make it work. For him “language is essentially an information-carrying medium,
intelligible in principle to every rational being, and governed by rules which organize a
finite vocabulary into a potential infinity of sentences.”177 Though music does not
contain rules in relation to parts of speech, is there something about music’s structure that
enables us to display our humanness? Can music convey information the way language
does?178 Scruton uses the linguistic terminology of syntax and semantics for the purpose
of discovering whether music shares the qualities embodied by these terms.179 Scruton
writes,
Our sense of musical syntax is not of a step-by-step substitution of syntactically
equivalent components, but of context-dependent affinity between tones. Certain
elements belong together, even when separated by intervening material—like the
dominant and the tonic chords in a lengthy cadence.180
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Taking a cue from signification theory in relation to semantics, Scruton seeks another
possible solution to music as a language problem. He suggests,
We could use the linguistic analogy to cast light on the meaning of music,
therefore, only if we could also think of music in the same structural terms—in
other words, only if we could envisage the meaning of any piece of music as in
some way composed from the meanings of its elements. We should need some
musical equivalent of a vocabulary—phrases, harmonies, progressions, and so on
with a fixed and repeatable significance, whose contributions to the meaning of
any musical whole is, if not exactly rule-governed, at least regular and
predictable.181
As will be seen in chapter four, music educators of the time also debated the kind of
vocabulary or parts of speech music contained and what a parallel with language might
mean for the instruction of students. Examples of the music to language comparison
occurred when classes dissected a composition in a theory or music appreciation class as
well as when instructors helped a choir attempt to capture the essence of a piece for a
performance. Between the concepts of syntax, semantics, and structure there exists a
number of ways music educators associated language and music.
The problems of meaning as presented in this section are numerous and complex
and are only part of the field of musical aesthetics. Problems such as deciding if and how
compositions can be comprehended and interpreted according to theories provided by
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significationists or expressivists are compounded when trying to understand the relations
between composer, composition, and percipient.
Theories on the Meaning and Interpretation of Music
Because of the longstanding traditions of expressivism and significationism, these
theories are in the forefront of the debate among music educators discussing ideas and
problems related to meaning. Although the theories of expressivism and significationism
generally encompass a great variety of perspectives on meaning (as mentioned in the
above section Explanations and Problems on Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension),
these two positions, however, are not the only views on meaning in music.
For the ancient Greek thinkers, especially Plato, mimetic theory interpreted music
as revealing “things about the harmony of the universe we could not otherwise
know….music imitates the beauty of the harmoniously balanced soul.”182 Meaning for
the formalist rests on self-contained musical analysis and is defined more conveniently in
negative terms. That is, instead of stating what formalism is, it is easier to argue what it
is not. According to the formalist music is not analogous to language, politics, or
feelings. In the words of the formalist Hanslick “Music consists of tonal sequences, tonal
forms; these have no other content than themselves…its content is nothing but the
audible tonal forms; since music speaks not merely by means of tones, it speaks only
tones.”183 He continues by clarifying that although
Music has no content in the sense of ‘subject matter.’ It does not follow that
music lacks substance…regarding the accusation of contentlessness, music has
content, but musical content…but only by firmly denying any other kinds of
‘content’ to music can we preserve music’s substance. This is because from
indefinite feeling, to which at best such a content is attributable, no spiritual
182
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content derives; rather, in each composition, the content derives from its
particular tonal structure as the spontaneous creation of mind out of material
compatible with mind [i.e., the tones].184
The formalist sees music as revealing and interpreting the art form in relation to itself,
that is, musically.
The position of the German idealist on meaning and interpretation is different
from the formalist. Generally for the idealist, in relation to meaning, “Music and musical
experience are somehow, uniquely able to penetrate and reveal the innermost nature of
the world and human experience.”185 Bowman writes that for Kant meaning exists within
the aesthetic experience, which is
contemplative delight in the imaginative perception of form…an experience at
once feelingful and mindful, yet reducible to neither feeling nor mind…judgments
of taste represent a kind of knowing of which intellect is incapable, a distinctive
kind of cognitive activity mediated by natural and artistic beauty.186
Similarly for Hegel, “Music’s abstract inwardness promises to acquaint people with the
inner soul-life, while at the same time enriching and vitalizing it through its immediacy,
vividness, and intimacy.”187 In other words, for thinkers such as Schiller, Schelling and
Schopenhauer, whose ideas can be linked to the work of Kant and Hegel, what is
interpreted is music’s revelatory power of “inward, sensual, expressive
phenomenon…the ineffable, inner nature of reality.”188 Like the German idealist view on
the nature of music, the perspective of these writers on the subject of meaning is also
metaphysical.
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Metaphysical perspectives on meaning are not the concern of the experientialist.
Thinkers such as Dewey see meaning and the revelatory power of music in direct relation
to the experience itself. The type of experience sought by Dewey is one in which “the
material experienced runs its course to fulfillment…that its close is a consummation not a
cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing
quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience.”189 For a philosopher such as Dewey
the meaning, interpreting and revealing brought forth by an experience has both an
immediate and distant quality because “what the live creature retains from the past and
what it expects from the future operate as directions in the present.”190 The immediacy of
meaning in an experience is an observation “that is both action in preparation and
foresight of the future.”191 The distant quality of meaning is difficult to determine since
the exact long term outcome of an experience may not be elicited until it is brought into
relation with other such experiences or other ends pursued at a later time. In summation,
the immediate and distant qualities of deriving meaning through experience are where “in
life that is truly life, everything overlaps and merges.”192 Dewey’s explanation of an
experience is rooted in the primary aim of his work. In this book Dewey puts forth the
argument that for art to reach its fullest potential in terms of meaning and value it must be
integrated with life. To put it another way, the process of living in the world, according
to Dewey,
is a combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and re-unions…the live
being recurrently loses and reestablishes equilibrium with his surroundings. The
moment of passage from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life….In a
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world made after the pattern of ours, moments of fulfillment punctuate experience
with rhythmically enjoyed intervals.193
With its arguably outward focus in terms of human relations, Dewey’s perspective on
meaning in art is one where an aesthetic experience is “the fulfillment of an organism in
its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ.”194 Arts’ revelatory
power and value, according to Dewey, is one that enables us to more fully understand and
deal with our environment, which is the case for both artist and percipient.
The experience of the composer and listener in relation to the production and
reception of music within the larger society are ideas developed by the sociological
offshoot of musical aesthetics called socioaesthetics here. Theodor Adorno is arguably
the prototypical scholar of the time in the field of the philosophy of music as it relates to
sociology. Music for Adorno is cultural and as such any search for meaning necessarily
involves commenting on social relations, social structures, and social institutions, for
example.195 With roots in Marxist thought the relations of meaning and value in music
are nearly contingent. The reason it is difficult to separate meaning from value in
philosophy arising from Marxist thought is that “all music functions ideologically to
perpetuate bourgeois consciousness.”196 Although Bowman goes on to assert Adorno
does not completely accept the Marxist argument, especially as it relates to so-called
193
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modern music and modern society, the links to Marxism are still present.197 Adorno sees
as necessity the broadening of an understanding of classical Marxist thought on the
relations existing between music and society by asserting,
Music in modern society is situated between two dialectically opposite poles: as
commodity, it perpetuates false consciousness; as social critique, it subverts
ideology and serves authentic consciousness…it is capable of revealing with
utmost clarity ‘the contradictions and flaws which cut through present-day
society’198
With modern music and the work of Stravinsky as exemplar, what is revealed by music is
“like critical philosophy, [it] is obliged to attempt to transform ‘the cultural
consciousness of the masses.’ To do this it must both engage and extend that
consciousness.”199 Furthermore, “the ‘most advanced’ modern music, then, is music that
pursues its social obligation not by attempting social ‘relevance’, not by pursuing
popularity or utility, but rather ‘by developing within music itself…those elements whose
objective is the overcoming of class domination.’”200 Socioaesthetic theory asserts
meaning and revelation in music are inextricable with the existing social situation. “As a
fundamentally social phenomenon, distinctions between music’s musical and social value
are completely spurious: music’s socially critical function is exercised within its own
formal language and technique.”201
The points of view on the meaning of music according to what it allegedly reveals
are numerous. The reader has undoubtedly noticed at this point that each major
theoretical perspective in musical aesthetics integrates the major premise of its
197
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understanding of the nature of music into what it argues the meaning and/or revelation of
music is. Whether music reveals a fuller understanding of our environment, the inner
nature of reality, reality symbolically, or means nothing beyond itself, it is clear that just
like the nature of music, the meaning of music is an actively debated topic now and in the
history of musical aesthetics. It is through the struggle of searching for meaning that
another component of musical aesthetics emerges, value.
The final category of contestation in musical aesthetics is value. Unlike the first
two categories where each was divided into two distinct and subsequent sections—the
explanations and problems of such and such, and the theories of so and so—this final
section is more fluid (closer to how expressivism and significationism were incorporated
into the writing on meaning in music). The connection between problems and theories is
more fluid in this final section because of the complex nature of value. The first layer of
complexity is the way the idea of value is discussed—as a means of evaluation and why
music is important. Added to the two ways in which value is used is a second layer of
complexity which involves the intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian positions
on value. Therefore, even though this final section on value is once again broken down
into two subsequent segments, the problems and theories are covered without as much
attention to distinction between problems and theories due to the nature of what the
concept of value includes. And to avoid redundancy, the section covering theories on
value will be brief.
Explanations and Problems of Value
The third domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems and
theories in musical aesthetics is value—musical judgment and why music matters.
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Fundamentally value based theories are concerned with how it is possible to make an
evaluation and why music matters at all. The key problems are rooted in questions such
as should we care about music, and if so why? What makes one musical work more
valuable than another? On what basis can a determination of the aesthetic value of music
be made?
Can a feature be a merit in one [piece of music] and a defect (or neither) in
another? Or does calling the feature a merit in one [piece of music] entail, or
presuppose, a general principle according to which it is meritorious wherever it
occurs?202
What roles do beauty, truth, and culture have in determining value?203 Finally, “does
aesthetic experience have value, and if so why?”204
The concept of value is primarily an idea of assessment which is rooted in the
analysis of a perceptive, thoughtful response to an aesthetic object or experience. This
assessment and analysis lead to some conclusion regarding music’s intrinsic, inherent,
instrumental, and/or utilitarian end. Whilst certain aspects of the previously introduced
concept of meaning may also be construed as responses to music, there is a difference.
The reason for the separation is that interpreting and comprehending a piece of music is
202
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mainly an intramusical affair with some extramusical components. In other words,
whether one is critiquing the music from the standpoint of significationist percipient or a
musicologist with expressivist tendencies researching various conditions under which the
piece was composed, the concern is with what it is in the music that elicits emotion or
signifies nationalist sentiment for example. It is mainly about the music, what it reveals
and, at most, is one step removed from the music to the composer or the percipient(s).
Meaning’s difference from value in relation to the intramusical/extramusical bifurcation
is a matter of degree. Where meaning may take into consideration if an emotion is
elicited, the concept of value deals with subsequent questions such as does this particular
piece bring out such and such emotional quality in a better way than another piece and is
the emotion something of worth to those who experience this piece of music? It is one
thing to suggest that music expresses melancholy and another to determine why the
expression of melancholy matters or to debate why the composition is judged to have
artistic merit in its expression of melancholy versus another piece’s depiction of the
same. Value moves beyond the attempt to comprehend and interpret by using elements
from artistic meaning to make judgments of quality in relation to other works and itself as
well as contemplating music’s worth and importance to us as humans. This is not to say
that the focus on value is the lone idea explored in normative theories but rather that these
theories emphasize value. I see the notion of value not only from the view of making
evaluative judgments of quality and worth but also in asking why it matters
(incorporating intrinsic, inherent, and instrumentalist perspectives).
Evaluation of music is the first area of focused attention. What sorts of issues are
revealed when making a determination of the aesthetic value of music? As a basis for
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making a critical determination of value Beardsley divides the “reasons and judgments”
for evaluating whether one work is better than another into three categories: genetic,
affective, and objective.205 For Beardsley, genetic reasons for saying one work is better
than another is a reference “to something existing before the work itself, to the manner in
which it was produced, or its connection with antecedent objects and psychological
states.”206 Examples of genetic reasons are “it fulfills (or fails to fulfill the artists
intention…it is an example of successful (or unsuccessful) expression…it is skillful (or
shows poor workmanship)…it is new and original (or trite)…it is sincere (or
insincere).”207 Beardsley dismisses these reasons and labels them as problematic based on
similar conclusions drawn in his assessment of expressivists’ attempting to find the
composer’s mindset present in a composition because, “the resulting judgment is not a
judgment of the work, but only of the worker, which is quite a different thing.”208 And in
reference to the category of originality he questions if originality is always to be regarded
highly.209 For example
Suppose there are two of Haydn’s symphonies very much alike, and we do not
know which he wrote first; are we going to say that A becomes better when we
decide that it was the earlier, but reverse our judgment when newly discovered
band parts give priority to B?210
Beardsley defines affective reasons for evaluating the quality of a work as “the
psychological effects of the aesthetic object upon the percipient.”211 Examples include:
“it gives pleasure (or gives no pleasure)…it is interesting (or dull and monotonous)…it is
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exciting, moving, stirring, rousing…it has a powerful emotional impact.”212 Problems
are again revealed with judgments made according to these criteria. How are fine
distinctions to be made between the emotional impact of Beethoven’s Piano Concerto
No. 5 in E-flat Major, Op. 73 and Bela Bartok’s Piano Concerto No. 1, Sz. 83.
Furthermore, “what in the aesthetic object causes the emotional response?”213 These are
clearly difficult questions to answer, which leads to the third category of reasons and
judgments used in evaluation, objective.
Beardsley defines an objective reason as one that “refers to some characteristic—
that is, some quality or internal relation, or set of qualities and relations—within the work
itself, or to some meaning-relation between the work and the world.”214 In this category
Beardsley relies on material rooted in the nature and meaning of art and divides objective
reasons into three “canons:” unity, complexity, and intensity.215 Examples of unity
include: “it is well organized (or disorganized)…it is formally perfect (or imperfect)…it
has (or lacks) an inner logic or structure and style.”216 Next are examples of complexity:
“it is developed on a large scale…it is rich in contrasts (or lacks variety and is
repetitious)…it is subtle and imaginative (or crude).”217 Finally, the term intensity is in
relation to human regional qualities and examples include: “it is full of vitality (or
insipid)…it is forceful and vivid (or weak and pale)…it is beautiful (or ugly)…it is
tender, ironic, tragic, graceful, delicate, richly comic.”218 Beardsley does acknowledge
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that these so-called canons are not universal but only reveal “general tendencies.”219
Furthermore, there are philosophical problems revealed when evaluating works according
to these canons and criteria.
The philosophical problems of making judgments relating to value covered by
Beardsley underscore the difficulty of these types of determinations. For example, does
it necessarily follow that when a composition is unified it is good?220 Basically, the
problem here is one of determining how such critical justifications assessing value can be
made.221 In the last pages of his chapter on “critical evaluation” he addresses relativism.
For Beardsley the relativist argues that restrictions are always placed on critical
judgments, which include individual, social, historical, and cultural qualifiers.222
Beardsley suggests the relativist’s position rests on two primary arguments: variability
and inflexibility.223 Variability is difference in taste, which in the end is a problem for
the relativist. For Beardsley, “Variability is an empirical fact; Relativism is a theory
about the proper way to define the term ‘good.’”224 So, “variability does not prove
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relativism.”225 But the relativist does have a noteworthy counterargument, and Beardsley
sums it up as follows: “the only way we can justify a standard…is to derive it from
another, and more general, standard.”226 The other argument in the relativist’s tool kit is
that of inflexibility, which Beardsley equates with determinism. It is in the process of
undermining the inflexibility argument that Beardsley echoes an idea that dates most
likely from the ancient Greeks and in more recent times from at least the late eighteenth
century which is the notion of the role of the arts in the elevation of taste and of the
mind.227 It is also similar to numerous statements given by music educators of the time
as to the importance of music education.228 Beardsley asserts
There is a great deal of evidence…to show that individual tastes can be changed,
that it is possible to increase subtlety of discrimination and range of enjoyment
and complexity of understanding by appropriate training. And if it is possible to
change, or to develop tastes, then we cannot avoid the question whether they
should be changed. The Relativist does not meet this question by redefining
words so that it cannot be asked.229
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We are now in a better position to determine the extent to which music educators from
1907 to 1958 justified music’s value relying on affective reasons of making evaluative
statements, or if they went further by making statements that infused the so-called canons
of objective reasoning.
Now that the topic of making evaluative judgments of quality and worth has been
covered we can move to the second use of the concept of value in this dissertation, which
is determining why music matters. Beardsley’s exploration of the concept of aesthetic
value moves beyond accounting for “reasons and judgments” to questioning why an
aesthetic object and/or the aesthetic experience has importance and matters. In other
words, the concept of aesthetic value used in this manner transcends determining the
quality and good-making elements of a composition, for example, by getting into why
music matters to humanity.
Beardsley writes about three theories that deal with aesthetic value.230 The first is
Beauty Theory. He explains, “The aesthetic value of an object consists in its possession
of a certain unique regional quality, called ‘beauty,’ and the degree of its aesthetic value
is determined by the intensity of this quality.” That is, in relation to the concept of value
in aesthetics, “the aesthetic object is aesthetically valuable because it is beautiful, and this
does not mean that it is beautiful because it is beautiful.”231 Beardsley continues, “The
beauty theory…may be summed up in three sentences: 1. Beauty is a regional quality of
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perceptual objects. 2. Beauty is intrinsically beautiful. 3. ‘Aesthetic value’ means ‘value
that an object has on account of its beauty.”232
Philosophical problems exist with the term beauty, which led Beardsley to define
the theory the way he does. For example, is beauty objective or subjective?233 Can an
aesthetic object be aesthetically valuable without an element of beauty? What are the
properties of beauty? He also mentions the problems of variability of meaning.234 The
crux of the theory, according to its adherents, is based on the notion that “to justify the
judgment that an object has aesthetic value…you first show that it has beauty, from
which it logically follows that it has aesthetic value.”235 This idea is what beauty
theorists claim gives music its value. It is unclear, however, if all of this does logically
follow.236 Beauty theory is only one way of considering aesthetic value.
Aesthetic value, according to Beardsley, can also be determined by what he calls
“psychological definitions.”237 The “psychological” notion of value is primarily
subjective because it rests on the supposition that for anything to have value there must
232
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be something “in relation, direct or indirect, to the needs or desires of human beings.”238
And in the case of this theory value is rooted in the psychological states or attitudes
toward the object.239 That is, proponents of this notion of value theory assert that value is
attached to something because of how we feel about it.240 Beardsley writes, “To put it in
a familiar, though casual, way, it is not liked because it is good, but good because it is
liked.”241 Beardsley also makes the point that these theories on value are intrinsically
based: “the attitude of liking is understood to be taken toward the object not because it is
a means to anything else, but simply for its own sake.”242 But problems emerge here
because value as proposed by this theory is primarily attitudinal which takes us back to
similar issues mentioned above associated with taste and variability. Beardsley states it
this way; “the language of likes and dislikes is an important and useful language, but it is
not the language of critical judgment. ‘Is it good?’ cannot be reduced to ‘Do you like
it?’...or even to ‘Will I like it?’”243 Making a leap from the first question to the second
would be a problem of consistency, and is a philosophical stumbling point for music
educators of the period writing on the topic of value. The last topic relating to value is no
less problematic and has generated debate in the field of music education for some time.
Finally, a significant problem associated with any argument of musical value,
whether it originates from the perspective of a utilitarian, an instrumentalist, or an
adherent to the idea of the intrinsic value of music, is: are the aesthetic object and the
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aesthetic experience infungible? Or to put it another way, can something else be
substituted for music and the aesthetic experience of it? And by extension if music is
infungible, to what other ends has it connected? These are problems that have bedeviled
the field of music and music education at least as far back as the time of ancient Greece.
Some of the perspectives from various theories attempting to give solutions to these
problems relating to value follow. I combine some of the problems and theories here so
the reader will see both the complexity of this final category of aesthetic analysis and as a
way to have a clearer picture of how theories are used to generate solutions to problems.
The first view is aestheticism. The view taken by the aesthete is aligned closely
with those adhering to the intrinsic and/or inherent value of art and is usually rejected by
the instrumentalist. According to Beardsley, aestheticism takes two forms. The first is
“not with art for the sake of citizenship, or patriotism or mysticism, or anything else, but
with Art for Art’s Sake only.”244 The second, a logical extension of the first, “is a pure
and single-minded view, which maintains the supreme value of art over everything
else.”245 The aesthete is not concerned with the indirect side effects of music or the
aesthetic experience.
The second view Beardsley covers is of the so-called moralist. Before getting
into the two main moralist arguments he defines the moralist in basic terms as “one who
judges aesthetic objects solely, or chiefly, with respect to moral standards.”246 The first

244

Ibid., 562. Beardsley calls this the Argument from Innocuousness. He continues “far from
being a handmaiden to other goals, art gives us immediately, and richly, the best there is in life, intense
awareness—it gives us what life itself aims at becoming, but seldom achieves outside art. This part of the
Aestheticist view is connected, of course, with a Psychological Definition of value; it claims that there is an
end in itself, an intrinsic good, and that aesthetic experience is that good.” Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems
in the Philosophy of Criticism, 563. Italics in the original.
245
Ibid., 563. Beardsley calls this the Argument from Aesthetic Primacy.
246
Ibid., 564.

89
argument is what Beardsley refers to as the “Argument from Reduction.”247 The crux of
the matter here is determining “whether a particular aesthetic object is a good one or not
is reduced to the (moral) question whether the feelings it arouses are good or bad.”248
Beardsley labels the second argument as the “Argument from Correlation.”249 The
Argument from Correlation allows for a distinction between aesthetic value and moral
value, but a determination of the aesthetic value is dependent upon the moral worth of the
object.250 If the object has low moral worth, then it has little aesthetic value.251 The
problem of a connecting aesthetic value and morality was discussed by music educators
during the first half of the twentieth century within the context of World War One, The
Great Depression, and the Cold War. For example, and in light of these trying times in
the history of the United States, the argument from correlation has, in the previous
chapter, been loosely applied by Edward Bailey Birge. As will be seen in chapter five
some music education scholars even went so far as to deliberately and thoughtfully
examine the aesthetic/moral relationship and determined, just as Beardsley states, “an
analogy is not a causal connection.”252 Other perspectives on aesthetic value, including
Adorno’s socioaesthetic and/or Marxist positions, are also seen in the evidence.
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Andy Hamilton writes that for Adorno, autonomous artwork has “no direct social
function but does have a social situation.”253 And that social situation rests in part on
what Beardsley labels the “Principle of Nonneutrality, which is the statement that every
aesthetic object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency to promote,
or to interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.”254 The idea
that there is an important relationship between music and society, especially possible
political and economic side effects, would seem to place sociaoaesthetics at the opposite
end of the instrumentalist spectrum from aestheticism. Yet almost paradoxically
Adorno’s so-called objectivist approach argues “the ‘most advanced’ modern music,
then, is music that pursues its social obligation not by attempting social ‘relevance’, not
by pursuing popularity or utility, but rather ‘by developing within music itself…those
elements whose objective is the overcoming of class domination.’”255 Reconciliation of
Adorno’s aloof form of objectivity with the argument that music is solidly rooted in the
social situation comes in the form of asserting that music is an important component of
society not merely a reflection of it. It is in Adorno’s view that the “most advanced”
modern [autonomist] music does not have a “direct social function.”256 Just like the
other theories, however, there are problems explored by the socioaesthetic perspective.
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A key problem examined by such writers as Adorno wrestles with the degree to
which art has freed itself from the patronage of the nobility or the church—autonomy—
while entering a so-called market, which, according to the modernist, it simultaneously
critiques. For Adorno art is both autonomous and commodified, which is a dichotomy.257
To put it another way, the question is whether music has merely traded a patron of one
kind for another—reducing or negating its autonomy—while the aesthetic object is
bought and sold in a so-called marketplace—increasing the extent to which it is
commodified. A component of this problem involves music affiliated with modernism,
and it is this aspect where music educators of the period make comment. In the first half
of the twentieth century, major shifts were occurring in the world of music. For example,
the turn toward atonality was altering the traditional musical landscape and Schoenberg
launched his twelve-tone method, 258 and in the United States specifically Jazz entered
the scene. Atonality, serial music, and jazz not only disrupted traditional styles of music
but also were in themselves considered to embody the principles of modernism. In an
odd twist of the autonomy-commodity dichotomy, art music created at this time shows a
“rupture between high and popular culture, it sets itself against popular culture,”259
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something the composer and music educator Howard Hanson lamented. Absolute art
music could be considered the quintessential example of aestheticism. Against the
backdrop of modernism and socioaesthetics, other types of music such as marches,
funeral music, or hymns, which have a particular function, can cause difficulty in making
a determination of value because it is unclear how to separate intrinsic from instrumental
value. Whatever the case for so-called modern music and its relation to society and/or
itself, the altering of the musical landscape in turn influenced the field of aesthetics. On
the one hand musical aesthetics now included such things as socioaesthetics where
philosophers such as Adorno argued the fragmentation in music reflected what he viewed
as the fragmentation in society.260 On the other it was argued the isolation of avant-garde
music from mass culture created a situation where this type of music could only be
examined objectively in relation to itself.261 Finally, a major problem for socioaesthetics
was that the analysis of the problems in this branch of aesthetics are squarely rooted in
time. Many philosophers argue that philosophy deals with problems that are timeless.
The problems presented in this last section are by no means easy to solve and are still
being debated. For example it is difficult to determine whether the music of Schoenberg
and Stravinsky reflected a new form of objectivity (the intrinsic) or a more extreme form
of social critique (the instrumental). To the Marxist the answer is clear. Art is not to be
separated from political, social, or economic life. Besides intrinsic value and the
examples of instrumental value of moralism, socioaesthetics and/or Marxism that have
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been given, what other possibilities exist for instrumentalism that are not as extreme? In
the words of Beardsley, what are the inherent values of art?262
If music has inherent value then, according to Beardsley, this notion rests on the
idea of being able to “show that the having of this aesthetic experience…makes its own
contribution to human welfare.”263 This contribution is unique because it resides in
having undergone an experience with music itself. The main difficulty here is the effect
of aesthetic objects is often supported by evidence that “is scattered, uncertain, [and]
subject to distortion by faulty introspection and emotional bias.”264 Regardless of the
nature of evidence on the topic of inherent value, it is explored by numerous philosophers
and aestheticians.
Other than referencing Aristotle’s notion of catharsis and ethos theory,
Beardsley’s work on ideas connected to the instrumentalist position leaning toward
inherent value does not name some other leading contributors in the main part of his text.
Even though his list of “predictions” generally takes into account ideas formulated by
scholars such as Schopenhauer, Schiller, Santayana, Dewey, and Collingwood, it lacks
the development needed for a thorough analysis of music education discourse. Therefore,
in addition to Aristotle, I also include the names and perspectives of those writing on the
topic of instrumental/inherent value.
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Theories on Value (Additional Perspectives on Intrinsic,
Instrumental, and Inherent Value)
For the ancient Greeks value was primarily utilitarian with some instrumental
inclinations. The Greek notions of musical value, especially utilitarian and instrumental
value, have manifested themselves in many ideas regarding music to this day. Generally
music “was to impart to the soul…what was noble and pleasing…music affords
enjoyment and recreation; but its higher mission was to comfort and calm the troubled
soul.”265 For Plato, “music which ennobled the mind was of a far higher kind than that
which merely appealed to the senses…bold and stirring melodies were for men, gentle
and soothing ones for women.”266 More specifically, music could be valued for its
emotional and ethical effects. For example,
The manly and serious Doric scale should be exclusively used in the education of
youth, as it was considered to be the only one calculated to inspire respect for the
law, obedience, courage, self-esteem, and independence. The Lydian scale,
imported from Asia was less highly esteemed. Plato considered that melodies
founded upon it had a voluptuous, sensual, and enervating tendency, fitted at best
only for the accompaniment of orgies…Aristotle ascribed to the Phrygian scale
the power of inspiration, to the Dorian the qualities of repose and dignity, and, in
opposition to Plato, attributed to the Lydian scale power of awakening the love of
modesty and purity.267
Shifting slightly from the arguably utilitarian bent of the above representations of ethos
theory is Aristotle’s notion of catharsis, which moves toward the instrumental, and
according to Beardsley the inherent, perspective on value. In Politics, Aristotle argues,
“music should be studied, not for the sake of one, but of many benefits, that is to say,
with a view to education or purgation; … music may also serve for intellectual
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enjoyment, for relaxation and for recreation after exertion.”268 And later in Poetics on the
topic of catharsis Aristotle asserts, in proposing the elements tragedy, that in addition to
being “the imitation of an action that is serious,” tragedy also contains “incidents
arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.”269 In
relating catharsis to inherent value, Beardsley writes, “Aristotle’s exact meaning is still
not agreed upon by scholars, but there is no doubt that he believed the tragic effect to
justify the social worth of tragedy, because it shows that tragedy accomplishes more than
idle stimulation of feelings.”270 The manner in which the topic of music showed up in a
number of works by Plato and Aristotle, such as The Republic, Timaeus, Laws, Politics,
and Poetics, in addition to the work of Pythagoras, Plotinus, and even what is arguably
the first treatise solely on music, Aristoxenus’ The Elements of Harmony, shows the
Greek view of music as possessing value is unquestionable. The kind of value music had
for these ancients was arguably utilitarian and instrumental with some indication that
inherent value was recognized.
With the exception of the formalist, in the nineteenth and twentieth century
normative theories were predominantly focused on the emotional experience or the
expression of feeling created or produced by music. The formalist, as mentioned earlier
by R.A. Sharpe, “is somebody who thinks that the value of music lies in its formal
properties of design and line and not in its expressive capacity…what matters is beauty
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and that beauty is a matter of form.”271 Value for the formalist is intrinsic. Intrinsic
value is also the position of Organicism, but things are a bit more complex here. Archie
Bahm in “The Aesthetics of Organicism” argues that
organic enjoyment, which includes feelings of pleasure, enthusiasm, satisfaction,
and contentment as variable aspects is idealized as the type of intrinsic value to be
kept in mind, rather than either alone, when the aesthetic is referred to as intuition
of intrinsic value…For Organicism, the end-in-itself quality of intrinsic value
experiences is aspectival…[since] experience is, by its very nature dynamic, i.e.,
an organic mixture of events and duration…value experiences are more or less
enduring, and variability in duration is to be expected normally.272
Basically, for the organicist the experiencing of music is to be “enjoyed as an end-initself” in a multifaceted network of aspects.273 From this point forward arguments on
value move toward the inherent and instrumental.
Contained within the theories of expressivism, emotionalism, and intuitionism
and even German idealism are views on inherent value that give music an important place
in human life. Generally, for the German idealist the value of music is in its ability to
reveal the innermost nature of reality. More specifically, Beardsley asserts for Johann
Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, “the enjoyment of art and the perception of beauty are a
necessary state in the development of rationality and freedom.”274 Furthermore,
Jacquette claims that Schiller “insists on understanding the value of art on its own terms
for the role it plays in adding meaning and color to our lives, even when its secondary
purpose is to condition citizens for participation in a morally elevated political state.”275
According to Graham, Schopenhauer and Collingwood, “both believe that the chief task
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of aesthetics is to explain the value and importance of art.”276 Or, in negative terms,
“normative theories of art concern themselves not with the definition of the nature of art
but with its value.”277 For Schopenhauer, a philosopher whose ideas influence much
nineteenth century thought in aesthetics, art
repeats or reproduces the external Idea grasped through pure contemplation, the
essential and abiding in all the phenomena of the world; and according to what
the material is in which it reproduces, it is sculpture, or painting, poetry or music.
Its one source is the knowledge of Ideas; its one aim the communication of this
knowledge.278
Andy Hamilton explains Schopenhauer’s theory as “art as a form of knowledge…while
ordinary perception is focused on particular material objects, aesthetic perception attends
to the permanent ideas behind them.”279 And, according to Graham, “Collingwood, in
contrast to Schopenhauer…thinks the value of art lies in its character as the expression of
feeling, and not some special apprehension of reality.”280 More to the point, Graham
states elsewhere on Collingwood “the end of art is self-knowledge, knowledge of our
own emotional state.”281 Colingwood argues in The Principles of Art “to know ourselves
is the foundation of all life that develops beyond the mere psychical level or
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experience.”282 So, for him self-knowledge is the value of art, both for individual and
community. The idea of community and an individual in the larger community is
important in determining value for the Dewey.
Dewey, according to Beardsley, “emphasized the continuity of aesthetic
experience and life, and has pleaded the cause of the arts as of the highest value to human
beings because of their uniting and liberating effect.”283 The inherent value of music for
Dewey lies in the uniqueness of the aesthetic experience it offers. For another twentieth
century philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, Beardsley writes that Whitehead argued
the arts are important particularly in education because “they help people to see things as
wholes, in their concrete organicity, rather than becoming prey to abstractions.”284 For
Langer, a significationist, “the significance of the musical image always derives from
what it shows us of the quality of motion, of passage, of felt time, and most importantly
feeling.”285 The inherent value of music for her is, “the education of feeling, as our usual
schooling in factual subjects…is the education of thought.”286 Later, Bowman writes
what nicely sums up her perspective on the inherent view of music: “music presents us
with…an image that reveals to us the otherwise hidden truth about how feelings feel.”287
Each of these aforementioned arguments on the topic on value—whether from Aristotle,
Schopenhauer, Collingwood, Dewey, or Langer—embrace instrumental and/or inherent
perspectives on value. In other words, art has an extraartistic, or in the case of music, an
extramusical function. That is the value of the work, process, and/or experience, though
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not wholly separated from the object, is rooted in the subjective (individual or collective).
The idea of being extramusical emphasizes what the music helps to accomplish rather
than what it is. What it does, or its end, may not be completely musically centered. In
the case of normative theory, however, it is argued that the extramusical value necessarily
comes through contact with music, and, therefore, music is unique in what it
accomplishes as compared to sports, for example. This was discussed above in the earlier
section on value quoting Kieran and is based on the difference between instrumental
value and intrinsic value, ideas primarily tied to why music matters.
Last, for Adorno, “the value of modernist artworks lies in their truth and not in
any pleasure that that they may occasion.”288 Adorno’s assertion, however, brings to
light a problem for art and music, which is its truth content. However, since truth is
primarily an epistemic concern, it will not be covered in my research. In relation to value
theory, his view on the value of art is more instrumentalist than utilitarian because it is a
step back from the Marxist notion of nonneutrality. Paradoxically it is also rooted in
formalism because the aesthetician is supposed to look upon the music as music. Adorno
does not say that music must always promote or interfere with ideology. Instead his
conception of the value of modern music is broader because of “its capacity to confront
and challenge consciousness or awareness, and to undermine ‘false consciousness’ rooted
in stereotype and habit.”289 Bowman goes on to argue that
by wrenching music from the realm of autonomous, aesthetic insularity, Adorno
paved the way for explanations of music’s nature and value that challenge some
of music philosophy’s most cherished and time honored beliefs. As something
that is fundamentally and invariably social, music is never innocent, never pure.
In fact, myths of purity and innocence themselves serve the sociopolitical end of
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masking music’s social complicity, sustaining the social status quo while going
unacknowledged, unexamined, and unchallenged.290
Arguments regarding the value of music are contested. If a problem of a
particular value theory ever appears to be close to resolution, countless new questions and
challenges arise from those offering opposing solutions. This generative quality of
problems in musical aesthetics in relation to nature, meaning and value will likely result
in reflexivity and the better articulation and understanding of how we think about and
experience music. Take for example the work of Adorno, who, according to Wayne
Bowman, forced a reflexive reexamination of tradition in the field of musical aesthetics.
By arguing that music is “concentrated social substance,” Adorno not only caused a
reassessment of long standing beliefs, but by doing so he also broadened the field of
musical aesthetics which led to an arguably more complete understanding of how we
think about and experience music. On a much smaller scale, developing a more complete
understanding of the philosophical discourse of music educators from 1907 to 1958 will
enhance our understanding of the philosophy of music education as it relates to musical
aesthetics. The task of examining, interpolating and analyzing the evidence through the
lens of what is the crux and substance of musical aesthetics proposed in this chapter
enables a deeper understanding of the philosophy of music education in roughly the first
half of the twentieth century.
Musical aesthetics, in this chapter, is related as follows: music defined as X or Y
means either Q or R, and since music reveals Q or R, it may be judged to be good or bad,
or is important, because of A or B. Arriving at this point is important in order for an
orderly analysis of the discourse of music educators to take place. Because of the
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complexity involved, brevity was not possible. I do not claim to have covered in detail
every aspect of each problem or theory, and I have likely left out problems or theories
and examples in each category of musical aesthetics other researchers will undoubtedly
criticize me for omitting. What I have included, however, is, based on an examination of
the evidence. What is covered in the subsequent chapters are cases where musical
aesthetics was an integral part of the discourse in music education from 1907 to 1958.
By revealing the essence of the discourse of musical aesthetics in music education prior
to the music as MEAE movement, I achieve the purpose of exposing music educators to a
deeper understanding of the philosophical discussion relating to the aesthetics. The
material presented in this chapter is a way of looking at the discourse of the period that
moves beyond Mark’s limited interpretation. The evidence I present in chapters three,
four, and five revises the limited and confusing conventional views of philosophical
discourse from 1907 to 1958.
Part III – Problems with the Conventional View
It is confusing to determine which of the three alternatives relating to philosophy
of music education (mere rationale, absence of, or utilitarian) best captures the essences
of discourse in the period prior to 1958. Part of the confusion is the result of two papers
published by Mark. In his “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from
Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” Mark writes “Basic Concepts was the philosophical
culmination, in the United States at least, of thousands of years of utilitarian philosophy.
Several authors discussed music education philosophy in utilitarian terms.”291 While in
“A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education” he argues:
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first, the new philosophy brought closure to the venerable relationships between
music education and societal philosophy…second, the new philosophy did not
replace an older philosophy. Instead, its advocates attempted to offer a more
respectable intellectual support system than could be imparted by the variety of
rationales that had previously served as a sort of ersatz philosophy.292
It is a mistake to think it possible to have it both ways. Either there was a philosophy or
there was not. The use of the word “new” also implies that something had come before.
McCarthy and Goble, in “The Praxial Philosophy in Historical Perspective,” also label
the notion of MEAE a “new” philosophy.293 Again, the use of the term hints at there
being philosophy prior to the so called new one since there is a developmental quality to
history, be it dialectical or synthetic. In Mark’s and Gary’s third edition of A History of
American Music Education, they suggest that when the influence that progressive
education philosophy had on a number of school disciplines faded in education, so too
did a philosophy that would unify the field of music education.294 Mark and Gary
continue, “One of the most critical needs of the music education profession was a central
unifying philosophy to replace the philosophical support of progressive education.”295
This argument denies that any meaningful philosophical writing relating expressly to
music education came from within the field prior to 1958, and if there was anything
philosophical being discussed, it came from a philosophy outside the arts and from
individuals outside of music education. This most recent historical evidence points to
there being philosophy but only one category of philosophy (utilitarian) and only as it
applies to a larger context and still only one provided by a general movement in
education embraced unilaterally by music educators. The resolution of the muddled
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meaning surrounding what existed philosophically prior to the late 1950s is another
reason for reexamining the evidence of this earlier period. This reexamination of the
evidence from the lens of aesthetics clears up what is portrayed as empty, ambiguous, or
monistic.
The standard interpretation that pre-MEAE philosophy either did not exist or was
exclusively utilitarian as suggested by Mark, implies that previous statements made by
the writers and thinkers within music education are somehow philosophically empty.
The early statements given by pre-1958 music educators are often currently understood
only as mere justification or rationale for teaching the subject in schools. Not only is this
a conclusion that deserves investigating because it relies on an examination of evidence
based on a narrow conception of philosophy of music education prior to 1958, but it is
also an example of a phenomenon whereby contemporary attitudes, ideas, and thoughts
are seen as somehow superior to the attitudes, ideas and thoughts of the past. Little credit
is given to the work of past writers and thinkers as contributing in meaningful ways to
what is argued as a significant happening in more recent times.296 Change is privileged
over continuity. Assertions that pre-MEAE scholarly writing was either not
philosophical or philosophically empty, or utilitarian, lead to a logical argument that there
was a significant change or philosophical shift that occurred in 1958. What results from
the shift is argued to be in some way superior, but more importantly as distinct and
unique, to what came before. It implies that there was no discourse on issues central to
aesthetics until 1958.
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It is not possible at one moment to describe the philosophy of music education as
utilitarian and at another moment to argue that there was rationale without philosophy
prior to 1958. It cannot simultaneously be both, and it does not leave open the option that
there were other philosophical discussions taking place. Regardless of the chosen
position of either case, whether the philosophy that existed was utilitarian as stated in
Mark’s “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” or
if there was only rationale as he argues in “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic
Education,” the portrayal of the so-called new direction in philosophy of music education
is one in which MEAE is still seen as novel. By showing that there was philosophical
discourse prior to 1958, music education can move beyond the notion that discussions
about music were based primarily on its practical social, economic, and political utility.
Another reason additional scholarship on the topic of philosophical discourse
prior to 1958 in music education is significant is that the underlying assumptions
originating in contemporary scholarship are based on non sequitor argumentation and
lead to the hasty conclusion that utilitarian philosophy guided practice just as the MEAE
philosophy was advanced to do. The lack of any formalized or clearly articulated
statements of philosophy does not necessarily mean that there was an absence of
philosophy or that philosophy played little or no part in intellectual developments and
discourse in music education circles at the time. In fact, there was meaningful
philosophical discourse in music education prior to 1958, and this study shows a more
comprehensive and accurate depiction of the period.
The evidence used to support the standard interpretation results in a non
sequitor. What the standard view espouses is a philosophy for music education (a
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rationale for music’s inclusion in the curriculum) instead of a philosophy of music
education (the principles meant to guide the practice of music instruction). It is a non
sequitor because the interpretation assumes a link exists between utilitarian philosophy
and practice—just as the movement for MEAE philosophy did by tying together a
rationale for the support of formal music classes with a philosophy that guides and
informs instruction—and is problematic because it relies on the belief that a philosophy
and purpose for music education is identical to philosophy and practice of music
education; it neglects any emphasis on the relation of philosophy as a guide to actual
classroom instruction in favor of a wider view of the importance of music for society.
The widely accepted view of the so-called utilitarian philosophy for music education and
the obvious and expressly extramusical claims attached to it have affected the degree to
which attention has been given to what the leaders within the field of music education
emphasized in the way of music’s nature, meaning, and value.297 Embedded within the
problem of a limited view of pre-MEAE philosophical discourse is the notion that any
philosophical support was given by those outside the field.298 This idea is likely to have
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had an effect on the degree to which attention has been given to what the leaders within
the field of music education said about the field themselves. In summary, the
philosophical discourse in music education is more complex than previously thought.
The crux of the standard interpretation is that it was not until the MEAE
movement that music was taught in a manner that was primarily for the sake of music and
musical understanding. This line of reasoning suggests that there was no philosophical
discourse present that emphasized the nature, meaning, and value of music—this was
only something to come as a result of the music as aesthetic education movement.
Although utilitarian philosophy was a philosophy that occasionally guided practice, it did
not uniformly manifest itself that way prior to the MEAE movement. Furthermore, to
assert that a utilitarian philosophy was the sole philosophy in music education assumes
that what was going on in the larger field of education directed what went on in terms of
guiding music instruction and that progressive philosophy only rested on utilitarian
premises. Both of these ideas result from a narrow and limited conception of philosophy
and its purposes. Framing an entire period where many dynamic events occurred
(philosophical and otherwise) is an oversimplification.
The characterization of any period in time as being particularly static deserves
questioning. The period before 1958 was an extremely dynamic time in music
education. For example, the orchestra and band movements in schools in the United
States were well underway. The child study movement was popular, and music teacher
preparation was moving out of the normal school and into colleges and universities and
was becoming more rigorous and formal. The confluence of these factors created a

Bennett Reimer and Abraham Schwadron, began the serious study of philosophy and became philosophers
themselves;” 8, 13.
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vibrant atmosphere in music education that provided fertile ground for questions and
discussions relating to practice to occur. Furthermore, since course offerings in music
expanded to include not only band and orchestra but also appreciation and theory,
discourse on topics in aesthetics were opened up for discussion. Specific examples of the
combination of expanded course offerings in relation to instruction in the music
classroom are the works of Thomas Tapper whose writings include elements of tonal
theory in addition to utilitarian values such as good citizenship.
The inclusion of musical understanding is problematic for the standard
interpretation of philosophy of music education. In addition to his book The Music
Supervisor: His Training, Influence and Opportunity,299 which deals with the topic of
justifying music in the curriculum based on so-called utilitarian rationale, there are also
two published books of his on harmony300 that were designed for use in the music
classroom. What is absent in the harmony books is any mention of music for utilitarian
purposes. The focus is on understanding tone, tone combination, and tone thought, all
formalist ideas about music. In other words, the focus is on helping students to achieve
greater musical understanding of “tonally moving forms,”301 not on how the student can
be a contributing member of society. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that a teacher
ignored the phrasing of a particular passage, the tone quality emanating from the clarinet
section, or attempted to get students to imagine the emotions of the composer while
expounding on the piece’s supposed civic value.
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If the discourse was more than a rationale of utilitarian philosophy, then what did
the philosophical discourse of the period 1907 to 1958 look like? The next three chapters
show what the conventional view argues does not exist. The evidence presented on the
following pages, using the analytical framework established in this chapter, shows that
the philosophical discourse of the period was in fact rich, varied, insightful, and
pervasive.

CHAPTER 3
NATURE
If philosophy of music education from 1907 to 1958, more specifically discourse
relating to musical aesthetics during the period, could be described using sonic
terminology, the closest is the Greek word συµφωνία (symphonia), or symphony.
Translated it means a sounding together, a harmony. The problem with using the word
symphony is that it implies a sense of acting in concert; also implied is a degree of unity
and a traditional and pleasing consonance, which the discourse does not fully express.
Cacophony is no more accurate because there were themes and threads that existed in the
historical material. The discourse of the time was much more than a meaningless,
discordant, and harsh mixture of sound. The perspectives that reflected and advanced
ideas from musical aesthetics by the writers and thinkers in the field of music education
did follow some distinct and semi-predictable patterns. Quite often, however, multiple
philosophical points of view are held or seen by an individual in one piece of work or
over a scholar’s lifetime. Additionally the aesthetic views held by one music educator at
a given point in time, sometimes incompatible, were not always held unanimously by the
entire group but were often one of several. Change in perspective from one point in time
to another or one view in opposition to others is not uncommon. Edward Lippman states
Richard Wagner’s treatises and essays in the field of aesthetics fall externally into
five groups separated from one another by intervals of ten years…this body of
writings contains a remarkable variety of aesthetic ideas, some of which
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contradict each other, a circumstance that is not surprising in view of the span of
time involved.1
Consensus of perspective was not the case when it came to discourse relating to musical
aesthetics in music education. In fact the evidence supports that views in the field of
music education during the period relating to musical aesthetics were not only present but
also varied, noteworthy, insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music
educators. Like much in history the perspectives were not a spontaneously or perfectly
formed set of ideas with accompanying meanings; the ideas were not like the stories
about the spontaneous birth of Aphrodite or Dionysus. The thoughts of these writers
were articulated over time and in time – there was a sense of “sounding together.”
The evidence reveals two types of material relating to musical aesthetics on the
topics of music’s nature, meaning, and value. The first type of matter includes examples
where musical aesthetics are at the core of the topic being addressed. To put it another
way, musical aesthetics, or a component of it, is specifically addressed, and in some cases
the purpose of the work is to advance an idea from the discipline of musical aesthetics.
For example, Will Earhart’s The Meaning and Teaching of Music blends his scholarly
discovery of the interconnected problems of “philosophy, aesthetics, psychology, and the
practice of teaching.”2 Often the works of the first type use the work of a particular
philosopher or aesthetic theory to argue and advance an idea as to what the nature,
meaning, or value of music and music education is. The second type of material is less
explicit regarding its author’s use of ideas relating to musical aesthetics. By this I mean
1

Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 243. Lippman describes Wagner’s
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the scholar was making or advancing an idea on a topic that was not expressly
philosophical but rather echoed or reflected a particular or underlying philosophical
perspective. Gleaning or interpolating an implied aesthetic position or view such as the
relation of words to music in a work that purports to be about the instruction of choral
music is an example. A specific example of the second type of material is Ralph
Peterson’s “The Unaccompanied Choir—Its Relation to Expressive Speech”3 In this
paper he argues that a highly trained a cappella singing emphasizing “beautiful speech”
leads to “more expressive singing”4 while also embracing a significationist perspective in
what he wants to see choral directors do in practice. In other words, while a particular
scholar is conveying, elaborating, or explaining the integration of music with other
courses in the curriculum, for example, he/she may knowingly or subconsciously accept
and/or use certain premises and points of view from Dewey’s assessment in Art as
Experience of the meaning of music.
Differentiation between the two types of material is necessary against the
backdrop or accompaniment of multiple philosophical perspectives (sometimes even
occurring in one document). One type of material contains an argument advancing one
or more ideas from musical aesthetics while another is an echo or reflection of arguments
borrowed from musical aesthetics. References to the nature of music, for example, were
frequently embedded within conversations on meaning and value, so it is helpful to see
which type of material—first or second—the writer used. Some material had the nature
of music as a main idea in the work and referenced various philosophers or theories to
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support or advance a particular view. Other papers mentioned the nature of music in a
casual manner and/or merely as a supporting idea for another point being made. Just
because one was a music educator did not mean every aspect of the nature of music was
thoroughly translated and explored. When a particular point of view or problem was
explored, it also did not mean the nature of music was the only topic discussed. Finally,
music educators of the period who may have felt or thought they understood what music
is in a deeper way than did a typical philosopher untrained in music still did not advance
a unified view of the nature of music. On the surface it seems musicians should
understand the nature of music, but after further analysis a variety of perspectives emerge
on what music really was.
Reasons for differing views on the nature of music also varied. Although the
reason for the differing views and their links with ideas on the nature, meaning, and value
of music are difficult to state with certainty, some influences appear that give hints of
perspectives. One might have to do with a particular teacher’s outlook, education, and
experience, a challenge to prove. Another had to do with currents in the field of
education happening at the time such as the so-called progressive education movement,
which is seen in some of the evidence. During this period in the field of music education,
transformations also occurred that indicate a slight relation to the differing views on the
categories of musical aesthetics—nature, meaning, and value. The birth of the band and
orchestra happened in the early decades of the twentieth century. Additionally, music
appreciation, theory, harmony, and eurhythmics courses were also offered in schools at
the time. For the sake of clarity the material in this and the next chapter of this
dissertation will be divided into two main categories. The first category that shows
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particular views on the nature, meaning, and value of music sorts the evidence according
to the paper’s intended audience – Performance based courses (band, orchestra, and
chorus). The second category is the Non-performance courses, which includes music
appreciation, harmony, theory, where an emphasis was placed on listening. The second
category contains two other designations however; generalized topics, which were
papers, addresses, books, and archival material geared toward the field of music
education writ large; the second grouping deals with the integration movement in vogue
during the later decades of the period. What the remainder of this dissertation looks like
organizationally is straightforward.
Each chapter places the evidence into two main sections (performance and nonperformance based material). And within each section the evidence is comingled
between the first type of material (musical aesthetics as central to the work) and the
second (the underlying influence and reflection of ideas seen in musical aesthetics)
depending upon the musical aesthetics idea being addressed in that space. The chapters
are aligned with my view of what musical aesthetics is set out earlier in this work.
Nature is the subject of chapter three; Meaning is the subject of chapter four; and Value is
the subject of chapter five. The intention of organizing the material in this manner is for
increased focus and clarity of thought as well as for reinforcing assertions made at the
beginning of this dissertation. The material presented will show that instead of a time
that has been characterized as a barren philosophical wasteland, the writings and
addresses of music educators involving musical aesthetics was varied, noteworthy,
insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators. There is more
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continuity than the standard interpretation allows between the MEAE movement and
what existed before.
Musical aesthetics was part of the discourse from 1907 to 1958. The nature of
music was one element in musical aesthetics that existed in the evidence of the time.
Discourse about the characteristics of music occurred in both types of material (as an
echo of underlying influence from musical aesthetics and musical aesthetics as a central
part of the work) as well as in the two main sections in the forthcoming chapter
(performance based and non-performance based work). Additionally, arguments about
the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be considered music
incorporated views and perspectives from expressivist, intuitionist, experientialist, and
formalist standpoints. Not everyone, however, was convinced of the degree to which
music educators were aware of the nature of music or at least certain aspects of it. Will
Earhart, for example, wrote “musicians and teachers of music persistently overlooked the
aesthetic importance of tone.”5 The differing levels of awareness of the nature of music
among music educators can be attributed to the fact that these teachers and musicians
were continually surrounded by tone. The issue of tone is also not the only avenue to
explore the nature of music.
Performance Based Courses - Chorus
Aesthetic theories on the nature of music such as formalism, expressivism, and
significationism, are seen in the evidence related to performance based courses. Trends
emerge in the writings of those on choral music in relation to particular theories on the
nature of music. Whereas the performance based work of music educators speaking on
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issues relating to instrumental music shares many of the same views as the choral
component, the themes are not as consistent. Topics in the discourse relating to choral
music frequently reflected or advanced expressivist views including those of Tolstoy’s
emotional expression, Croce’s intuition, and Dewey’s experientialism as well as those of
significationist thought that suggest “music is an iconic sign of a psychological process.
It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does so by presenting auditory
equivalents to some structural or kinetic aspect of that life.”6 While these ideas appeared
in the evidence on topics relating to instrumental music, there were also leanings to the
formalist and objectivist mindsets. Rarely, however, did either the vocal group or the
instrumental group dig into problems on the topic of the nature of music that went
beyond the categories of musical aesthetics. Problems like the extent to which regional
and kinetic patterns of music create greater or lesser degrees of unity in particular pieces
of music, or what it is that arouses expectation in music were largely absent. Mention of
problems on form, structure, and texture might emerge from time to time, but these
discussions were limited in terms of scope, depth, and frequency. Regardless of some of
the inconsistencies pointed out, the discourse on the nature of music was an important
aspect of the musical aesthetics conversation in performance based courses.
Instances where the nature of music is part of the conversation reveals in the
evidence perspectives that are more often associated with a particular theory rather than
in relation to a given historical context. W. Otto Miessner wrote, “Art in its LOWEST
form is but an imitation of Nature…in the HIGHEST form it is an expression of
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SPIRITUAL ideals.”7 In this paper Miessner delves into the teaching of the aesthetic
drawing on Platonic, expressivist, voluntarist, German idealist, and significationist
positions for the purpose of showing how these ideas are valuable in the teaching and
production of good vocal music. For Miessner, reflecting a hybrid expressivist and
voluntarist view, “imagination is the magical Aladdin’s lamp which kindles the divine
spark in an art expression, and transforms…mere vocal utterances into expressions full of
vitality, action, feeling.”8 The core of Miessner’s idea is that music necessarily includes
“a sense of proportion, of harmony, of designs and the contrasting elements of unity and
variety,”9 and the use of imagination. The roles of the teacher and vocalist are important
because through the use of imagination in music as the latter imitates or expresses, the
artist can transform the conditions in nature or of feeling or emotion into something
explicit.10 His ideas on the nature of music that incorporate a variety of influences are
not unusual.
Synthesizing the essence of a particular theory’s argument in musical aesthetics
with another regardless of the degree of compatibility was common among music
educators at the time. The synthetic practice of joining this idea with that is common
practice in philosophical and historical scholarship, and sometimes this practice can
generate sophisticated results. Synthesis, however, can also cause compatibility
problems that may not be resolved over the course of a brief paper or address. For some
music educators the synthesis of ideas was the result of trying to advance an argument for
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one thing and using supporting evidence from multiple perspectives to do that.
Sometimes it worked, and in other instances it did not. An example of a successful
attempt at synthesis could be incorporating views from Deweyan thought on the
integration of music with various subjects in the curriculum and using arguments
suggesting the value of music is instrumental. A less successful attempt could be
defending the practice of learning to read the notes of music using formalist and
significationist arguments on the nature of music. In either case there is evidence that
suggests ideas from musical aesthetics were incorporated in the written work of music
educators.
D.A. Clippinger, a voice teacher and scholar from Chicago, explained in 1914
what he meant by “musicianship.” For him the concept includes, “melody, harmony,
tonality, the control of the vast amount of material constituting music…[and] the
development of tone quality and taste.”11 Formalist notions of music are implicit in his
understanding of musicianship as it relates to the nature of music. For the formalist the
necessary and sufficient conditions of music are the musical combinations of notes on the
staff paper, and for Clippinger this takes the form of “melody, harmony, tonality,” the
stuff that “constitutes music.” Clippinger goes on to say, “The singing tone is round, full,
rich, steady, resonant, and sympathetic, and these elements of good tone must all be
definitely fixed in the mind of the singer or they will never be expressed though his
voice.”12 While this statement still contains formalist tendencies such as “full,” “steady,”
and “resonant” it begins to address elements contained in expressivist theory. The phrase
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“sympathetic expressions” gives away the expressivist view. Later in the paper he fully
embraces the expressivist position on the nature of music. He writes, “Art is a transfer of
feeling, and the feeling is not in the medium…when we listen to the orchestra, the music
is what we feel…real art therefore consists of pure feeling rather than material objects.”13
Clippinger does not stop with combining formalist and expressivist views on the nature
of music; he also adds hints of German idealism.
Quoting Whistler, Clippinger writes, “Art is an expression of eternal, absolute
truth.”14 This idea, when coupled with the latter’s next statement that “Music begins
where speech leaves off. It can awaken one’s feelings, emotions, and aspirations which
are beyond speech”15 displays echoes of Schopenhauer and Schiller. By using elements
of formalist, expressivist, and German idealist thought on the nature of music Clippinger
effectively argues for the musical teaching of singing and the development of
musicianship but at a philosophical cost. Although the tenets of formalism, expressivism,
and German idealism are embedded in his argument and reflect his philosophical
approach to teaching singing, he does not bother with the fact that the formalist position
does not accept music as analogous to feelings. For that matter he also does not wrestle
with whether the embodied feeling was the composer’s—an expressivist view—or if it
was an expression of the metaphysical Idea—a German idealist view.
Clippinger’s work is an example of something that reflects some sense of musical
aesthetics, and the use of this awareness is used to support his idea of teaching. It is also
an example that shows how certain ideas were synthesized but not in any thorough or
successful way. This piece was also not written for the purpose of advancing an
13
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argument where one philosophical position is shown to have particular merits while
another is argued to be deficient. An example of a work that uses merits and defects of
certain philosophical perspectives in a synthetic manner comes from Will Earhart.
In The Meaning and Teaching of Music Earhart argues for the development of the
aesthetic attitude. He says, “instead of projecting ourselves into the objective world that
we might master it, we should accept ourselves as the central fact and allow the world to
enter us, then we should have exchanged the factual for the meaningful.”16 Throughout
the book he cites the work of Bell (formalist), Henri Bergson (intuitionist), Santayana
(expressivist) by name and Croce by implication. Here, however, the specific concern is
with the nature of music as it relates to singing. On this topic Earhart shows the
characteristic arguments of two theories for the purpose of using these ideas to advance
his own. First he cites the work of Richard Wagner, specifically his Opera and Drama
(1851)17 where Wagner argues music is “emotional speech” or “tonal speech.”18
“Emotional” or “tonal” speech, according to Wagner, is the beginning and end of verbal
speech.19 This so-called emotional speech, as related by Earhart, “arose through the
feeling of the utterer and were intuitively understood by the feeling of the hearer.”20 So,
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for Earhart, Wagner saw music as “an art of expression.”21 In opposition to Wagnerian
aesthetics, Earhart juxtaposes the notion that music’s origins are based on “natural
sonorities” and, therefore, are characteristically instrumental, not vocal.22 The “natural
sonorities” theory on the origins of music are based in both Platonic mimesis and
formalist views on the nature of music. That is, the tone is paramount and the
combination of tones imitates sounds originally found in nature and as such are good.
For Earhart, ‘instrumental music is more specifically musical than song because its entire
appeal lies in the musical field and is not derived from associated interests connoted by
song text.”23 Earhart’s critique of the locus of each of these theories led to his assertion
that the teacher is to arouse in the mind of the student what is contained in the mind of
the musician, namely “tones, tunes, harmonies, rhythms, forms, which shape themselves
again and again in his imagination, to his absorbed delight.”24 More specifically, it is
“musical power…which is to be educated,” and for Earhart, “those powers are…an
aesthetic sensitivity to tone (the very substance of music) in all its colors, degrees of
force, ranges of pitch, melodic undulations, modes of rhythmic motions, and
architectonic arrangements.”25 Earhart’s argument shows the synthesis of assertions from
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various ideas originating in musical aesthetics. Although his writing on this subject is
mainly formalist, he advances a philosophical position intended to have an influence in
music education practice as it relates to performance.
Earhart’s views are an exception to my argument that the majority of
philosophical perspectives on musical aesthetics in relation to vocal performance are
expressivist. He does, however, acknowledge that in the field of music education,
expressivist ideas are common in the instruction of songs—more will be said on this
point in the subsequent chapter on meaning. Expressivist and significationist
perspectives on the nature of music in relation to vocal music that reflect and advance
philosophical views persist through 1957. During the years of World War II and in the
period thereafter, however, there is less material on the nature of music in the work done
on vocal music. The material from 1941 through 1957 is mainly a reflection of
underlying ideas in musical aesthetics, and when these ideas are present they are often
tied to some aspect of patriotism. For example, in “The Code for the National Anthem of
the United States of America” it is written, “since the message of the Anthem is carried
largely in the text, it is essential that emphasis be placed upon the singing of the StarSpangled Banner.”26 Furthermore, and continuing along significationist lines, “the
slighting of note value in the playing or singing of the National Anthem seriously impairs
the beauty and effectiveness of both music and lyric.”27 When vocals are part of the
music, as the above example shows, it is difficult to extricate textual meaning from ideas
about pitch, rhythm, and harmony as well as other musical qualities such as kinetic
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pattern or unity. Vocal music has a straightforward connection to expressivist and
significationist notions of the nature of music. The same does not hold for these
theoretical perspectives on the nature of music as each is associated with music generated
by the use of humanly constructed instruments.
Performance Based Courses – Band, Orchestra, and
Individual Instrument Classes
Courses in instrumental music, which include band, orchestra, and various
individual instrument classes in group format, such as piano or violin, shared many of the
same general underlying philosophical ideas in relation to aesthetics as the vocal courses
did. Ideas reflected, advanced, and synthesized material from musical aesthetics but the
difference, as stated earlier, was a greater—though not exclusive—association with
formalist thought.28
A reason for the link between formalist musical aesthetics and instrumental music
is due to the fact that much music written for band or orchestra is absolute music.
Absolute music, as described by Sigmund Spaeth,
is music that depends entirely on its own material to establish a mood or create
directly an emotional or intellectual response. It has not descriptive title, nor does
it lean on any other extraneous factors for support. It is music pure and simple,
with nothing but tones and time to carry its message…titles or playing directions
may give a hint as to the gayety or somberness of their mood, but beyond this
their message is absolute, an abstract proposition, entirely removed from the
concrete except as it exists in the materials of music itself and the physical
qualities of the interpreting instruments.29
Absolute music is often juxtaposed in musical aesthetics with so-called program music,
or music “which, by its title, or descriptive analysis, or its words, actions, scenery or
accompanying pictures, tells a story, indicates a definite episode, hence follows a distinct
28
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program.”30 Program music need not necessarily be vocal music, but a good example of
program music is opera. Likewise, absolute music need not necessarily be instrumental.
One example might be a chorus humming a piece that has no title. The point is that the
music written for the instrumentalist tends to be absolute, such as a Bach or Brahms
concerto, and its descriptions, therefore, are more readily linked with formalism.
Aestheticians could provide many counter examples, but in music education the
association between formalism and instrumental performance is present. For example,
Lucy Markham Chinn, in posing a question to a fictitious piano class, asks “What is
music?...finally, the idea is advanced that music is beautiful sound.”31 A formalist
response for sure. For her, “the objective is to begin study with the ear…first, about
objectives outside music; then we notice the difference between tone and noise.”32 The
importance given to listening in this example is in place so the piano student is better able
to acquaint himself to music along formalist lines. Formalism here, however, is only
reflected in her argument, it serves as the aesthetic foundation of her practice, but there is
no critique and problems with this perspective are not considered.
Earhart’s work is more sophisticated than Chinn’s because he advances a
philosophical idea and relates it to instrumental performance. Examining the merits and
defects of expressivism, Earhart accepts for music education the formalist arguments of
Bell and Edmund Gurney. By using specific examples from Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony
in C Minor, Op. 67 Earhart argues this monumental work
expresses something in C-Minor; something that appears to need rather insistent
reiteration; something that moves restlessly, urgently, but ‘without joy’; that now
30
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thunders, now whispers, now gropes, now moves confidently; that is compounded
of sounds by flutes that express flute-meanings; of sounds like timpani that
express timpani-meanings and horn meanings. If we seek more explicit
‘explanation’ than this we shall probably descend for it.33
While this example shows the link between formalist ideas and instrumental music,
Earhart acknowledges that music education is not limited to instrumental music.
Therefore, he advances formalist ideas for music education generally because for him
if one does know, and is keenly responsive to, the factors that constitute music in
general, he is then prepared to enjoy specific modes of employment of these
factors that are represented in many compositions of different types. The material
presented to young children, therefore, does not represent repertory so much as it
represents their introduction to tone, rhythm, color, form, design.34
The inner workings of a piece of music are at the heart of Brock McElheran’s
argument for generating a more artistic performance. Although he does not exclusively
write about the instrumental ensemble, rehearsals of the instrumentalist occupies much of
his attention. For him, the use of theory in rehearsals, particularly harmony, “can speed
up the learning of notes, correct bad intonation, and improve the aesthetic effect of a
piece.”35 He takes ideas from musical aesthetics to justify his argument that the structure
of music is important to pay attention to in rehearsals. His critique of modern practice in
rehearsal rests on the notion that “most musicians recognize the importance of phrasing
and hidden themes, but in this age, relatively little time is spent in thinking about the
aesthetic and emotional quality of structure.”36 Using formalist language regarding the
nature of music, he makes a comparison between architecture and music. McElheran
writes, “It is not too far fetched [sic] to compare the element of structure in music with
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the beauty of design in a statue or cathedral…the musical effect may be built up by
counterpoint, fugue, fugal device, or by harmonic pattern, as is so often the case in
Beethoven’s key relationships.”37 Rehearsal are then used to help students understand
“the true nature of form in music”38 through emphasis on certain passages that allegedly
resemble formal characteristics in the sister arts. Oddly, the comparison does not rest on
extramusical associations because what he is comparing is a matter of form and design
not on what the design means or an emotion brought about by contact with the form
itself. Teaching for aesthetic effect and with aesthetic principles in mind was not limited
to performance based courses. Topics on and from musical aesthetics are also seen in the
discourse in other areas of music education such as in the music appreciation class and in
generalized address on music to the entire field.
Non-Performance Based Courses – Appreciation, Theory, Harmony, and Music History
The next area of music education discourse reflecting underlying support or
rejection of particular ideas in musical aesthetics and/or advancing certain views on the
philosophical subject are found in the non-performance based evidence. Like the
previous section on the nature of music that distinguished the performance based material
into two categories, the instrumental and the vocal, this section is also subdivided. The
first section includes perspectives and ideas from musical aesthetics in the classes where
listening to music is emphasized. Examples of these courses seen in many, but by no
means all schools and mainly in the upper grades—junior and senior high—are music
theory, music appreciation,39 harmony, and music history. The material examined in the
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second division of this section includes topics generalized for all of music education not
necessarily related to any specific category of music instruction previously mentioned
and points of view regarding music in the curriculum. Examples of these generalized
topics include addresses and discussions like Karl Gehrkens “Ultimate Ends in Public
School Music”40 and Lilla Belle Pitts’ “The Place of Music in a System of Education.”41
Unlike the previous section the notion of the nature of music in non-performance based
courses and in generalized discourse is more developed and recurrent throughout the
period.
Because non-performance based courses necessarily spend less time learning such
things as fingering technique or proper tonal production—the technical “how to” training
objective of singing, playing, and listening. It consists chiefly of the development of right attitudes and
emotional responses—reactions to musical stimuli.” Russell Morgan, “Developing a Program for Music
Education,” in Yearbook of the Music Supervisors National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors
National Conference,1931), 61-66, 63. Lillian Baldwin also defends a broad conception of what music
appreciation is in her 1938 address to the MENC. For her “the feature which distinguishes an appreciation
class from all other musical activities is that here, history, biography, theory and illustrative playing and
singing become means to an end which is neither knowledge nor performance but intelligent enjoyment of
music.” Lillian Baldwin, “Music Appreciation in General Classes and for Special Groups,” in Yearbook of
the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1938),
191-194, 194. Everyone did not accept these broad defenses of music appreciation classes. In 1932,
Thomas Briggs encapsulates the divide adequately in his statement “I seem to detect a distinct tendency to
deprecate the teaching of appreciation without performance.” Thomas Briggs “A Layman Listens to
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elements of playing music—more class hours could be spent on a broader range of
musical topics. Examples of possible study include biographical information on
composers or the elements of folk music infused into particular compositions. A
transformation from an emphasis solely on playing to one on a broader understanding of
music is mentioned by Karl Gehrkens in his “Theory Courses for Students of Applied
Music.”42 This is not to say that the leader of a performance group did not address
musical topics as part of the class instruction. I merely suggest that without the time
required to put together a performance more time could be spent in the non-performance
based course on a wide ranging variety of topics and subjects relating to music. In other
words, it is rare for the orchestra leader to explore the structure and evolution of choral
music from the Troubadours to Palestrina and later to the Oratorio, while preparing for
the upcoming festival or contest.
The broader range of topics that could be and were discussed in the nonperformance based courses allowed for a diverse number of perspectives on the nature of
music. Formalism in this period girds many thoughts on the nature of music. In
Osbourne McConathy’s 1910 address “High School Music” he described coursework
undertaken at Chelsea High School in Chelsea, Michigan.
Theoretical music…aims to develop the power to think in tones in correct melodic
and harmonic relations…the training will develop a keen sensitiveness to the
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beauties of rhythm, melody, and harmony, and will be a means to opening to them
the inner purpose of the technical elements of composition.43
Will Earhart presents the report of the Committee of High School Music at the 1912
MSNC meeting. Earhart, speaking for the group, argues there must be genuine musical
knowledge that accompanies the teaching and learning of music. For the committee
genuine musical knowledge in music appreciation meant “analysis of the form and
content of these [great composers’] compositions, together with contributory study of
musical history, biography, form and forms, and THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF
THE ELEMENTS AND LAWS OF MUSICAL BEAUTY.44 Not only are formalist
notions of the nature of music present but this is also an example where practice is
intended to be influenced, and with an underlying philosophical position. Although the
committee does not develop what “the elements and laws of musical beauty” are, it is
implied that content and form provide the structure on which such elements and laws are
investigated and realized. Formalism persisted in its connection with discourse on the
topic of music appreciation as can be seen in Earhart’s 1948 Music Educators Journal
article “The Roots of Appreciation,” as well as Sudie Williams’ 1920 address “Music
Appreciation in the Elementary Grades.” Citing an unattributed source she conveys
“music is stored up thought told in beautiful tones.”45 These examples contain
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underlying formalist ideas. A more sophisticated approach that cites formalist ideas and
also exposes problems with differing viewpoints came from Earhart.
In relation to formalism in non-performance based courses, and in a philosophical
manner, Earhart charges the materialist and empirical philosophy embraced by society
and rooted in the work of Francis Bacon is epistemologically limited. For Earhart,
“science, then cannot guide us in moral and aesthetic matters.”46 He takes the aesthetic
as another way of knowing and uses this idea to encourage teachers of music education to
consider “(1) What is there in music to be appreciated? (2) What is the nature of
appreciation? (3) What is its value in human life?”47 It is in response to the first question
that Earhart supplies a formalist answer, which he acknowledges is adopted from
Goodhart Rendel’s definition of music in Fine Art. He asserts, “the material of music is
commonly said to be tone.”48 In a subsequent passage his formalist position is advanced
while critiquing expressivism and intending to influence practice. For him,
tone is also the one exclusive and distinguishing possession of
music…considering the universality of response to tone, its basic character, its
intensity, and its value, it would appear that to seek beauty and purity of tone, and
develop discrimination with respect to it, in every form of musical activity, should
be the paramount concern of every teacher…the majestic beauties of form also
come forth in clearer relief when programmatic and highly emotional interests are
not advanced to the forefront of attention.49
Although Earhart’s position on the nature of music shows a formalist influence in relation
to appreciation, his work is still typical of many music education scholars.
His work, while incorporating ideas from musical aesthetics, blends two or more
theoretical perspectives. Earhart’s writings, as will be shown throughout this dissertation,
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display aspects of formalism, but however highly he regarded it, it was not the only
theory for which he expressed support. “The Roots of Appreciation” is a good example
of his embracing more than one perspective on the nature of music. He both
acknowledges expressivism as a valid position while simultaneously calling into question
some of the basic tenets of the theory. For example, and in reference to the nature of
music, he recognizes “in all the arts, aestheticians find three factors, namely Material,
Form, and Expression.”50 By taking Santayana’s headings on the nature of art as
“Material, Form, and Expression” from the philosopher’s The Sense of Beauty and using
these to justify his argument that music be taught more thoughtfully, Earhart gives tacit
support to expressivism. And it is under the heading of expressivism that he both
supports and calls the theory into question by exposing a major problem with it. He
writes, “All agree that any work of art seems somehow to be expressive. The difficulty
begins when we ask what is expressed?”51 Here Earhart leans toward an expressivist
view of a necessary and sufficient condition of music, namely that it is an expression, and
then he does what formalist critics of expressivism typically do, and that is cast doubt on
the precision of what is expressed. More will be brought up on this topic in the chapter
on meaning. The point for now is to state that discourse on the nature of music was
varied, and the variability sometimes happened within a single paper.
Variation on the nature of music also appears with regard to perspectives reflected
and advanced from other theories such as Platonism, German idealism, and views fully in
support of expressivism. A.E. Winship argues in a characteristically German idealist
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manner, “Music is physical and intellectual life spiritualized.”52 Similarly, in answering
the question “What is appreciation?” Augustus Zanzig calls into questions tenets of
formalism and an element of significationism by giving an explanation of music and
music appreciation that reflects an underlying German idealist and Langerian view on
musical aesthetics. For him
Music is often undistinguished from merely sensuous pleasure; from knowledge
about music; or from the pride of performance…or it is identified with
sentimentality and with delight in ‘pictures’ and stories supposed to be suggested
by the music. But to appreciate a man is to participate completely, selfforgetfully, in his life; it is in the ideal sense, to live in him, and there feel the
motion of his spirit, hidden from ordinary sight. And so is it to appreciate music,
which is an image of that inner motion.53
Each of these authors asserts that the nature of music “affords intuitions or insights of
profound transcendental significance. Music is at once an end in itself and a means of
spiritual elevation, at once fundamentally mindful and fundamentally felt.”54
The expressivist view on the nature of music is also found in the non-performance
classes. Franklin Dunham, in “A Music Understanding Course for the Junior High
School” uses the expressivist view of Walter Spalding as groundwork and an important
component for approaching deeper musical understanding. Music, according to
Spalding, “is a tone picture of an emotional experience, regulated by an overwhelming
intellectual power.”55 Dunham then asserts that certain things such as “cacophony” or
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other “harmonious sounds” do not constitute music.56 Therefore, while form may not be
required, content is.57 Unfortunately, Dunham does not go on to question if form can be
separated from content, he simply accepts that “Musical Understanding must necessarily
consist of a knowledge of the form, the emotional and intellectual content, and the
relative development background which music composition possesses.”58 Dunham
clearly embraces expressivism by suggesting that understanding cannot be fully complete
unless there is knowledge of what it is the music allegedly expresses, its “emotional and
intellectual content.” Along similar lines Thomas Briggs claims, “Art is anything
produced which results in a satisfying emotional response.”59 Using a musical example
to justify his position he writes, “Nothing is art, not even the masterpieces of Mozart,
Bach, Mendelssohn and Beethoven, unless it results in a feeling satisfying to someone.”60
It is not clear in Briggs’ paper if eating ice cream in the park on a pleasant summer day
could also bring about a “satisfying emotional response.” However, his definition of art
not only states ideas at the heart of expressivism, but it is also highly subjective. Both the
expressivist and subjective components of Briggs’ definition are ideas he advances in the
course of the paper. While one might call his definition relativistic, it is, in my view,
merely a matter of taste and preference. Furthermore, as Beardsley explains, “It is the
existence of divergent preferences that gives rise to dispute in the first place; the problem
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of Relativism is what can be done about the dispute after it arises.”61 While Briggs does
not offer much on the problem of relativism Beardsley describes, he does justify and
advance his own position using arguments from variability and the argument from
inflexibility.62 From the argument of variability he asserts, “art is personal, that it differs
with individuals.”63 From the argument from inflexibility he argues art “differs with
fashion, modes and countries.”64 Briggs’ main purpose was to ensure more students
would be able to appreciate music by making it more emotionally accessible through
experience. To achieve this end his inclusion of philosophical arguments displays how
educators could use a theoretical position in musical aesthetics with the intent of
influencing practice.
Historical context had no substantive effect on the topic of the nature of music in
non-performance based courses from 1907 to 1958. Neither war nor peace nor
depression nor prosperity appeared to have influence over the argument’s underlying
problems and theories relating to the necessary and sufficient conditions of music in
musical aesthetics. In 1945, for example, while there were numerous papers being
written with suggestions for music teachers to support the war effort, there were, on the
topic of the nature of music (this is not the same for value), arguments that continued
from the earlier periods. Bertha Bailey’s “High School Theory,” for example, presents an
explanation of what the high school theory course ought to look like. Embedded in her
description is the notion that music is a “complete expression.”65 The expression of
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which she speaks is further defined and fundamentally linked with the structures of
music. “Tempo, dynamics, tone, all of these problems are in the music and will only
come out as they should if one has a good grasp of the construction.”66 Bailey’s ideas on
the nature of music, much like Earhart’s, have a formalist bent. Yet, while there is
similarity on the topic of the characteristics of music, there is, as can be seen in this
section, nothing anyone would call consensus. Furthermore, context did not significantly
influence ideas here. Whether the material was from Earhart’s Report of the High School
Committee written in 1912 or his “The Roots of Appreciation” written in 1948, or
Dunham’s “A Music Understanding Course” written in 1926 or Bailey’s “High School
Theory” written in 1945, ideas about how music is described were more dependent upon
a theory’s merit for music in the eyes of the music educator than in the time period in
which such educators wrote.
Generalized Topics and Integration
Included in this last part of the section of non-performance based topics are
subjects from the field that are generalized to the entire field of music education. Papers
and ideas here are as specific as the integration of music within the curriculum and as
general as arguments on the principles and objectives of school music. Here again, the
larger economic and political context has little bearing when it comes to the subject of the
nature of music. What one begins to notice, however, is that the larger ideas within the
discourse are influenced by both social, political, and economic factors as well as the
educational spirit of the time. Not too far removed from World War II Howard Hanson,
in his “The Scope of the Music Education Program,” examines the role of music
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education in relation to general education “in line with the best in progressive thought,”67
as well as situating it within the efforts put forth by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in promoting international
understanding. So, while context and setting are important for the analysis of the main
ideas presented in many of these works, often linked with notions of value, the
descriptions of music are not fundamentally altered by context. There simply is not much
of a story to be told. The themes in musical aesthetics that appear in the previous
sections on performance and non-performance based topics, such as formalism,
expressivism, and significationism, remain and are advanced in the historical evidence
from music educators. One notable exception to the lack of context in other theories on
the nature of music comes from socioaesthetic theory. Socioaesthetic theory rests on the
notion that art is “concentrated social substance,”68 and as such it is necessarily bound to
context. In any case the discourse in generalized topics relating to the nature of music
continued to not only be present but also varied, rich, noteworthy, insightful, and
naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators. Additionally, of all the
sections of this dissertation containing material on the characteristics and descriptions of
music, the part on generalized topics is larger in both size and scope.
Absence of a plot and/or any mean spirited debate does not make this section on
generalized topics in music education on the nature of music devoid of interest. On the
contrary. What is fascinating from a scholarly standpoint is the multiplicity of
perspectives revealed in an area that the standard interpretation of philosophy of music
education argues is philosophically barren, especially in relation to aesthetics. The 1914
67

Howard Hanson “The Scope of the Music Education Program,” Music Educators Journal 34,
no. 6 (June-July 1948) : 7-8, 54, 56-57, 7.
68
Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, 129.

136
MSNC convention was held from April 27 through May 1 in Minneapolis, MN, and at
the banquet held on Wednesday evening at Hotel West, Charles Farnsworth argued for
the teaching of “right feeling” in music.69 In arriving at this conclusion he asserts,
“When people get up and say all these glorious things about music,--music is a language
etc. I feel in one sense, like saying, rot!...it is the feel.”70 Farnsworth’s assertion about
the nature of music is interesting not only because it displays the underlying expressivist
view, but also because of the idea that feeling can be and must be taught. The belief that
feeling can be taught is an idea from Langer that was attached to the MEAE movement,
which shows continuity from the first half of the century to the second. Continuity is also
seen in Karl Gehrkens paper “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music Teaching” and the
subsequent discussion generated from his address. A question Gehrkens asks music
educators to consider is whether the group should develop the “esthetic and emotional
nature of the child…or shall we emphasize theory-teaching most strongly, assuring that it
is knowledge about music.”71 At the conclusion of the discussion Karl Gehrkens issued a
statement at the request of Arthur Mason, president of the MSNC at the time, which
reflected the attempt to resolve the question. Gehrkens writes that while the so-called
scientific side of music is to be studied,
it should always be as a means to an end and never as an end in itself…these
technical aspects of musical study must never be allowed to interfere with the
legitimate working out of those emotional and aesthetic phases of music which
constitute the real essence of the art; in other words it is the art side of music with
its somewhat intangible influence which we are seeking to cultivate.72
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Here, again, in the adopting of an expressivist position where emotion is a necessary and
sufficient condition of music there is a presupposition that, on some level, feeling is
teachable. Following this address and discussion, music educators continued to use ideas
from expressivist theory in conjunction with explanations of descriptions of music.
The address of Herbert Weatherspoon at the MSNC meeting in 1929 titled
“Aesthetic Education and Music” supports the larger argument made in this dissertation
in a few ways. First, his message explicitly links aesthetic education with the instruction
of music, which predates the standard interpretation’s assertion of the origins of MEAE
movement by thirty years. Second, it is another argument for the cultivation of feeling.
Rhetorically he asks
are we even now cramming so many little heads full of information and facts,
instead of leaving a little room for the feeling, for all of the beauty of life which so
many pass by and wholly miss, just because they never have been taught to see, to
hear, and to feel?73
Finally, while he does use an expressivist assertion regarding the nature of music, he also
includes ideas on meaning and value from German idealism, Plato, and some material
from Bell, a formalist, and perspectives found in the work of Dewey and Collingwood.
Weatherspoon’s argument that music “arouses the same or like emotions in the crowd or
in the classroom,”74 is immediately followed by “[it] develops that kind of understanding
which as Plato says precedes reasoning power.”75 Since it is not the place to go into
meaning and value in this chapter, it simply stands as an example supporting my larger
thesis and shows an expressivist outlook.
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Expressivist notions on the necessary and sufficient conditions of music are seen
in numerous other works throughout the period. In 1933 Orville Borchers writes, “Art is
a human expression from one person to another of those ideals and expressions of life
which are governed by laws of beauty and grandeur.”76 James Mursell states, “Two
aspects of esthetic experience are present in the enjoyment of music…one aspect can be
described as awareness, interest, and insight regarding music, and the other as emotional
expression through music.”77 In 1941 Hanson argues music “is the greatest educator of
the emotions.”78 Scribbled on notebook paper for a music class she was teaching or a
speech she was preparing Pitts asserts, “music is as direct a conveyor of emotions as a
‘blow or a caress.’”79 In 1954 Karl Ernst wrote music “is an art of expression and
communication which goes beyond words.”80 Replete with references to expressivist
ideas about the nature of music the period of 1907 to 1958 was one in which the
connection between music and emotion was abundantly evident.
There are simple reflections of expressivist ideas from early in the century when
Gehrkens wrote, “music is a language of the emotions”81 to later when Pitts wrote,
“music offers a means of expression and communication that goes deeper than reason and
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beyond the power of words.”82 Also included in the material from this time are
sophisticated treatments of expressivism. Earhart’s “Beethoven, The Interpreter of Life”
written in 1909 is dedicated to considering the insights into human life the composer had
that are then revealed in his music. Oleta Benn, a contributor to Basic Concepts in Music
Education: The Fifty–Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of
Education,83 states a problem with expressivist doctrine in 1956. She writes, “the famous
question which asks whether or not the tonal art expresses emotion, and, if it does not,
what then does it express?84 Later in the paper, after some analysis of elements of the
nature of music, she argues that the “material of our art is sound”85 and as such the form
consists of “tonal combinations or tonal designs which go forward in time.”86 She also
develops the idea of music being expressive. She does not think that such a thing as
“tonal design” is enough to satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for something
to be labeled music. Instead she says in addition to the basic element of sound and forms
“we are obliged to consider the remarkable effects which result from the exploitation of
the properties of tone by the composer.”87 Benn continues,
These properties are not so barren when used by the artist in the expression of his
idea; they are not detached from the impressive form as conceived by the
composer. The contrasts, the similarities, the tension, the relaxation, the rapid
pace, the gradual ritard (sic), the change of mood, of tonal color, the hesitancies,
the climatic peaks, the gentle close, the short biting staccato, the calm legato
line—indeed all the means by which expression is achieved, are never divorced
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from the notational designs in the composer’s mind—they are an integral part of
the composition.88
Benn gives her readers an answer to the earlier problem by using examples of what is
expressed in the music although she does not follow it through with specific music
examples showing such and such is expressed. Nevertheless she advanced the notion that
a characteristic of music is not sound alone but rather how that sound and tonal design are
used in order to express something in the composer’s mind. The non-conceptual quality
music possesses, according to the expressivist, is an idea that Dewey also mentions. It is
also under the influence of the pragmatists that some music educators wrestled with ideas
of expressivist thought.
Dewey writes in Art as Experience, “Through the use of instruments, sound is
freed from the definiteness it has acquired through association with speech. It thus
reverts to its primitive passional quality. It achieves generality, detachment from
particular objects and events.”89 The work of the Pragmatists, especially the ideas of
Dewey given in Art as Experience, are peculiar on the topic of the nature of music. The
ideas are peculiar because the group occupies two camps. Primacy is in the experience
itself and as such the experience is at the center of the philosophical investigation. It is as
a corollary that the material that relates to or is used in the experience is examined.
Because of the primacy accorded the experience, the pragmatist school of thought has
more affinity with the categories of meaning in musical aesthetics. There are, however,
clues from these thinkers that show an alignment with expressivism and the nature of
music.
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Music educators of the time spoke of students experiencing music and the
importance of the musical experience, but it was not as common for these writers to refer
to an experience in the Deweyan sense when examining the nature of music. Foster
McMurray, however, shows the link between the experience and music in his 1956 paper
“A Pragmatic Approach to Certain Aspects of Music Education.”90 He writes,
As the listener listens he finds himself responding to heard sounds, and whatever
he hears, and only what he hears, is that which causes in him a qualitative
response…if the experience of goodness in an episode of music should lead the
listener to want to find more of that goodness in the future, then, if he is
intelligent, he will want to know somewhat of that which a composer must
know.91
Even here the connection with expressivism is muddled, mainly because the emphasis is
on having an experience rather than all the correlatives of the experience. William
Kilpatrick explains it like this, “the actual experiences as we have them constitute at once
the matter of study and the stuff of the explanation.”92 That is, you cannot divorce the
experience from what constitutes it. If a particular musical passage allegedly expresses
an emotion of some sort, you examine the emotion in context, that is, in the experience of
the music. So, “whenever man by his conscious contriving succeeds in effecting desired
results, there is art in its broadest but essential definition.”93 Finally, in espousing a
constructivist view of teaching music where “emphasis is placed upon creative activity
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and constructive doing,”94 Frank Baker states, “Music becomes a means of child
development through self-expression, a thing to be lived rather than to be learned.”95
Even though ideas relating to the expression of emotion as a characteristic of
music are as common as adjudicators at music contests, not everyone agreed with
expressivist sentiment. Notions of expressivism did not go unchallenged, although
pointed long-running debates between those calling music expressive and those doubting
music’s ability to clearly express particular emotions were infrequent. Again, it is
difficult to argue that the nature of music is based solely on tonal relations when in the
same address there is tacit acceptance that music also is self-expression. Music
educators, however, who referenced formalist thinkers like Bell and Hanslick and
displayed skepticism to elements of expressivism and significationism, did just that.
While this does not necessarily mean the work of these music educators was any less
philosophical because two viewpoints were used to support an argument, inferences can
be made regarding where these scholars were in the articulation on material relating to
musical aesthetics. First, there was likely confusion on comprehending the compatibility
of fine gradations of various differences between philosophical theories. That is, for
example, if music is a language why is it precluded from also being tonally moving form?
Second, there is the manner in which the schools of thought are employed. Here, it was
that elements of a theory lent support to a larger argument where a variety of evidence
was used to justify a point unrelated to musical aesthetics specifically. Finally, there was
a sort of pluralism in the field. Music educators, in attempting to solve problems in
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music education and because of their experience as musicians etc., possessed a particular
insight that enabled them to argue music may be more than one given set of precepts—a
synthesis if you will. It, therefore, should not be wholly disheartening from a
philosophical standpoint to work through Earhart’s thoughtful arguments with the
knowledge that they rest on claims of both Bell and Santayana.
Earhart is an interesting case. He clearly has a formalist leaning which is seen in
comments such as “all of us who are purists or absolutists in music….”96 But on the
issue of the nature of music the formalist aspect of his view of music is only partial.
Earhart is keenly aware of topics central to musical aesthetics. He begins his address to
the New Jersey State Teacher’s Association by suggesting that problems in teaching
music “arise in part from incomplete or imperfect conceptions of the nature and function
of music. What music is, how it makes its appeal to us…are questions that aesthetics and
a psychology of beauty might answer.”97 From there he outlines “two aspects of musical
aesthetics,”98 which are located in the origins of music and correspond generally to the
ideas of expressivism and formalism. In reference to the origins of music and
expressivism he cites Wagner’s assertion that music is “emotional expression.”99 And for
formalism he refers to “a contrasting doctrine, which…would declare that music arose
from the pleasure of art in tone.”100 Earhart follows up his definitions of the two
contrasting doctrines with an observation regarding how practice is guided by the
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acceptance of the ideas from one or the other. He writes “in the choice of music for
orchestra, band, choruses, and in the quality and trend of our interpretative instructions
and directions, we all reveal a more or less complete acceptance of one or the other of
these doctrines.”101 From here he continues criticizing the theories by drawing out
elements of each on the characteristics of music as well as its meaning, and concludes by
saying, “the significance of this discussion to a group of teachers lies in its emphasis on
the purely tonal values that inhere in music.”102 His conclusion reveals his formalist
stance on the nature of music, but he never truly gives up his affinities for Santayana.
Other writers also display formalist characteristics in their views in the area of
generalized topics on music education. Mabelle Glenn writes, “Music is a tone pattern.
In the more complex forms it is merely, to the uninitiated, a confusion of sounds ‘in
motion’ that, upon closer acquaintance, becomes an orderly arrangement of tone.”103
Spaeth begins The Common Sense of Music with the formalist statement “music is the
Organization of Sound toward Beauty.”104 Much later in the book he writes
the underlying purpose of the composer is always to make his melodic material as
interesting as possible to the hearer…by introducing even a few of the numerous
devices known to musical elaboration, he can create a diversion which will then
emphasize all the more the beauty of the melodies themselves, when they are
heard again, in part or as a whole.105
The reader has most likely noticed that the emphasis Spaeth gives to the composer’s work
relies on formalist theory. The so-called trick of the contrast relies on “numerous
devices” which need not have any relations to the emotion of the composer or percipient,
101

Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 6.
103
Mabelle Glenn “Rhythm, ” in Thirty-Fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of
Education Part II Music Education, ed. Guy Montrose Whipple, Prepared by the Society’s Committee on
Music Education (Bloomington, IN: Public School Publishing Company, 1936), 51-58, 51.
104
Spaeth, The Common Sense of Music, ix.
105
Ibid., 248.
102

145
but are rather “admirably clever”106 constructions of the melody itself. Spaeth, however,
does not think that formalist ideas are the only ideas in music since he writes on a great
variety of material that explains and has as a basis for his arguments material from other
theoretical schools of thought. In another case of multiple philosophical personalities
James Mursell argues that “an essential task of the music program is that of bringing
beauty to the child—beauty in a peculiarly compelling form—tonal beauty.”107 Formalist
ideas were also included in the historical material in a sophisticated manner.
Hanson writes in a lengthy and highly formalist statement
The greatest problem in the study of music, from the standpoint of the musician or
layman, is found within the nature of the material with which the art is made…the
art of music is the art of sound. Its media are sound and time…the musician, in
order to make himself, borrows terminology from other fields. He speaks of
color, but this is a term borrowed from painting…music is not blue or green, or
black or white, or bright or dark. There may be connotations in the mind of the
listener, but they are only connotations. The critic may speak of line or form in
music, but these are terms borrowed from architecture, from sculpture…there is
no line or form in music, but only tonal or time relationships, and yet we
frequently speak of writing a symphony as though we were building a structure of
brick, stone, or steel. The problems may be analogous, but they are
fundamentally entirely different. The musician, whether he be creator or
performer, only confuses himself by these analogies.108
Hanson makes the reader aware that the difficulties presented in musical understanding
are rooted in the nature of music itself. In making his argument, Hanson’s formalist
position refutes significationist notions of the nature of music calling this latter position a
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so-called crutch and “an impediment rather than an aid to his understanding.”109 Views
rooted in aesthetic formalism like Hanson’s above, or those espousing expressivism on
the nature of music were not accepted by all, and were just two of many theories linked to
music education where questions arose regarding music’s characteristics.
H.L. Butler argues in “The Vital Elements of Music” that such elements are
originality, sincerity, nobility, vitality, and quality.110 In the course of his paper he
references Hanslick’s critique of Wagner and cites Calvocoressi’s Musical Taste and
How to Form It, in which the latter suggests, “theoretical considerations can never
provide a standard or proof of beauty…analyzing can only tell us how sounds are
combined, without ever helping us to know why certain combinations leave us entirely
unmoved.”111 Once again a writer has not only shown an understanding of theories in the
field of aesthetics but has effectively used such ideas to advance a related argument, in
this case that quality music instruction should employ those inner and vital elements
Butler says are necessary and sufficient conditions of music.112
The notion that there are qualities to music outside of the tonal relations or the
expression of emotion lead us at this point to two other oft recurring theories revealed in
the evidence—signification and socioaesthetics. Significationists are those who suggest
music “is an iconic sign of a psychological process”113 or “signifies, inclines toward,
and/or refers or represents something extramusical,”114 which includes such things as
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language and feeling. Echoing the arguments of the significationist is J. Victor Bergquist
who recognizes the problem of describing music. In responding to the problem of what
music is, he says it is “a language, a universal language, the most comprehensive means
of expression.”115 Bergquist’s assertion is distinct from expressivism because in this
brief statement he invokes music’s similarity to language and, while mentioning
emotions, recognizes that emotions are brought about by the symbolic material of
language. He asserts later, with a resounding significationist quality, the philosophy of
music is “the relationship of beats and tones, and their application to the emotional and
intellectual life of man.”116 Therefore, in practice, the teacher is to reconcile the
aforementioned philosophy with an “understanding of the student mind.”117
In the same book of proceedings, William Bentley writes, blending
signficationism and Platonic mimesis, “Music is the beautiful language of nature herself,
for there is scarcely anything on land or sea which cannot be mirrored through music.”118
He follows this significationist and mimetic assertion on the nature of music with a
similar statement that uses an example readers today would consider racist. On the topic
of folk songs and “negro spirituals” he says, “music is the language of emotion, and in
the simple songs of simple people we feel the pulse, the temperament, the real character
of these people.”119 Each of these works not only reflects the underlying aesthetic theory
of signification but each also closely examines music and its extramusical associations in
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order to justify their respective arguments. Bentley even refers to the Greek musical
philosophy of “celestial harmonies” and “music of the spheres.”120 While his reference to
these Greek ideas might suggest his paper is really idealist in that it calls on the mimetic
quality of music, this would be an incomplete understanding. For Bentley the problem is
his use of the term mirror, a metaphor to which he applies ideas from many aesthetic
theories.121 The essence of what he is really trying to get at is beyond simple Platonic
mimesis. For Bentley, extramusical associations may take—mirror—whatever form they
may, be it emotional, societal, or physical, whereas Platonic mimesis is traditionally
restricted to the good alone. The point is that Bentley actively engages the reader in
thoughtful writing that relies on ideas about music found in aesthetics but does it in a way
that relates to his purpose, which is for the music teacher to be aware that music is far
more than notes on a page and should be taught with this in mind. Like Bentley,
Bergquist uses philosophical material to support a position. But unlike Bentley,
Bergquist advances a specific idea relating to a position in aesthetics. Bergquist’s work
relies on significationism and he methodically displays and connects the material of
music with extramusical associations, some of which will be addressed in the following
chapter on meaning. Bergquist’s purpose, like Bentley’s is characteristically
significationist because it calls for educators to “lead students to the wellspring in their
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own lives. Let them hear, use, and see, musically.”122 These are ideas that imply
extramusical associations in a symbolic manner.
James Koontz also ties together ideas from signification and teaching by
suggesting “Teachers can and should help students to translate these [musical]
experiences into the language of feeling. One of our primary tasks is to develop the
latent aesthetic sensibilities of our students to beauty in all its varied forms.”123 Koontz
continues, “some of the highest and holiest concepts developed by the mind of man have
their expression in the symbolism of art and music,” as such “it is imperative for us
[music educators] to read and comprehend the symbolism before we can share in the
experiencing of such concepts.”124 Here again ideas of underlying aesthetic theory are
used with the intention to influence practice.
While there are a number of perspectives on what is entailed in the practice of
music, such as listening, performing, or integrating music with other subjects in the
curriculum, one of the ways learning of music that was promoted was as a creative
endeavor. Often the creative program took the form of students writing their own
compositions and staging musical events which showcased the work of students. During
World War II Pitts even made a connection between the war and creative music. She
describes the Victory Corp Project as one where “every Victory Corp School is being
urged to provide its own Victory Corp song. This offers a timely and real incentive to
thousands of our boys and girls…to compose such songs for their own particular
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schools.”125 Additionally, the Schools at War Project promoted a song-writing project
that asked students to infuse in their composition the ideas of saving, serving, and
conserving.126 This type of creative music could be critiqued by a scholar embracing
socioaesthetic perspectives. To prove his point the socioaesthetician would argue the
compositions of a wartime creative project shows how social and economic concerns take
priority over aesthetic concerns. The Marxist’s point about endeavors such as the
Schools at War Project would apply the principle of nonneutrality to prove the argument.
That is “every aesthetic object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency
to promote, or to interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.”127
It is not clear, however, if student compositions had any so-called aesthetic value.
Regardless, the question of whether music generated through wartime creative projects
was noteworthy or even the subject of analysis by a Marxist or socioaesthetician is
debatable, especially since a writer embracing the latter position roils at the suggestion
that music has utility. Including the idea here does, however, force an examination of the
evidence reflecting the socioaesthetic and/or Marxist view of the nature of music.
Socioaesthetics, particularly the work of Adorno, defines art as “concentrated
social substance.”128 Art itself is, therefore, historically bound and is a product of social
context. In “Recognition of Beauty Through Art, Literature, and Music” Dudley Watson
argues that for art to be creative it cannot be imitative, thus he would reject what Pitts
called for earlier. For Watson, “one sees in art a great struggle of youth, modern as
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everything else. Art today is a reflection of this struggle.”129 Cloea Thomas in “Modern
Music for the Elementary Grades Children” writes
The phenomenal speed of mechanical inventions of the past sixty years and the
rapidly increasing problems of social adjustment were so troubling the creative
artists in all fields that the various phases of the struggle and the resulting
nervousness were bound to be expressed.130
She continues, “in music we recall the steady use of dissonance, in the struggle for
freedom in form, the effort to express man’s reaction to the new mechanical forces in his
environment, in the use of chromatics, polytonality and atonality.”131 Pursuing the
Adornoesque perspective in practice the teacher is to select appropriate music that has
“the characteristics of the movement and [are] not too complex or too long.”132 By
exposing the students to modern music the hope in socioaesthetic terms, was to give them
“a feeling for tonal patterns and harmonies and rhythmic combinations that are
particularly the vocabulary of the modernist.”133 It is clear from this statement how the
socioaesthetic movement is a descendant of the formalist school where the emphasis is on
music as an object and the focus is to be “tones and their artistic combination.”134
However, it is also clear, that while the emphasis is placed on the object, the music, this
music is itself a construction of history and social relations, something the formalist
rejects.
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Cultural context is at the heart of socioaesthetic doctrine, and since this is the case
views associated with it are occasionally reflected in music education discourse relating
to the integration of music with the rest of the school curriculum. As part of the so-called
Progressive movement in education the idea surfaced in music education in the 1920s and
1930s that music should be integrated to both the life of the student and to the rest of the
curriculum.135 To put it another way, “the child, then must also maintain his personal
integrity, his sense of being, of existing as a complete whole. But he also cannot exist
independently of that larger group we call organized society with which he is by nature
integrated.”136 And in socioaesthetic parlance
music, like each of the arts and sciences, is, in turn an integral part of a larger
whole which we may term life, experience, or state of culture; it is intimately
related with life situations; indeed, it could not exist independently of them.137
While the crux of Miessner’s argument deals with the problem of maintaining music’s
integrity as music, he does assent, “music is integrated experience, that it is inseparably
bound up with life.”138 It is, therefore, incumbent upon the music teacher to enable “the
children to experience music in relation to other activities in the curriculum.”139 But, he
goes on to say this must be done in a way that maintains the identity and integrity of
music.140 In 1948 Herold Hunt also writes about the integration of music, but in specific
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relation to the humanities courses. For him “music is truly the finest expression of beauty
and it is the truest interpreter of social conditions.”141 It is evident from the material
above that socioaesthetic perspectives share some affinity to ideas in the integration
movement. Socioaesthetic views, however, are not the only ones seen relating to
problems and theories on the nature of music and the subject of integration.
Integration and the nature of music are subjects that correlate with one another. It
is the purpose of the nature of music to examine the necessary, and sufficient conditions
for something to be labeled music and the notion of integration brings questions about the
characteristics of music to the fore. Questions about the descriptions and characteristics
of music are apparent in integration because music educators must, in their support or
refutation of integration, show and explain how music’s characteristics make it music.
Lylian Niquette Simpson, a supporter of integration and an assistant project supervisor of
the Federal Music Project, argues
Without emotion there may be craftsmanship, but not art…our responsibility as
educators is to help him in his search for material which will be the right medium
for working out his ideas, his feelings and emotions and to help him in the
building up of an integral experience out of the interaction of organic and
environmental conditions and energies.142
An argument for integration from Simpson had to include what her view of a necessary
and sufficient condition of music was. In this case the support for integration rested on
underlying expressivist and Deweyan expressivist notions of music.143 Pitts offers a
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nearly identical argument. Wanting to integrate but also maintain the integrity of music
she argues, “music engages the emotions and the imagination far beyond most school
experiences; therefore it induces mood and states very susceptible to aesthetic
impressions.”144 In a piece that mentions Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Berkley, Hume,
William James, and Dewey, Orville Borchers defines integration as a “dynamic unifying
force in the complete fusion of a whole experience.”145 For him, in relating music to the
“complete fusion of a whole,” and in a more cautionary manner, projects selected for
integration should not view music as a mere adjunct.146 He argues that music must be
more than a handmaiden to the other subjects because the “emotional aspect is becoming
increasingly dominant in education.”147 Even though he does not thoroughly defend why
it is only music that can bring about a particular emotional experience, he does say that
music is possessed of the unique qualities of emotion, self-expression, and social
relations.148 Not all agreed, even using expressivist support, that integration was good for
the field.
Osbourne McConathy questioned the role of music in the integration movement.
For him music “has a significant place of its own, a place which deserves its own
cultivation apart from all other associations.”149 Interestingly he uses expressivism,
German idealism, and Aristotelian catharsis as his defense. “We must do our part, and
more than our part, to show that music still maintains its place as humanity’s great
144
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spiritual and emotional expression and release.”150 Also seeing music against the
backdrop of integration from more than just an expressivist perspective was Nellie Zetta
Thompson. Her view displays an underlying significationist bent. The core of her
argument is really about the role of the teacher using music for uplift in the community.
Her attempt to make the case for uplift relies in part on a specific suggestion that
“literature and music can be brought into close association by studying music and literary
types of elements, by viewing them as integral parts of cultural epochs, or by a topical
bond.”151 Although Thompson’s article is not a demanding or probing work, the
evidence supports that there were underlying philosophical positions supporting
statements of belief. It was, in these cases, the movement toward integration, that
revealed how debate in one aspect of the discipline was a cause for argumentation using
philosophical support, regardless of the degree to which the philosophical position was
understood.
Discourse relating to musical aesthetics in the nature of music varied from the
simplistic reflection of one or another theory to a more sophisticated awareness and
incorporation of problems and theories from musical aesthetics. What is also apparent in
the evidence is a lack of consensus regarding the nature of music, which should not be
surprising considering philosophers themselves are not in full agreement on any subject.
If philosophers and other researchers cannot agree on every aspect of a debate, why
should that be expected of music educators? Much like the field of musical aesthetics,
there does not appear to be any particular position that was dominant or more accepted
than another among music educators on the subject of the nature of music. As a result
150
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there is little movement toward any type of agreement on the necessary and sufficient
conditions in terms of a philosophical argument. It may be tempting to assume that many
music educators believe very strongly that the characteristic of music can be easily
uncovered. But even if this assumption were true, further analysis reveals they do not
always articulate their arguments for this belief consistently. The arguments for a
particular position on the nature of music exist, and in some cases they are well thought,
reasoned, and systematic statements, but even in these cases the field, while “sounding
together,” has not proceeded in concert. The fact that there are disparate views on the
nature of music leads to the question of whether the same holds true for the categories of
meaning and value.

CHAPTER 4
MEANING
The patterns that were revealed in the previous chapter on the nature of music are
similar to those seen in the material on musical aesthetics from music educators on the
topic of the meaning of music. That is, the discourse that included material relating to the
necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be labeled music were embedded in
the same work that also mentions ideas relating to the interpretative and revelatory
aspects credited to music. Also, the arguments in the discourse range from material that
merely reflects the underlying philosophical problem or theory to arguments that show a
keen awareness of musical aesthetics and use the branch of philosophy in a way to
advance ideas. Finally, in terms of patterns, this time a difference between nature and
meaning, there are more references to and reliance on expressivism and signification than
any other set of problems or theory. This is not to say problems and theories from other
philosophical systems were not part of the dialogue but rather that theories such as
formalism, socioaesthetics, and German idealism were not as frequently mentioned in the
papers and addresses of the time. While there are similar patterns that surfaced in the
evidence on the topics of nature and meaning, like choral performance being linked with
expressivist or significationist thought, there are important differences.
Distinctions between the nature and meaning of music, because of their partwhole relations, are sometimes challenging to parse out because of their
interconnectedness. Differences, however, are seen. For example, an expressivist sees
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the nature of music as an expression of some quality, emotion, or feeling. Music, then, is
a revelation of the embodiment or objectification of emotion.1 The emotional quality
allegedly invoked in the music must next be examined in terms of meaning. The
emotions of say anguish or desire were either placed in the music by the composer in an
attempt to convey such emotions based on his own experience, or the percipient’s state of
mind is such that he interprets anguish or desire in the music. In both cases there is some
type of extramusical association that has been, in part, influenced by experiences with the
object of music. Whether these expressions were intended or received as such is not a
point to be debated here. The example is merely to show how meaning is distinct from
nature.
Even though there is some degree of relation between nature and meaning, the
intent of this chapter is not to compare how the two are used. The structure from the
previous chapter, however, is maintained. The first section covers material in
performance based choral instruction. The next section is brief because of the limited
amount of material on musical aesthetics for performance based instrumental courses.
Part two of the chapter is much more extensive because there is a great deal of evidence
for the non-performance based courses (although later in the time period the line is
blurred between performance and non-performance based course). There is some
evidence, for example, that suggests music appreciation begins to shift from being
primarily a listening based course to one where listening has an added musical
participation component. In other instances evidence coming from the performance
based course documents show a shift to broaden musical understanding by infusing
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elements of appreciation into rehearsal. The evidence for the generalized topics section is
vast. First, however, is the section on topics covering choral performance.
Performance Based Courses - Chorus
Significationist perspectives vary, but each rests on the notion that extramusical
connections are not only necessary and sufficient but also help in making meaning.
Included in significationist arguments are points of view that music is “an iconic sign of
psychological processes. It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does
so by presenting auditory equivalents of some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”2
Musical meaning can, therefore, be symbolically related to the “rhythm of life.” Another
perspective relating to signification is the fusion theory in which it is argued there is
correspondence between the words in a piece of music and the music itself. The meaning
of music is subsumed by text. Fusion theory places verbal language in a privileged
position in front of the music. Beyond the basic elements of fusion theory are arguments
that suggest music has its own vocabulary. In this theory the music is what expresses
meaning through chord progressions and certain tonal combinations. For example, a
“minor second [means] spiritless anguish, context of finality.”3 So, in addition to
meaning being revealed as symbolic of psychological processes, connection and
correspondence to language and meaning is also a topic covered in signification theory.
Music educators from 1907 to 1958 who conducted choruses in the school setting
and/or spoke about particular aspects of choral music and choruses in the school setting
both reflected ideas from signification theory and used significationist thought to advance
their own arguments in relation to meaning. One remarkable example of a work that has
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the question of the meaning of music at its core is Miessner’s 1912 paper “The Child
Voice in Song Interpretation.” In this paper, Miessner delves into the practice of
teaching choral music relying on perspectives from musical aesthetics. Throughout the
work he reflects ideas from German idealism and expressivism, and at one point he even
quotes Ferruccio Busoni’s “Sketch of a New Esthetic of Music.” It is near the end of his
paper where he directly advances ideas from fusion theory in the teaching of song. He
asserts
We must lead children first of all to grasp the poetic thought, to determine the
mood, atmosphere or setting…we must teach children how to determine which
phrases express mood, which WORDS express color, action, feeling, and how to
EXPRESS WITH THEIR FACES, as well as with their voices, the fuller and
deeper meaning of these key words. The tonal beauty of a language, its color
value, lies almost wholly in its vowel elements, while its consonant elements give
meaning, character, and express dramatic intensity.4
By way of illustrating what he meant by the above statement Miessner included the
following material:
a
a
a
a
a
e
e

in far (distance)
in awe (reverence)
in May (brightness)
in praise (worship)
in afraid (fear)
in cheer (happiness)
in deceived or grieve
(disappointment)
o in glow (warmth)
o in cold (coldness)
oo in true (faithfulness)
oo in brooding (gladness)5

m
m
d
d
s
s
sh

in mother (tenderness)
in mighty (power)
in dearest (affection)
in death (bereavement)
in sailing (pleasure)
in sorrow (sadness)
expressing sympathy

sh expressing impatience
f in fair (beauty)
f in fierce (ugliness)

For Miessner there is correspondence between the “character of the text and the music.”6
These extramusical associations both aid in understanding and enhance the quality of
performance.
4
5
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Fusion theory continued to underpin the work of a number of music educators
during this period. Mabelle Glenn writes
the song content should always influence the tone…the lilt of the poem has its
influence on ‘lifting’ the tone. Selecting the climactic phrases and picking out the
important words in each phrase help in building up in the minds of children in the
intermediate grades a feeling for measure accent, phrasing and tone color.7
Ralph Peterson argues in 1937 for “making our singers conscious of beautiful speech will
serve as a desirable short cur to more expressive singing.”8 Support for his thesis is
generated from a philosophical issue mentioned at the beginning of his paper.
No matter how fine and resonant the tone, how excellent the dynamics, the
product is still poor singing if the singer has nothing to say. Herein lies the
crucial problem of vocal expression, for the supreme purpose of singing is just
that—expression—expression of what? Not words alone, but of ideas, emotions,
thought, impressions.9
For him, “the verbal and the musical ideas must fit into a unified whole—they must
match, otherwise one nullifies the effect of the other.”10 Hollis Dann echoes a similar
position and also includes other aspects from significationist thought. “The soloist, the
chorus, must react to the emotional stimuli of words and music, must feel the rhythmic
swing, the surge of tone, the thrill of the climax; must dramatize the story, sense the
humor and pathos of the text.”11 Alice Inskeep, in recalling the choral conducting of
William Tomlins, remembers the “stress he placed on thought in tone, vital, dramatic,
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interpretive expression of the text, and words making up the text.”12 She continues by
elaborating on an idea central to fusion theory. Her example is “last night it was so cold,
but that means nothing unless you prolong your vowel as c-o-ld. Something is far off, yet
not so far unless you prolong the vowel and say it was so f-a-rr off.”13 Each of these
scholars clearly adopts a significationist position in terms of meaning and does so in an
effort to influence practice and vocal performance.
Pursuing musical understanding through practice and performance generated
debate among music educators. Much of the evidence reflects one of two views. The
first is that emphasis in music education should be placed on building proper technique
for a solid performance. The second view considers emphasis on technical aspects of
musical performance alone to be incomplete music education. Thinkers identifying with
the second view tend to support ideas about music education which encompass not only a
technically sound performance that includes achieving high standards of musical
reproduction but also other elements relating to musical understanding such as what the
music allegedly reveals. George Howerton was a music educator who embraced the
second view of music education. He decries what he sees as “our tendency toward
overemphasis on performance” and asserts “we are attaching much too great an
importance on technique.”14 Instead of overemphasizing superior technical performance
Howerton argues, “There should be an indication that the singer has some perception at
least of the inner content of the text.”15 For him, “technique and emotional expression
12
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must be combined.”16 Echoing Howerton’s sentiments is Ivivine Shields who writes, “it
is not the reading of the music, but the reading of something into it that counts.”17
Shields provides an example of what is meant by the above statement. Describing a
rehearsal led by Arturo Toscanini, Shields tells the story of how the noted conductor used
the imagery of a handkerchief floating to the ground for how he wanted the ensemble’s
tone to float.18
It is a Los Angeles high school teacher who also ties together practice,
signification, and the second view of music education. Olga Sutherland asserts the “task
facing the voice teacher of the high school student is that of developing in him the ability
to interpret his music.”19 Her suggestions for how to accomplish the task of getting a
student to “interpret his music” relies on views borrowed from signification theory such
as kinetic pattern, psychological processes and an association with language. Her first
step is creating the mood, which the teacher would do by playing a song in its entirety.20
For her, “there must be a feeling of movement in the song from beginning to end for
continuity. Where moods change within the song, the singer must convey that
thought.”21 The next step for the teacher is to work on phrasing. Here Sutherland
suggests, “the musical phrase usually coincides with a thought or sentence. It is very
important that the student think in terms of sentences and not in single words.”22 Lastly
for Sutherland is the topic of imagination. She calls for the singer to “live his song” so

16

Ibid., 332.
Ivivine Shields, “Special Choral Techniques,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National
Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1939-1940), 348-352, 348.
18
Ibid., 351.
19
Olga Sutherland, “Interpretation,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference
(Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1939-1940), 358-359, 358.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
17

164
that he “re-create it in the mind of the listener. (The song is a drama without action, a
picture without paint).”23 Sutherland’s methods reflect various elements of signification
in order to advance a view that musical performance is much more than flawless
technique.
Choral performance being much more than simply notes and markings on a score
is not only expressed by those advancing or reflecting significationist thought.
Expressivism and German idealism also convey that there is a deeper meaning to music.
In 1912 Alexander Henneman argues that while scientific knowledge of how tones are
produced by the human anatomy has led to advances in the field, it is a mistake to make
this the sole basis for how music is taught. His argument reverberates with material from
the debate between those espousing technical perfection for performance and those who
think of music as a grander affair packed with significance. Combining ideas from
expressivism and German idealism Henneman argues, “Music, more than all other
arts…expresses feeling. The voice being the most human of all instruments, reveals like
nothing else, our soul states.”24 Clippinger like Henneman argues that, aesthetically
speaking, there is much more in “Training of a Singer” than vocal methods alone. As
mentioned in chapter three Clippinger brings together several philosophical perspectives
in his paper. Here, expressivist and German idealist views on meaning are seen in his
argument. Clippinger asserts feeling and nothing else is the “material of the singer’s
art.”25 Taking the expressivist argument practically verbatim, he continues by stating,
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“The singer evokes within himself feelings which he has experienced and by means of his
voice transfers these feelings to others.”26 Phrasing is Clippinger’s answer for how
feelings are apparently transferred from the singer. Clippinger’s use of meaning is in one
sense straightforward in that it is achieved through a reliance on vocabulary.27 In a less
direct way meaning also transcends dictionary like references. Drawing on Hegelian
thought Clippinger argues
By means of imagination we take the materials of experience and mold them into
idealized forms…every song has an atmosphere, a metaphysical something which
differentiates it from every other song. The singer must discover it and find the
mood which will perfectly express it…the song is that which comes from the soul
of the singer, it is not in the printed page.28
Clippinger’s view on meaning and music supports an important though subtle
argument in his paper which is for music education—specifically relating to singing—to
“develop the spirituality and imagination”29 of students. His views remain consistent on
meaning, which are seen again in an address he gives in 1925, “Collective Voice
Training.” In relating meaning to practice he writes
The pure singing tone is one that may be used to express all normal, healthful
emotions; such as joy, freedom, courage, affection, sympathy, revereance (sic),
etc. You will observe that these are all mental qualities, and the tone necessary to
express them must be firm, steady, full, rich, resonant, and sympathetic.30
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Choral music and choral music instruction as a means of revealing emotions or some
other extramusical association as argued in signification theory was not limited to this
kind of musical performance alone.
Performance Based Courses – Band, Orchestra, and
Individual Instrument Classes
Ideas from expressivism and significationism are seen throughout the period in
conjunction with the instrumental practice and performance. Russell Morgan began his
1926 address “Musical Perception and the Orchestra” by defining musical perception.
According to Morgan it is “a process of acquiring an accurate mental image of musical
composition. This image…includes melody, harmony, rhythm, form, beauty of tone, and
interpretation.”31 In relation to music and meaning “these elements are foundational in
building thorough musical understanding on the part of the student.”32 Clearly, Morgan
believes meaning and interpretation is something that can be understood, and it is
therefore important for the teacher to bring these ideas out in the process of instruction.
To achieve this lofty goal of musical interpretation the teacher must understand
“interpretation depends first upon a concept that is clear-cut in all details.”33 What
Morgan insists is that the elements of a piece of music must reside in both the music and
mind of the performer. For example, a melody must be present and clearly distinguished.
Once all of the elements contained in the concepts are comprehended and absorbed by the
performer “freedom begins.”34 The teacher must consciously encourage the student to do
more than simply play the notes; he must help the student construct the so-called mental
31
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image.35 “Having secured this, there comes the task of persuading him to release his
personality, his whole being, if you please, in an art expression.”36 Morgan relies heavily
on the notion that there is something that is expressed so much so that he concludes his
paper by asserting that the development of musical perception from contact with the work
of the great master acts as a catalyst for a student’s own self-expression.37 Morgan’s
purpose in the address is in line with those music educators mentioned earlier who
believe it is important to develop musicians rather than “performers who are not
musicians at all, but musical mechanics.”38 While philosophical in substance Morgan’s
arguments do not adequately get at what is to be expressed other than a few passages
which are primarily formalist. To put it another way, what Morgan asserts is that in order
to be a true musician, you must be able to interpret the music beyond the notes printed on
the page. However, the only support he uses to identify what is to be interpreted and
expressed are ideas like various instruments trading parts in the overall melodic flow,39
an idea which is valid but not consistent with the way he uses the term art expression.
Not all philosophical discussions were as ambiguous on expressivism as the one
above given by Morgan. In 1954 Melvin Bernasconi wrote a paper for the Music
Educators Journal titled “Instrumental Music and the Philosophy of Music Education.”
Bernasconi’s paper is the application of Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience applied
to the instrumental class. Showing Dewey’s thoughts in action Bernasconi makes it a
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point to contrast the former’s emphasis on experience with what traditional philosophy
counts as knowledge. He writes
the student must learn technique to play music. The classicist would say that
accumulation of facts represents knowledge per se in connection with the goal and
that it requires no immediate application to a present purpose; that the function of
mind in regard to this matter is to collect information. The experimentalist,
relating learning to human beings, conceives of the mind as the intentional
interaction of a person with himself and his environment.40
Meaning is then bound up in the immediate experience, that is, the doing and undergoing
of ensemble members “where ends are contingent, contextual, related and in process.”41
Meaning is in the process, and “these children know what to do on the basis of what they
have done and want to do as a result of that background of doing.”42 Although
Bernasconi’s statements differ from other expressivists on the subject of meaning in the
sense that he seeks to explain how meaning is made, it still leaves open what that
meaning might be. The indefinite nature of Bernasconi’s work is more intentional than in
Morgan’s because by applying Dewey’s notions of an experience, meaning is not a fixed
point. Bernasconi’s writing is also intentionally meant to influence practice, and it does
so by advancing a particular philosophical position to achieve this goal.
Articulating a philosophical position is often the result of much concentration and
thought. The material relating to instrumental performance, while rooted in philosophy
mainly reflected the problems and theories of musical aesthetics. For example, Harold
Friedman argues. “we can teach music as a language, using the piano as the medium of
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its expression”43 Scruton would undoubtedly cringe at Friedman’s suggestion that “all
elements of language have their counterparts in music.”44 His rationalization of
signification and structural theory is, nevertheless, plain to see. He asserts the child is
“taught to recognize word groups in sentences. He then builds up a vocabulary, learns
spelling, enunciation, sentence structure, grammar, etc…we should follow a similar
course in music.”45
The music and language association takes on a different form regarding
instrumental music than what was seen in the previous section on choral music. The
examples from choral music made use of fusion theory while the example immediately
above from Friedman and what follows below echo the structural similarities noted by
Scruton. Donald March, in contributing his view on musicianship from the view of an
instrumental music practitioner, states, “Music is a language, and we must help our
students to extract intelligent meaning from its sentences.”46 Furthermore, the teacher
should carefully direct “attention to such considerations as where a phrase really ends,
whence it is derived, why a note is stressed or why we must make a false accent here, we
shall develop taste, imagination and musical insight in our pupils.”47 Notice the links
with the structural elements of language, the notion of a phrase and how to separate more
important items from the rest of the material. March’s example is also another case
where an underlying idea from musical aesthetics is used to influence practice.
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References to music as language, or the universal language are quite common in music
education discourse; these examples show that some music educators thought about the
connection between the two.
Instrumentalist performance papers reflecting and advancing ideas of signification
and expressive theories might seem slightly surprising since several of the views on the
nature of music were formalist. Upon further analysis, however, the fact that there were
so few formalist perspectives on the instrumental side of performance should not be
astonishing. The lack of formalist perspectives is not surprising because the formalist
would simply assert there are no extramusical associations. So, while others are apt to go
on about meaning in terms of expression or association with language, the formalist
scoffs at such suggestions. The writing of the formalist in terms of meaning is mainly as
a rejection of extramusical claims. The burden of proof remains on the expressivist or
significationist and so the formalist is mute. The characteristics of the discourse on
musical aesthetics from the period, however, are such that compatibility between and
among various theories and the associated problems was not always consistent. Whether
this is the result of trying to provide answers to the many questions in the field of music
education or that the philosophical positions were not carried to their logical conclusions
is not clear. What is evident is that multiple philosophical prospective were seen in the
work of these writers and thinkers.
Philosophical ideas reflected or advanced in this section on the meaning of music
in performance based courses are of a type that is meant to guide and influence practice.
That is, there is necessarily discussion that pairs ideas from significationism or
expressivism with vocal and instrumental education. Writers on the meaning of music
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debated the importance of performance techniques in relation to what many concluded
was far more than just flawless technical reproduction of the markings on the score. The
efforts of these thinkers was to advance an idea that authentic musicianship involves
interpreting and revealing thoughts and ideas of the composer and his music. Whether
the revelation came in the form of a choral or band director linking music with language
or a particular emotion, the important thing was that meaning and performance were
bound to each other.
Non-Performance Based Courses – Appreciation, Theory,
Harmony, and Music History
Meaning’s relation to performance, an idea held by many of the aforementioned
scholars, was not limited to just the performance based paper topics. As a matter of fact
there is far more evidence from the non-performance based course papers and topics
generalized to the whole field regarding the meaning of music. I am not suggesting that
one path to get at meaning in music is superior to another—performing or listening—but
am simply stating meaning was a topic addressed philosophically during the period by
music educators and the majority of the evidence comes from the non(explicitly)performance based material. Numerical support for this statement is straightforward.
There were nearly twenty papers etc. that reflected or advanced philosophical positions
on meaning from the performance based choral material. During the same period there
were nearly 120 on topics meant for the whole of music education in the public schools.
Clearly meaning was an important and often discussed subject in music education
discourse from 1907 to 1958.
Music educators talked about issues related to meaning that were not related to
performance. Some of the conversations were about the music generally and the
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experience of interacting with music in a setting that did not necessarily involve singing
or playing an instrument. Even without trying to explain meaning in relation to
performance, the work of these scholars still relied a great deal on expressivist and
significationist thought. Still further, it is in this section that there is much more
questioning regarding meaning and music educators probed questions in a deeper fashion.
To put it another way, the manner in which and the frequency of authors questioning
expressivism or significationism or the work of a specific writer on musical aesthetics
was increasingly present. There was also slightly more consistency within works in the
sense of sticking to and accepting a particular philosophical perspective on meaning. In
other words, on the topic of how music was to be interpreted there was less vacillation
from expressivism to formalism, for example, in the same paper, although this is still
seen regularly. If an author looked at meaning from the significationist perspective, the
concepts and ideas from that theory or the problems associated with it were often carried
throughout the work. While there may have been a greater degree of consistency, there
was still not any disciplinary consensus. However, it is very clear in this section that
signification and expressive theories were where most music educators sought
explanations for music’s meaning.
Writing on music’s meaning in non-performance based courses, which often had
listening and the analysis of music as primary paths to understanding music, reflected
many of the characteristics listed above such as an emphasis on signification and
expressivist views, but other theoretical perspectives also exist. Additionally it is in this
section that more debate about meaning emerges.

173
At the 1914 MSNC meeting held in Minneapolis, MN, Theo Fitz delivered a
paper called “The Appreciation of Music in the Grades” in which he included examples
of voice placement using a children’s choir and diagrams sketched on a blackboard.48
Unfortunately no written record could be found of the content and points made by Fitz,
but another paper was given by Mary Conway after his, and the subsequent discussion of
her work, against the backdrop of the Fitz work, consumed the rest of that particular
afternoon session. The substance of this discussion shows that these early music
educators were aware of problems with meaning in music.
The first discussant, Agnes Freyberger [sic], gives an example she used in her
classes where the children listened to the song Chanticleer by Elizabeth Wheeler.49 The
children respond to the words and ideas in the song and arrive at the conclusion that
Chanticleer is a rooster.50 Although this is signification on a very basic level, it does
show that at an early age children are taught to think that there is a story to music, that
there are necessarily extramusical associations. After an exchange between Fryberger
and Eckert on musical understanding in which the former suggested it could be achieved
through listening and the latter said it was necessary to also participate through playing
and singing, Peter Dykema chimed in. In his very brief response he offers a challenge to
the significationist perspective using a formalist argument. He says,
This particular piece played had no more suggestion of ‘butterflies,’ to me than a
group of children dancing at a May party—absolutely no more of one than of the
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other. To me it was absolutely false to try to find butterflies in that thing…we
must not get into the false notion that a literal interpretation of music is true
musical appreciation.51
Immediately following Dykema’s statement is another given by Charles Farnsworth who
also shows problems with signification but more from the position of an expressivist.
Farnsworth relates an experiment he tried while at Columbia’s Teachers College. In the
experiment art student’s listened to piano pieces composed by Chopin and a minuet by
Paderewski.52 The students were then asked to draw what they felt the music meant to
them.53 The results showed that while the art could be classified according to the two
pieces
no two subjects were alike; there was everything imaginable,--merely showing
that while the story has nothing to do with it, the mood has everything to do with
it. When you play a piece and tell the child the story, you are limiting that mood
to your own interpretation, and I think that is wrong.54
Differing views on the subject of music’s meaning continued throughout the period of
study.
Dykema and Farnsworth along with others questioned signification theory. This
theory was not the only one questioned and/or supported. Expressivist and formalist
doctrines had their share of critics and supporters. Sudie William adopts an expressivist
stance on meaning in her 1920 address. She says, “we must impress on the minds of the
pupils the fact that music is a form of human expression—one of the ways thought is
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conveyed from one person to another.”55 She relates an example of a boy listening to
pieces being played at a music contest. He was apparently so moved by the experience
he declared that the contest made him love music.56
For the first time it dawned on me that it [music] had a meaning—that it was not
merely a jumble of sounds. In studying the motives and themes and how they
were used to express the composer’s thought, it flashed upon me as it had never
done before that it all meant something.57
Williams’ use of this example shows that meaning lies somewhere outside music though
she does not develop the idea any further.
Fryberger’s comments on formalism and expressivism are evident; they also show
her thoughts on the matter of meaning had been refined since her earlier 1914 address.
By 1920 she argued, “the mere reading of notes will not make one think of what he
hears…merely singing is not an end in itself. The process is too formal, and one knows
the danger of formalism.”58 Although it is not wholly clear what problems exist with
formalism and as such it is difficult to determine what she truly means when using it, it is
apparent that meaning is derived from expressivist and/or significationist thought.
Fryberger suggests the music appreciation teacher read songs and song books and ask a
few questions when performing an evaluation of such work. The third question
undoubtedly relies on fusion theory and significationist thought: “Does the music bring
out the meaning of the words?” Her analysis continues on the next page where she
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discusses some objective ideas about music such as the “character of its motion (or
rhythm); the appeal of its melody; the distinctive force of its harmony; the noticeable
features of its structure and form.”59 There is for her, however, a subsequent step. It is
the next step that is more subjective and ties in ideas from expressivism. “One may
always ask after hearing music: What emotion does it stir? What lines of thought are
aroused? What imagination does it provoke? In short, what did the piece mean to
you?”60 What she expects of the appreciation student is to make intelligent comment on
the music from both an objective and subjective determination. In relation to the
subjective, her point is what is expressed is personal and specific emotions are difficult to
get at. So, while she accepts the expressivist position that there is an emotional response
in the listener, she also asks, “who shall say what the composer had in mind when he
created a certain piece of music?61 Fryberger’s views are interesting because she accepts
certain notions from both formalism and expressivism while questioning others from
those identical theories. She accepts the idea that there are certain elements of music that
can only be assessed in terms of what they are as music, rhythm, melody, harmony, etc.
At the same time, however, she says there is a subjective element which places meaning
outside the music, something the formalist rejects. Curiously enough, while she accepts
the idea there is an emotional response by the listeners, she questions the extent to which
it has anything to do with the composer.
Frances Clark also straddles the line by questioning the formalist position on
meaning and does so in her 1924 address “Music Appreciation of the Future.” She
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asserts “music itself is more than its technique, or its mathematics.”62 Yet earlier, in
developing a significationist position that rhythm, melody and tone color mirror aspects
of daily life, she says of melody that
the bits and fragments of melody called motive and theme that furnish the colored
threads of the pattern the composer weaves, whether simple or intricate, whether a
blanket or dull drab or a riot of Basket colors…it always rests upon a definite
theme or central melodic figure.63
Her characterization of melody is significationist e.g. “Basket colors” and the elements of
music mirroring aspects of daily life, but the idea’s foundation is formalist e.g. “it always
rests upon a definite theme or central melodic figure.” She continues to embrace both
perspectives later in the paper, much like Fryberger. Clark asserts, “from simple song
form and dance form through the suite to the sonata form and the analysis of the
symphony, the study of form lies in the immediate field of intelligent listening.”64 This
analysis of form for Clark is a necessary requisite of “Music Understanding, or still
better—Music Consciousness.”65 It cannot be neglected, however, to mention again the
end of her address where she quotes T.T. Munger who wrote, “emotion is the summit of
existence, and music is the summit of emotion—the art pathway to God.”66 The
synthesis of significationist, expressivist, and formalist views of Fryberger and Clark
reveal the complexity in musical aesthetics. It is very difficult to maintain one
perspective, and attempts to do so are often the subject of intense scrutiny. This
complexity also reveals something about music itself, namely that efforts to describe its
nature and meaning place boundaries on something that is abstract and multi-elemental.
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In other words, music can be object or experience or phenomenon, or something else
entirely, and attempts define it or get at what it reveals, if anything at all, can at best be
merely analyzed from a particular standpoint.
Music educators continued to debate ideas relating to meaning throughout the
period and the problems these debates consisted of recurred. From the address mentioned
in the previous chapter by Dunham is material from the discussion that followed his
address. S.M. Cate wonders about an issue she has observed in music education and in
her inquiry questions the significationist position on meaning. Cate writes
It seems to me the idea of a story is very much carried out in the grades, and I
want to know, does so much emphasizing of the story get the child into a frame of
mind where it thinks whenever a piece of music is played there has to be a story
connected with it?67
Mohler’s immediate reply to Cate was, “there is never a story in music only when there is
one. There is always some beauty of form and some beauty of melody…you can’t have
beauty without form, you can’t have form without content.”68 While Dunham does not
mention if form can be separated from content, Mohler’s comments are firm in asserting
the two cannot be. Unfortunately, neither scholar fully explains what the content is,
which would be of great help in making a determination about meaning. For example, if
something is written in sonata form, what does the content of that form mean? How is
the argument made and justified or supported? Does the fact that music might be written
in such a form as a sonata have any bearing on its meaning? Mohler would say yes, but
without detailed elaboration on content, it is difficult to be sure. The closest Mohler gets
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to the relation of form and content is to suggest that “a selection of music” can generate
reflection based in experience for a student, and once this happens “the substance matter
of the music” aligns with “a necessary response in the children.”69 At this point he
introduces the idea of symbolic content and music in order to try to make a connection
between form and content. Using the work of Robert Schumann as an example he asserts
the composer, through observing the play and activity of his children, “caught the
rhythmic motives that represented their activities, and he holds them in these melodies.70
So, while Mohler rejects the idea of a specific story being attached to every piece of
music, he accepts that there is symbolic content that is rooted in form. Even though
Mohler’s argument is not a tight argument, it is at least an example of material from
musical aesthetics permeating a discussion in music education that shows how
philosophical ideas underpinned and advanced debate.
The complexity of music and the supposed meaning it has draws people to
comment on the subject rather than having the opposite effect. Attempts to comprehend
music continued and continued in relation to the problems with a solely formalist
position. Again, from Bergquist’s “Harmony Alive” is his notion that “mere facts, rules
about parallel fifths, octaves, augmented seconds, etc. are not inspirational.”71 His basic
premise is to make harmony a relevant and exciting class endeavor. To achieve his lofty
aim of making “harmony alive” he relies on the significationist parallel between music
and the structural elements of language. At first the student is “to find an idea in tones,
balance if [sic] with another. With every question (antecedent phrase) find an answer
69
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(the consequent phrase)…as one sentence is completed add a contrast, then return to the
first, the simple Ternary form.”72 The next step in his language/music relation presages
the significationist work of Deryck Cooke’s The Language of Music by 33 years.
Bergquist argues, “in intervals we find interesting moods’ in thirds, sixths, and open
fifths, we find much emotional desire; in augmented seconds and Dim. Fourths, etc. we
find pathetic melodic effects.73 On the surface, to many musicians and music educators
teaching appreciation, the ideas Bergquist advances on the relation of language and music
make sense.
Willys Peck Kent was desirous of music teachers doing more to teach music
understanding. In his 1915 address “Music for Every Man: Suggestions for Courses in
Music Appreciation” one of the topics he spoke about was “the Analogy between the
Spoken Language and Music.”74 Peck’s analysis begins
we find in language many onomatopoetic words, whistle, boom, mew; and in
music we find one, namely thunder; this is probably the only one, for the other
sounds of nature the composers try to introduce into their music are so badly
misrepresented that we have to be told what they mean…so music is but slightly
concerned with the imitative word.75
He continues “we find in language Arbitrary Words, apple, boat, etc. and in music the
arbitrary motives of Wagner; the only way one can know what these mean, in nearly all
cases is to be told.”76 It is his third comparison between music and spoken language that
most closely aligns with what Beardsley calls kinetic patters or kinetic qualities, which
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are typical in significationist descriptions on meaning. His assessment of this third group
of words “which express an idea in terms of another unrelated idea” is that “music makes
very little effort to accurately describe concrete things, but aims only to arouse in the
listener such a feeling as those things would arouse were they present.”77 The best that
music can do is to “express motions, and emotions, without any definite
representation.”78 To reinforce his point he introduces a formalist counter-argument to
the idea of music representing anything in a definite way. “If the musician is inclined to
point the finger in scorn at such efforts, the Futurist has only to reply:--listen to
MacDowell’s Wild Rose; can you hear the five petals? Do those sound pink to you?”79
Therefore, the best music can do in terms of meaning is approximate kinetic patterns,
which is a view in line with significationists such as Langer.
Questions about signification and meaning, especially in the relation of words and
music continued in the period. Always eager to question the significationist point of
view, Earhart, in his “The Roots of Music Appreciation,” asserts the goal of “beauty and
purity of tone…is easier in connection with instrumental music, because in vocal music
story telling or emotionally charged words constantly beckon toward other effects.”80 On
expression he writes, “as a function of art [it] is the subject of endless debate among
aestheticians…all agree that any work of art seems somehow to be expressive. The
difficulty begins when we ask what is expressed.”81 But at the end of his paper he takes a
Langerian tack when it comes to generating some kind of answer about meaning. He
suggests “We yield ourselves to the symphony and are borne forth on its current. The
77
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journey will not be uneventful, but every question raised will be answered, every tempest
encountered be won through, every expectation, every yearning, satisfied.”82 Although
he appears to be inconsistent here since much of his work had a formalist slant
particularly when it came to the nature of music, Earhart clings to a view that holds a
sense of mystery and reverence for music. In this light his questioning of significationist
and expressivist thought are tools used to work out his own understanding of music’s
nature, meaning, and value.
In a similar philosophical manner, Kate Mueller studies how to better train and
measure the ability of the listener. One of the challenges she faced in designing tests to
better understand music and musical form was “the part played by words in the
development of musical ideas and music appreciation.”83 For her, divorcing explanations
about music and what music means from verbal utterances is nearly impossible. This
idea about a necessary connection between words and music poses significant challenges
for the significationist and formalist. In her paper it is not so much that she disbelieves
ideas inherent in significationist and formalist thought, but her beliefs of how humans
developed language historically to explain our experiences make the problem of any
relation between the two difficult to solve. Her grasp of the problem is sound, and she
explains it in a direct manner. On the subject of the relation of words and musical ideas
being debatable she writes, “Some argue that music cannot be described in words, and
that the attempt to do so befuddles the mind.”84 For this group “music must be
understood ‘directly’ as pure perception, without any intermediary symbols from another
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avenue.”85 This idea is akin to Hanslick’s notion that “musical content is nothing but the
audible tonal forms…music has content, but musical content” and Langer’s idea that
music is the “tonal analogue of emotive life.” The formalist and the Langerian
significationist have similar views here because each does not think “statements about
musical meaning can be reduced to descriptions.”86 It is on the point of the kind of
“description” where the formalist and linguistic significationist differ because the latter
says these kinds of verbal descriptions using “symbols from another avenue” are possible
and required. The counter argument to the notion of direct understanding purely
perceived is “when we lack proper words to use as symbols for manipulating and
communicating our experiences it is doubtful if the experience is precise or vivid or clear
to us.”87 Therefore, it is necessary to rely on words for descriptions of music and what it
may mean. Mueller writes, “to acquire any other system of symbolization for ordering
one’s thoughts would be even more difficult than learning a new language, a foreign
vocabulary and grammar.”88 All of these thoughts on music and language of course pose
challenges for the teaching of music appreciation. Therefore, she acknowledges that
since the time has not come when youth are “habituated in the use of kinesthetic
perceptions or other types of visual or auditory perceptions, color, shape, pitch or
tone…children and amateurs who want to understand the music of their times have
perforce to learn about it through words.”89 Mueller’s statements show a keen awareness
of matters addressed in musical aesthetics. She was not alone in thinking matters in
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aesthetics were important in music education, especially in non-performance based
courses.
In 1938 Vincent Jones called for “advanced courses” on a number of topics in
music, one being “criticism and aesthetics of music.”90 The substantive material of
musical aesthetics was undoubtedly a component of the discourse. The frequency of
material containing substance on topics from musical aesthetics more than trebled in the
papers and addresses that music educators geared toward the entire field as compared to
the three areas mentioned thus far. While some of the statements and perspectives mirror
the ideas already shown, there is slightly more diversity in this last section with theories
present here but not in the evidence related to the performance and non-performance
courses.91
Generalized Topics and Integration
1907 was year one for the conference that became the Music Educators National
Conference. Topics of discussion at the first conference in Keokuk, Iowa were varied
although they generally were geared toward improving music instruction in terms of
methods used to develop the technical aspects of music making. Music educators
discussed teaching music making and continued the ongoing debate, from the nineteenth
century, of rote singing versus music reading (rote versus note). Molnar cites Philip C.
Hayden’s “Rhythm Forms Demonstration” the latter of whom referred to C.A.
Fullerton’s presentation at the first meeting where he made a connection between “the
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teaching of music reading and the teaching of reading words.”92 Molnar states Fullerton
“urged that the pupil be taught to grasp the meaning of the words and music of the song,
rather than to rattle off meaningless notes and syllables.”93 In 1912 Karl Gehrkens
recognized that while songs are “based on an interesting story or description,”94 he also
wanted students to understand the importance rhythm and the beauty of music as
necessary to music making. Associations between words and stories and music were part
of the discussion in the early years of the conference.
In 1921 Bergquist examined the connection between language and music.95 He
extends his elaboration on the relation of music to language to include specific examples
of what music allegedly says. His purpose is to help teachers give students the ability “to
see, to recognize, and to analyze what we hear in order to thoroughly understand.”96 As
such, “the vision of music as a language should not be lost sight of.”97 He provides a
practical example for teaching understanding by posing a problem to a hypothetical class:
“what is music made of and how is it made?”98 His explanation to get the class started is
that “music is a language, the universal language, the most comprehensive means of
expression. What do we express in music? Our emotions, our feelings.”99 The class is
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then asked to give examples of feeling while the teacher sits at the piano “and
improvise[s] on the words suggested.”100 Bergquist then asks the class to express
themselves musically. What Bergquist establishes here is the expressivist position in the
teaching of music. This expressivist position, however, is not the only idea taken from
musical aesthetics, so too does he borrow from signification theory. It is his use of the
latter theory that is remarkable because his ideas presage the work of Cooke and some
basic elements seen in Langer’s philosophy.
In The Language of Music Cooke argues there is a vocabulary of music that
contains meaning. He provides examples such as “minor second:…spiritless anguish,
context of finality; major second:…pleasurable longing, context of finality; minor
third:…stoic acceptance, tragedy; major third:…joy; etc.”101 Bergquist, 38 years earlier
than Cooke, proposes a “dictionary of intervals” for the student to use in writing
appreciation, and understanding of music. It is necessary to insert an extensive quotation
here to in order to capture the depth and fullness of his suggestions. Bergquist argues
A major second,…an active combination, wants to be continued, suggests trouble,
restless, uncertain, asking, anxious; an harmonic and melodic interval. An
augmented second,…taken melodically in its key setting arouses a feeling of
lonesomeness, of anguish, a questioning character…A major third,…restful
kindly, peaceful, quiet, a question (why)…the diminished fourth harmonically
indefinite, melodically a most expressive interval, a pleading character.102
What may be the most telling connection between the two works is not that one predated
the other but the differences in the so-called vocabulary. Notice the example of major
second and major third. For Bergquist the major second suggests “trouble, restless,
uncertain, asking, anxious.” The same interval according to Cooke suggests a
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“pleasurable longing.” The interval of the major third suggests for Bergquist a sense of
peaceful and quiet contemplation while for Cooke it is simply joy. And it is the
differences in the supposed vocabulary that pose such a difficult problem for the
significationist. Even though each author advances his idea that there is a language of
music and attaches a vocabulary to such a language, others argue (and noted in the
inconsistencies in the above examples) it is not possible to have a definite vocabulary.
The closest Bergquist can really come to a definition of arguable substance is his notion
that “the relationships of beats and tones, and their application to the emotional and
intellectual life of man is the philosophy of music.”103
Some music educators continued to insist there was a connection between music
and language. Miessner stresses in his 1931 paper “Names for Tones” the importance of
teaching music reading (still debating what was mentioned at Keokuk). Justifying his
position on the value and importance of reading music, Miessner incorporates the
significationist position that music and language are related. From Miessner’s
perspective music is “intelligible discourse,” because it “embodies degrees of emotion
and shades of meaning analogous to poetry and drama.”104 For him music has
“vocabulary and idioms, as well as structure and design” it has a “means of development”
that is “rhythmic, thematic, harmonic and dynamic.”105 Even though it appears that
Miessner has already concluded music is a language, over the next few pages he takes a
philosophical approach in supporting his position. He writes, “the questions before us,
then are these: Is music a language? If so, What is its nature and how shall it be
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acquired?”106 He frames a response to these questions that is based on work done in
philosophy, science, and music history.107 Referencing the like of Aristoxenes, Ptolemy,
Ambrose, Gregory, and Hucbald in the development of tonality, Miessner asserts
It is important to remember that, from the earliest attempts to organize musical
sounds, it was absolutely indispensible, that names for tones should be found, for
without names for things, no clear thinking is possible. Indeed it was this vital
need for signs, names and characters to represent things and meanings that
impelled the invention of language, numbers, and letters, as well as musical
names and devices of notation.108
The parallels he draws between music and language include: “First, in that all languages
words have no intrinsic or inherent meanings, but only those assigned to them and
accepted by general consent and custom.”109 “Second…laws of simplicity and
euphony—of easy utterance—prevail.”110 And “Third…children learn their language by
imitation and constant use.”111 While Miessner is specifically addressing the practice of
naming tones and tonal ideas, he is doing so drawing support from the manner in which
he sees language developing. He is, therefore, not supporting an idea such as fusion
theory but rather an idea that music, at its core is really a language. The equivalents he
advances of each characteristic of language stress his main point which is the importance
and necessity of teaching the reading of music.112
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Lastly, on the relation of music and language is material from the Pitts papers.113
In one particular set of papers Pitts begins, “Notation is not music, (is not song) but
merely a systematic way of recording music by means of visible marks, (Signs, symbols)
‘notes’ made to call to mind the way music goes.”114 From this point she moves to the
topic of music and language citing the work of Leonard Bloomfield’s Language. She
connects the structural elements of language to those of music. She writes
melody-tune-phrases-material may be viewed as consisting of any number of
successive parts in which distinctive features occur (same and different)…word‘man’ with one and same meaning, ‘tonic chord’ with many different ‘effects’
caused by key changes, context, key, and harmonic changes. It is, nevertheless, a
significant and recurring musical idea or phonetic grouping. Phonology and
semantics based on assumption that in every speech-community (communicative
language-music) some vocal utterances are alike in form and meaning.115
In another lengthy but insightful elaboration on the linguistic/music connection in
relation to practice and meaning she says
Gross, over-all effect of a phrase of music to the ear and its distinctive features as
these recur in successive song experiences-Distinctive features occur in lumps (or
bundles) or groups…a statement of the ‘meaning’ of a musical figure, motive or
melody is a weak point since it is of necessity one of association with children
and people who are only normally sensitive to musical relationships per
se…[therefore] Everything in a hearers world has some effect on his
interpretation of meaning in the imprecise language of music which is its own
meaning-its form may be said to express its musical content. The context in
which children learn songs, rhythm, of their verbal association should meet a
child’s need to take for granted the imprecision and associations which a given
song calls up.116
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What Pitts encourages is the teaching of music in a way that lets the child’s imagination
and creativity connect to a multi-sensory experience that enhances understanding through
reading music. Pitts like other scholars wants to have the association between music and
language both ways. Her explanation relies on structural signification, but there are hints
of formalism and Langerian signification as well. The formalist assertion comes out in
the phrase relating to the imprecise language of music; it has its own meaning and its own
content. The Langerian component enters in when she refers to the “imprecision and
associations which a given song calls up.” In a closer link with the work of Langer, who
she cites at the end of the paper, she writes, “the general picturization to the eye of how
music feels and goes is the surest way to ‘charge’ or to infuse patterns of notes with
meaning.”117 Pitts’ thoughtful analysis of music and language takes into account the
significationist perspectives and concludes the closest link between the two is largely
imprecise.
Besides the association with language, spoken, structural or otherwise, music
educators also addressed the aspect of music as a symbol. David Mattern related a story
at the 1923 conference in Cleveland, OH of the noted conductor Albert Coates. In a
rehearsal of the allegro giocoso movement of Brahms’ Symphony No. 4 Opus 98 he said
to the horns
‘this passage is like the opening of a furnace door—blazing heat,’ on to the
trumpets in a martial theme—‘now let the flags fly,’ or again to the horns playing
the noble theme in the Cesar Franck D Minor Symphony—‘this is the soul of
chivalry,’ and again, ‘this is the cold grey cathedral at dawn—the snow is
falling.’118
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This kind of imagery is said to help in the understanding of music and is typically used
by significationists, but they are not the only group to enlist the power of an impression.
In 1932 Ernest Fowles wrote, “let us make no mistake with reference to
aesthetics. They are the real things in life, the intangible, the unseen…music offers a
training ground for aesthetics more valuable than perhaps that afforded by any other
subject of human concern.”119 His use of the term aesthetics reflects the notion that there
is material to be understood in the world that cannot be linked with science and scientific
understanding, a traditionally Kantian view. Aesthetics, for him, in German idealist and
significationist thought represents connection with and understanding ideas that are nonquantifiable. Meaning and music are related through “the physical, the material, and the
emotional.”120 First, in terms of rhythm “everything in the world is influenced by, nay, is
the embodiment of rhythm; the plants, the tides, the progression of time…rhythm is the
bubbling, effervescing element of all healthy life.”121 Fowles claims, music has rhythm
in “a far more definite and spiritual manner.”122 On another topic, this time the mental
aspects of meaning and music, Fowles played a tune in which the main theme was
hidden. After a number of audience members were unable to catch the masked melody
he said “remember that even very musical people are often oblivious to the inside texture
of music.”123 Finally, on the subject of music and emotional life he asserts, “The
emotions work in waves corresponding to the lines of verse or the phrases of
music…music sublimates them, deifies them, makes them living and human…music is
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instant in its reflection of these waves.”124 And in a statement that could have come
directly from Langer, had it not been for his address taking place ten years before the
publication of Philosophy in a New Key, Fowles says after playing the Episode from
Chopin’s G minor Nocturne…”the passage holds its power because it pictures so
inimitably the rise and fall of the emotions of man.”125
Echoing this view of Fowles, James Mursell states, “music in particular is
emotion captured and crystallized in tone.”126 Finally, on the subject of signification Pitts
made some handwritten notes that may have been for a class she was teaching or a speech
she was to make.127 She writes, “Signs and symbols are intellectually recognized as
standing for those things and experiences which are as permeated with personal and
social significance that we can say they are appreciated and understood.”128 For children
the idea of signs and symbols acquiring meaning is a challenge, especially when it comes
to understanding music. On this subject Pitts writes, “Children confronted with
translating written musical notation into rhythmic, tonal or moving-sound relations,
which convey meaning/are patterned, have the bewildering task of finding out the
essential characteristics of music reading.”129 Signification underpinned much of Pitts’
thoughts on music and meaning in her personal papers. It is also clear from the amount
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of evidence explored in this section that significationist ideas were ever present in music
education discourse.
Questions about signification as an acceptable theory to explain meaning and
some of the tenets associated with it often show up in the evidence. Lillian Baldwin, for
example, argues, “no person can teach another by direct instruction how to feel…we
cannot teach feeling as such, yet to minimize it importance…is to make music a craft
instead of an art…for music is a language of feeling.”130 Here Baldwin questions an idea
connected with signification theory that feeling can be taught, but simultaneously she
accepts the relationship between feeling and music which puts her in a difficult place,
philosophically speaking. Her way out is to suggest that while the teacher cannot directly
teach feeling, the teacher can create an environment that prepares “The way for the
emotional response, the teacher then helps the listener recognize the factors that caused
it.”131 Harrison LeBaron echoes this idea, asserting “it is very probable that we cannot
directly teach musical feeling any more than that results will come by saying, let us now
be happy or glad or sad.”132 Also like Baldwin his way out of an earlier suggestion
regarding his explanation of musical feelings resulting from music as opposed to
associations with other fields or experience is similar. He says, “our educational need,
then, is to know how to develop perception of the elements, that sensitiveness to each
may be progressively advanced.”133 Both Baldwin and LeBaron see the role of the
teacher as one who establishes conditions for understanding, and then it is in the
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experience with music and making music in these environments established by the
teacher that deeper interpretation and musical feeling occurs. Other music educators also
tried to use aesthetic discourse to solve problems and advance ideas relating to practice.
Those looking to advance a particular philosophical position of their own
questioned ideas associated with signification during this period in a thoughtful manner.
The work of Edward Howard Griggs, for instance, was a philosophical potpourri, but he
was skeptical when it came to signification. In “Music’s Meaning to Humanity” he
acknowledges Platonic mimesis, Expressivism, and spends time advancing a view that
ties “music’s meaning to humanity” to German idealism. For him, “Alone or in
combination, music does its work, cultivating and refining the sensuous and emotional
susceptibility, and thus rendering one more finely and deeply responsive to all beauty, to
love, the moral ideal and religion.”134 He continues in the German idealist view to assert
that music takes us to a place where “the ideal seems possible, and is more possible.
Thus the marvelous, fluid, ever-growing temple of sound…recreated in liquid wonder of
flowing forms by each artist anew, fulfils a wondrous function for the spirit of man.”135
The German idealist perspective that “music and musical experience are somehow,
uniquely able to penetrate and reveal the innermost nature of the world and human
experience”136 is plain to see in Griggs’ writing. To get to this point Griggs rejects some
aspects of formalist and signification theory. From the standpoint of Hegel, while music
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gets at the inner soul-life, it does so “through its immediacy, vividness, and intimacy.”137
Griggs agrees with Hegel stating that while an analytical or formalist approach to
studying music is helpful for appreciation, it is “always a means to an end, and should not
be confused with the direct response to the appeal of art.”138 The significationist, who is
searching for those extramusical associations, is not concerned with the immediacy of the
experience in the same way as the German idealist is. Griggs provides some insight of
the difference and why the formalist and significationist approaches ought to be rejected.
For the former, he asserts, “one may carry the analysis of the structure of a Wagner opera
so far that one hears the motifs and not the music.”139 For the latter (significationist) he
relates a personal experience where he witnessed William T. Harris interpreting
Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata. Griggs writes
The sonata was played over by a masterly artist, and Dr. Harris took it up, passage
by passage and interpreted the development. Its central conflicts, he said,
represented the struggle of Titans with the gods. …it was all deeply interesting;
yet if the hearer supposed Beethoven wrote the sonata to illustrate that story he
would utterly misunderstand the music.140
Griggs goes on to give other examples of conflicts in mythology and history just as
suitable even suggesting these ideas may help people who have difficulty understanding
music, “but if it is supposed to give the meaning of the music, it is worse than useless,
positively hampering a sound response to music, by substituting something else for it.”141
The extramusical associations draw attention away from the music and thus restrict it
meaning and power.
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J.J. Weigand wrote reviews on some of the research being conducted in music
education and found a few projects on “musical meanings.” His brief reports include
recent studies of the last decade.142 One project by Higginson studied adolescent boys
with the aim of finding out the nature of associations made while listening to music
without being given the title.143 Of the various associations the ones that stood out were
“(a) those that had their origins in a corresponding emotional quality evoked by the
musical composition; (b) those that had their origins in a perceptual activity; (c) those
that had their origins in wandering thought.”144 Higginson found nothing definite.
Reinforcing Higginson’s conclusions, Riggs did a similar experiment with college
students and “found that it is possible to tell whether music is joyful or sad, but finer
discriminations are not accurate.”145 The problem with determining so-called finer
discriminations is precisely a problem Beardsley highlighted with signification theory.
Max Schoen gives a stinging critique of Langer’s theory in his 1954 JRME article
“On Musical Expression.” In this paper he focuses on association between music and
feeling and how Langer handles the topic. According to Schoen, Langer’s central theme
is determining if music is the language of emotion, a medium of self-expression.146
Schoen takes issue with her conclusion that music is not the language of emotion or selfexpression but rather “formulation and representation of emotions, moods, mental
tensions and resolution—a ‘logical picture’ of sentient, responsive life, a source of
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insight, not a plea for sympathy.”147 Schoen does not agree the so-called logical picture
is not a case of self-expression and supports his expressivist position in the following
passage: “The composer’s knowledge of human feeling is his knowledge, and what he
expresses is his knowledge in his own unique way, and his expression is therefore selfexpression and nothing else.”148 Schoen’s critique is, again, proof that music educators
not only debated topics in musical aesthetics but did so in thoughtful, insightful, and
philosophical ways showing they understood far more about musical aesthetics than the
common interpretation allows.
Two archival documents from Earhart also identify problems with signification
and say it gets in the way of understanding. In his undated “The What and Why of the
Y.S.P.C.” he criticizes the teaching of choral music using the idea of a song story. His
goal for the choir is to move toward an instrumental approach to music. If a choir can
look at music more as a tonal art, like the instrumentalist or a cappella choir does, then
the focus is on understanding the music as opposed to the “dramatic literary interests.”149
His speech to the Department of Music of the New Jersey State Teacher’s Associations in
1932 titled “Teaching Music: The Art and the Child” also criticizes the tenets of
signification but more precisely and more powerfully. Employing a formalist critique—a
position he acknowledges espousing himself—Earhart argues what is expressed, rather
than “impressed,” is a function of the form, and this should be enough to bring about and
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satisfy the need for delight and understanding.150 Those who would oppose such a view
Earhart refers to as “ardent pragmatists and romanticists”151 who have inappropriately
used the term expression. The solution for Earhart is to argue that the term “expression”
should be abandoned “to the associationists entirely” because it has been used
“persistently to connote extraneous ‘meanings’”152 Teachers should, therefore,
emphasize the “purely tonal values that inhere in music,” instead of “the non-musical or
associational or expressional meanings connected with music to a point that prevents
attention to the constitutions and behaviors of the tones themselves.”153 Not only is
Earhart’s argument using language from musical aesthetics—even citing aestheticians
such as Santayana—but they are also given to influence practice, and in this case it is a
call to teach music with a “more soul-searching scrutiny of our aesthetic doctrines.”154
This is obviously an argument that is both rooted in aesthetics and one in which music
teaching should be conducted along the lines of formalist doctrine.
Imanuel Willheim’s formalism, like Earhart’s, results in the philosophical
questioning of expressivism. Willheim argues that true understanding comes from the
structural analysis of the composer’s so-called plan.155 He includes five steps to help
achieve such structural understanding and argues that “by introducing the student to
musical organization we furthermore wean him from many erroneous concepts…the
music-is-an-expression-of-the-composer’s-feeling’ theory becomes superfluous as soon
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as he is able to trace the logical growth of a musical idea.”156 Willheim does not leave it
at that in his criticism of expressivist theory. He continues by saying those who link
music and emotion fall prey to “the following dangerous corollary: since music is
emotion translated into sound, the only way the listener can cooperate with the composer
is by being receptive to the artist’s ‘emotions.’”157 This places “the responsibility of
comprehension” on the composer which implies a passive audience.158 To those who
assert the structural approach is sterile because the percipient knows what is going to
happen before it does, his response is that “the process of co-creating with the artist”
enhances the depth of enjoyment and subsequent meaning.159
Understanding the composer occupies a central role in expressivist theory because
the expressivist argues that the embodiment of such and such emotion that is in the work
is, at least in part, a reflection of the composer’s state of mind at the time. Parks Grant
thinks an idea like the one just mentioned is absurd. In “What the Music Educator Can
Learn from the Composer” Grant argues, “the outrageous notion that the mood of a piece
essentially reflects its authors emotional state at the time he composed it cannot be too
insistently stamped out—one of the most naïve to which the gullible mind is prey.”160 He
continues, “Only a few moments careful reflection would readily show that any piece
requiring several days or weeks to write would be an incomprehensible garble of shifting
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moods.”161 In one fell swoop his does away with Tolstoy’s primary argument in What is
Art? Parks’ albeit brief statement and paper have plenty of philosophical counter
argument to undermine the expressivist position. His goal is for the music educator to
better understand how the composer approaches his work in order for the former to play
and interpret it more intelligently. That is, instead of trying to figure out what emotion is
expressed, time would be better spent on rendering a particular passage more musically in
a performance, apart from any specific emotion.
Other music educators of the time approach the subject of meaning in a
philosophical manner as well. Charles Farnsworth, in his paper “Beauty in Music,”
argues appreciation and interpretation of the beautiful is necessarily bound to the
percipient. Getting to this conclusion he acknowledges that the term “beauty” has many
applications.162 Since he is primarily concerned with the musical effect of beauty for the
listener, he spends a great deal of space developing how the listener is to be prepared for
the experience and not as much clarifying what he means by beauty. For him beauty and
music are synonymous in a German idealist’s view. That is, the percipient is enwrapped
in the experience, “the soul finds itself, unhampered, in an ideal state.”163 The role, then,
for the teacher is to help the student to both recognize and be attuned to beauty as it is
manifested in art that is seen or heard in the everyday lives of percipients.164 So instead
of beauty being in the object of music alone, as the title suggests, beauty is also a
desirable response by the properly prepared percipient. Farnsworth writes, “While
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beauty has its origin in an external stimulation, this external stimulation does not produce
the desired effect unless, besides the sensuous and perceptive responses, there is a feeling
of response that gives the total experience most of its value.”165 Therefore, meaning,
value, and beauty are part of the subjective experience, an experience where the
“expression of spirit” conjoins body and soul.166
The role of the listener was also a concern of Eugene Stimson. In “What is Real
in Music?” he shows that he relies on both expressivist and German idealist positions in
relation to meaning. Stimson argues, “music is the expression of the human soul…[it] is
the human race’s mean of expressing something that no other medium so exactly
expresses; and the expression of this is meaningless and in vain unless you and I permit
this expression function through us.”167 His purpose is to encourage music educators to
bring out in students “that natural responsiveness to music which is the varying but
universal birthright of all human beings.”168 Music is the expression and our
responsiveness to what is being expressed as having meaning is the goal of music
education for Stimson.
One of the theories where the role of someone actively engaged in perceiving
and/or performing and/or composing is highly evident is seen in experientialist
philosophy. Oddly, however, while Dewey is referenced many, many times by music
educators in their writing there are not nearly as many references that specifically relate
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his work Art as Experience to meaning making in the music classroom. Therefore, the
material in this paragraph is taken from ideas embraced by some the experientialist
progressive educational thought in vogue at the time.169 Lillian Fox was a so-called
pedagogical progressive. For her it is important to provide experiences where musical
knowledge is pursued in a meaningful way. Echoing a Deweyan goal for art she writes,
“Music is not something separate and apart from life. It is an integral part of life.”170
Defense of this point by Fox includes a number of ideas relying on significationist
precepts to spark the creative efforts of her students in making and creating music. That
is, she used something the children could relate to from observation and experience as a
spark to initiate the telling of a story through music. Her end goal, while not wholly
significationist fell back in line with Deweyan experientialist and expressivist thought.
The projects were not only a means to build “skills and techniques” as “the need arose,
but also the refining and deepening of emotions and the enrichment of personality
through fuller self-expression.”171Again, this is an example of incorporating thoughts and
ideas from philosophy and aesthetics meant to influence instruction in a very specific
way.
Creative music and the integration movement were efforts at the time where
student learning was thought to be enhanced if more and better links between life and
school as well as cross-curricular connections were made. The integration movement and
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creative music projects were embedded in pedagogical progressivism. Pitts stated,
regarding the movement, “The more I study the philosophy of integration the more I am
convinced it is not a scientific, but an aesthetic approach to education.”172 Pitts also
observes that the movement is meant to foster exploration in a curricula which is
“experience-centered, value-centered, and social-centered.”173 She, for one, saw
advantages for music to be part of the integrated program. However, the reader will
recall from the previous chapter the acceptance of integration for music was not always
the case. Many music educators were desirous to maintain music’s integrity as a
standalone subject. Many others, like Pitts, however, asserted while it was fine for the
occasional relation with a social studies lesson, the primary purpose of music education
must still remain—music must be taught as music. Still others thought music should only
be seen as one of many subjects deserving no special recognition beyond its function in
society, merely another subject that has an important relation to human life but no more
so than math or literature. For example, if a social studies lesson on reconstruction in the
post-civil war era was the topic then the teacher (not necessarily a music teacher) would
include illustrations of music of the time. Music for this final group was viewed as
subordinate. One would be hard pressed to find music educators solidly in this third
group. For those in the first or second group the mindset was since music was integrated
with life, then music ought to be seen as a necessary component of the curriculum in such
a way that emphasized “not quantities of subjects but qualities of experience.”174 In
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particular the emphasis on the quality of experience was important because the belief was
the experience was memorable and important and, therefore, meaningful.
In much of Deweyan and pedagogically progressive thought social relations were
vital for more democratic living. It is on the topic of social relations that there exists an
intersection of aesthetics’ concern for meaning, modernism, and music education, but one
in this next case that is hardly Deweyan. Discourse reflecting and advancing ideas from
socioaesthetics necessarily involved a social component. For socioaestheticism,
especially for Adorno and Marx, and to a lesser extent Busoni, music is inextricably
linked with the social situation. Music is a form of social critique, and it can be an object
of ideological persuasion. Music, then, is very much a production of its time, and socalled modern art music in particular is music for itself that simultaneously seeks to
subvert class domination. This idea of music existing for itself while having a social
function at first appears paradoxical. However, Bowman suggests it is through its own
formal language that the social critique is undertaken.175 Music, through itself, reveals
social structures and social relations.
Socioaesthetic thought is difficult to locate prior to the 1920s, and when it does
surface in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s it is often, though not always, seen on topics
covering so-called modern or contemporary music. One writer in particular—Hanson—
shows elements of socioaesthetic thought in his writing, arguably because as a modernist
composer (and the director of the Eastman School of Music) he was tuned into the
subtleties of the movement. Hanson argues in 1938, for example, the composer of
contemporary music should be more in touch with mainstream tastes of his time while the
performers of the time ought to make more of an effort to embrace music written in their
175
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time. Hanson’s “The Status of Contemporary Music” has strong echoes of socioaesthetic
notion on the meaning of music. He begins by acknowledging any analysis of music
should also take into consideration the “forces and conditions which directly and
indirectly influence it.”176 He continues by saying, “the music of today is the only music
which can embody the consciousness of today. Composers should be writing honestly
but fearlessly their own interpretation of their own times.”177 For him there are three
types of composers of contemporary music, the first type is those who follow the
trajectory of music from the past. Examples from this group include Jean Sibelius, early
Arnold Schoenberg, and Randall Thompson. The second type of composer desires a
separation from the past and this group consists of those who employ atonality and
polytonality in their works.178 Members of this group are Dmitri Shostakovich, Aaron
Copeland, and George Antheil, and Hanson asserts they are suspicious of “expression and
sentiment of emotion.”179 The third type of composer has a rebellious streak, “to such
artists realism in art is all important, and to them realism is synonymous with the
expression of the tragedies and sordidness of many phases of human life.”180 Hanson
criticizes this group by suggesting music is not very good social propaganda, therefore,
since it may be a release from reality, the goal of trying to avoid reality subverts the
reason music exists.181 While he does not supply the reader with examples here of
composers in this third group there is enough written to let us know he thinks they have
missed the mark. It is not with the first or second group but with the second group that
176
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we gain an insight into Hanson’s aesthetic propensities. Hanson’s description of how this
second group developed its style is reminiscent of Busoni’s views in New Objectivity.
For Busoni, new music should attempt to explore and express material in new ways but
do so in “a return to harmony, to melody, to ‘the most highly developed (not the most
complicated polyphony),’ and away from what is ‘sensuous,’ music as description.”182
Hanson says of this group, “these composers…turned back to the practice of
polyphony.”183 Using the work of Palestrina as an example, Hanson writes that there was
rhythmic independence and the “various melodic lines were integrated and fused” in an
“underlying sonorous background almost completely constant in structure.”184 If there
was dissonance it was resolved in terms of the overall consonant structure.185 In the new
music, using a Busonian description, “the contemporary polyphonic atonalist separates
from his sixteenth century brother. In this music there is no underlying consonant
sonority.”186 The examples Hanson uses in his paper show both the nature and
underlying meaning of music in Busoni’s objectivity, a forerunner to socioaesthetics. As
music it is historically rooted, it consists of traditional musical elements such as harmony
and rhythm; it also rejects some of the emotional connections often said to be in music—
the last of which is a point which Hanson also sees as problematic—and it is socially
situated. Therefore, its meaning is bound to the existing social reality.187
Hobart Sommes is the obscure music educator I spoke about in chapter two. That
is, he is the lone example that exists in the evidence that ties in specifically Marxist
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thought and music. His general call is for music educators to continue their push for
music to be a necessary component in general education mainly because of its spiritual
nature. He argues that in this age of science the spiritual side of man should also be
cultivated.188 On the topic of Marxism and music Sommes writes
The Marxist school asserts that music, as one of the forms of human culture, is
nothing but a minor byproduct of the economic structure within which it is
written, and its products are either a justification or a condemnation of the
economic system which gives it birth…the Marxists say that music can only
produce an emotion for or against the government.189
Sommes’ mentioning of the tenets of Marxist philosophy on music and its meaning
shows an astute awareness of ideas in musical aesthetics. So, even though he does not
use the perspective of Marx, or refute it in a systematic manner, it is nevertheless
included to advance his idea that music can be a positive force in the United States and
the world. Simply put, contrary to the standard interpretation, the music educators of this
period were talking about highly philosophical matters.
These two examples under the general sociaoaesthetic umbrella also show how
there is distinction in socioaesthetics. The Marxist sees music as having a primary social
function—what Beardsley refers to as the principle of non-neutrality. As such, its
meaning is in direct relation to the economic superstructure. Sommes’ use and
understanding of Marxist aesthetics subsumes music as a “minor byproduct of the
economic structure.” Hanson’s work reveals how the ideas of Busoni and Adorno—
though neither are specifically mentioned—are broader than those of the Marxist.
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Instead of music being merely subsumed in the economic structure, music is capable of
much more than subverting or supporting a given ideological perspective. Hanson’s
work shows how music is both related to the social conditions—those “forces and
conditions” he speaks of—yet music most certainly relates to itself, which can be seen in
the difference between the atonal and polyphonal work of so-called contemporary
composers and their relation to the past in their newer forms of music. So, meaning is
simultaneously musical in the formalist sense, of which objectivism and socioaesthetics
in the twentieth are offshoots, and socially situated because it is a product of the time.
This also happens to be an instance where meaning is subtly rooted to context, and
context will be much more overt in the next chapter on value.
Meaning, interpretation, or what music is said to reveal contains a complex milieu
of perspectives and problems, some of which I highlight in this chapter. Formalist,
significationist, expressivist, and socioaesthetic points of view in the evidence have
shown that these views are present and debated. Sometimes these debates often were
embedded within arguments unique to music education. One example seen is this chapter
was the problem of musical understanding as it relates to the role of the percipient and the
performer. Another ongoing debate centered on musical understanding and the learning
of music—the rote versus note argument. Music educators were also considering what
their role in the integration movement looked like or how to successfully introduce
contemporary art music into the classroom. Fundamentally, however, when it came to
considering the meaning of music there was a reliance on ideas from musical aesthetics
regardless of whether these were embedded in the debates above or as standalone
questions on what is allegedly revealed in music, for example is music a language? The
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complex milieu of problems and perspectives occupied a great deal of space and
generated much discussion. The fact that there are many points of view on the problems
of meaning in one’s aesthetic position as compared to another’s simply displays the
diversity, or lack of unity depending on one’s perspective, of discourse in musical
aesthetics. Varied voices on the topic of the meaning of music in music education were
prevalent in the discourse. Many music educators had reflexively considered what music
means, which is a quality also seen in why this group thinks music matters.

CHAPTER 5
VALUE
Diversity in the musical aesthetic perspectives from the last chapter on meaning
also appears in this chapter on value. There is, however, an additional element that
shows up in the discourse on value that was not in the earlier chapters – the larger
historical context.1 Another wrinkle in this chapter is the two ways in which people use
the word value. There is material that covers evaluation, that is, making judgments about
the quality of music. The other material connects to the question of why music matters.
Think of it this way, an evaluative question asks, “What music is good?” and a question
on why music matters asks, “What good is music?” Evaluation occupies the first section
of this chapter and I make no effort, nor is it necessary to subdivide perspectives on
evaluation into the performance and non-performance based categories. The reason for
this is the evidence does not show any noticeable difference in the arguments of what
good music is. In other words the point of view of a work on the subject of good music
for chorus contains a negligible difference as compared to someone discussing good
music in a paper on music appreciation.
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Evaluation and Judgment
Evidence of judgments about music is far more uniform here than in any other
category of this dissertation. For the vast majority of music educators who wrote on the
topic during this period, the goal of music education in relation to musical judgment was
the elevation or cultivation of taste. Someone with cultivated taste, according to these
writers, understood why certain types and styles of music were superior to others.
Therefore, the role of the music teacher was one where developing an understanding and
appreciation of honest, sincere, and complex music, usually Western Art Music, was
expected. Good and great music was Western Art Music, and in order to be considered
someone with elevated taste, the percipient should be able to recognize and be sensitive
to differences in quality between a Mozart symphony and Scott Joplin’s ragtime music.
Mary Conway was very concerned with what was passing for music in the early
years of the twentieth century. She associates rag-time music with evil saying, “a certain
type of modern song can break down in half a minute the careful teaching of years in
church, Sunday-school and home.”2 Quality music education was considered a necessary
requisite to cure the corrupted tastes of the average person. Mary Armitage expressed in
1920 “the average child prefers rag-time and the cheap song of the street to the
classics…and it devolves on the supervisor to offset that taste and give him a liking for
something infinitely better.”3 Many music educators shared her basic view. Paul Weaver
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argues in 1929 “the chief concern of all music education is the cultivation of
discrimination.”4 A number of these music educators advancing the notion that part of
the role of the music educator was to elevate taste did so in a manner reminiscent of
Plato, Aristotle and Schiller. Birge wrote in 1910 “the cultivation of taste is of prime
importance.”5 Similarly, Anton Embs asserts the purpose of school music is to “develop
the musical taste of the child.”6 Along those same lines Osbourne McConathy suggests,
“Music should inspire to noble thoughts and feelings,”7 a classical Greek view. Echoing
Schiller, Louis Mohler makes a connection between listening to good music and the
development of cooperation and more democratic living.8 Spaeth advises the average
listener “not to worry about your musical taste. It will develop normally if you hear
enough music, both good and bad.”9 Little had changed by the 1950s. In “A Question of
Taste in High School Band Music” Joseph Doran laments good music does not exist in
the majority of literature available to the band. Instead, “it primarily consists of popular
music and novelties.”10 Like many music educators he equated good taste with Western
Art Music. “Public School music—band, orchestra, and vocal groups—must work at all
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times to develop taste in the youth of America.”11 To support his point that the band is a
group capable of artistic production, he urges band directors to not only include marches
but also the work of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Ravel, Holst, even Stravinsky and Bartok.
Mursell shared the same sentiment. He wrote in 1935 that is was the responsibility of the
music educator to influence the lives of children with the music of the great masters.
Referencing Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, and Chopin, Mursell insisted it was the music
educator’s responsibility to call attention to “the work and utterances of these men. The
mere existence of such work is the greatest single reason for music study.”12 Educators
desired the study of better music, but for some, what better music actually looked like
was an idea not fully developed. At the 1937 Eastern Music Educators Conference in
Buffalo, NY a panel discussion was dedicated to what “more and better music” looked
like. Yet even here specificity is lacking. Russell Morgan, for example, merely drew on
the traditional delineation between the music of the great masters and “cheap tawdry
music.”13 The larger goal was for the better teaching of good music. To this effect, it is
apparent that these music educators thought taste could be improved and that good music
had certain prescribed characteristics.
Making music judgments is a central idea in musical aesthetics and music
educators were, in fact, aware of this. In 1925 Clippinger devotes an entire section of his
address to musical judgment. He lists several kinds of judgments such as “is the
tone…too bright, too somber, or is it the right color?...is it too thick or thin? Is it steady
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or unsteady? Is it harsh or mellow and sympathetic?”14 Clippinger also goes on to state
that the aforementioned judgments “all have to do with musical taste, of which aesthetics
is the philosophy.”15 Once again, the evidence is overt and in this case it is an example of
what a music educator understood aesthetics to be as well as keys to making such
judgments. Frances Martin specifically asks, “What are some of the criteria of good
music?” in her article “A Plan for Good Music.”16 She continues by generating a series
of questions that enable teachers to judge the merits of a composition.17 For starters she
judges a good work on the basis of whether the composers name appears “in studied
music reference books.”18 The follow-up question also relates to the noteworthiness of
the composer and his music as being necessary criteria for something to count as good
music. Questions four and five inquire about the appropriateness of the score considering
what kind of group will perform it and whether it corresponds well with the original.19
The remaining questions, (six, seven, eight, and nine) delve into the musical experience
itself. However, while Martin’s perspectives rest on the notion that good music must
“have some value, whether it be technical, social or educational,”20 she does not spend
any time developing how good music has social value. She also does not discuss what
elements of her view of good music enrich the experience. Not all views of what good
music is were as simplistic as Martin’s.
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Anne Pierce also made suggestions for music educators to consider when
selecting music. First on Pierce’s list is that the “materials must be of good quality.”21
And in determining the worth of the music Pierce includes the characteristic that it
possesses certain qualities. She, unlike Martin, acknowledges there are differing views
on what constitutes good music. Pierce writes that for some, good music is music that is
structurally sound, and for others music that has withstood the test of time is good.22
These perspectives, for Pierce, are incomplete. Her recommendation is that instead of
using these two criteria alone, the teacher is to seek “the superior and permanent.”23 Her
notions of good music share in a simple way the genetic, affective, and objective reasons
given by Beardsley in making judgments of musical worth. Specifically, Pierce writes
good music “is sincere in expression,” (a genetic reason); it is “presented in such a way
as to arrest and hold attention and interest,” (an affective reason); and finally, it is “wellplanned and constructed…in fact the details of melodies, chords, cadences, dissonances,
motives, and phrases must be so worked out as to give the listener an impression of
coherence,” (an objective reason).24 Once again is it unmistakable that some of the music
educators of the period understood and could make well formed arguments on the subject
of separating good and cheap music using language of evaluation from musical
aesthetics.
H.L. Butler is another example of a music educator who has reflexively thought
about the notion of good music. Mentioning Hanslick, Butler argues that good music
21
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possesses certain inner qualities. For him, these elements are “Sincerity, the true and the
honest; Originality, the genuine output of the individual imagination; and Nobility, the
freedom from cheapness, vulgarity, and banality.”25 He continues by arguing the sum of
these three elements is vitality, a quality that enables a masterpiece to persist.26 In other
words, a tune “is not great because it is difficult to sing from a technical standpoint. It is
great because it has in itself the vital elements, originality, sincerity, and nobility, which
in turn give it vitality, or the power to live.”27 Butler’s assertion, like those of Pierce, also
echoes Beardsley’s reasons for making judgments, in this case genetic reasons. But
while Beardsley took issue with qualities of sincerity, originality, and nobility, Butler
simply accepts these ideas as the vital elements of music—ideas specific to making
evaluations.
There were other music educators who also showed an awareness of and
advanced ideas from musical aesthetics in their work. Minerva Bennett deliberately and
explicitly incorporated arguments and theories in musical aesthetics in her Master’s
thesis. On the topic of taste Bennett relies on the work of M.D. Calvacoressi, Dewey,
Frederick Lund, and W.H. Hadow. From Calvacoressi she borrows the idea that taste can
and should be developed, and some music educators ought to help students refine their
ability to discriminate between good and bad music.28 In order to develop the ability to
discriminate, she advocates the application of Deweyan thought. The student and teacher
are involved in the process of learning what it is the artist experienced as the work was
25
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produced.29 She takes from Hadow’s work his evaluative reasons for something being
labeled as good music.
Bennett applies Hadow’s four principles of judgment from his Studies in Modern
Music for the purpose of arguing that education and experience are the foundations for
making authoritative judgments about the quality of music.30 These are “the principle of
vitality…the principle of labor…the principle of proportion…fourth, that of fitness.”31
Explanations given for each of these principles of judgment adhere, like the works of
Butler and Pierce, to Beardsley’s description of genetic, affective, and objective
reasons.32
Approaches to evaluating music appear in Henry Moses’ “An Icky Looks at Good
Music.”33 Moses posed two questions to nearly 850 students: “(1) Define what you mean
by good music. (2) On what basis do you judge whether music is good or not good.”34
The students’ answers to the second question fell into distinct categories of reasons for
being able to make such judgments. It will not surprise the reader at this point to find out
that the reasons given by the students fell into the affective and genetic categories. In
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fact, Moses notes “there was little factual basis for objective reasoning.”35 There is,
however, an interesting twist in Moses’ analysis based on discussions he had with groups
of students involved in the study. For “music to be great, [it] must not only be well
written and well played but must also have a good purpose…[it] must also carry out that
purpose.”36
Finally, Howard Murphy points out the difficulty of evaluating modern music in
“Judgment Values for Contemporary Music.” Since “a conservative is a man who
worships dead radicals,”37 fair evaluation of so-called modern music is problematic. He
notes that Beethoven was criticized harshly in his time and until perspective is gained
meaningful evaluation is difficult. What, then, can be done? Murphy suggests that
modern music can be evaluated effectively. To do so requires making the new music
more familiar through repeated hearing.38 The next task is to better understand the
composer’s use of “new technical devices.”39 It is this second category that aspires to
objective reasons for evaluation. Here Murphy divides the structural aspects of modern
music four ways: “(1) The extensive use of dissonance, (2) the new melodic line, (3)
rhythmic complexity, (4) the new formal structure, or means of obtaining continuity.”40
Changed conceptions of music, according to Murphy, should enhance rather than obstruct
our ability to evaluate modern music. So, while tastes change, percipients are in no
worse a position to make an educated evaluation if they become more familiar with the
music and group the technical devices used by the composer. And in his follow-up
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article in the next issue of the Music Educators Journal, he sets out to establish specific
criteria and make such an informed judgment.
Murphy’s ideas about judgment are meant to influence practice. He explicitly
states that teachers teaching modern music “must make some evaluations, however
tentative. As teachers of music we cannot evade this responsibility; indifference is as
deplorable as dogmatism.”41 He thus establishes basic criteria for the teacher to consider
in performing such evaluations. Once again, the criteria fell into the categories
mentioned by Beardsley. The first question of new music is, does it successfully “convey
mood or emotion to the auditor?”42 which combines genetic and affective reasons.
Second, does the new music possess a quality of unity in its design?43 According to the
criteria Murphy lays out, “new music is to be judged primarily in its power of
communication, on its sincerity, and on its technical competence.”44 These judgments, in
turn, rest on genetic, affective, and objective rationales.
The recognition and establishment of criteria for evaluating music is yet one more
way the evidence points to important matters from musical aesthetics finding their way
into the discourse of music educators. Although there were definitely music educators
who were content to suggest an underlying association with basic principles in musical
aesthetics such as the objective of elevating taste, not everyone was satisfied to leave it at
that. Several scholars probed issues associated with how it was possible and in what
ways evaluative judgments about music could be made. Whether the topic was music
appreciation, a performance based piece, or something generalized to the entirety of the
41
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field, these music educator’s perspectives were explicitly attached to ideas on evaluation
and cultivating taste that were directly linked with influencing practice. Separating good
music from that of lesser quality and applying criticism for doing so to make some
evaluative judgment is only one aspect of questions about musical value.
Why Music Matters
The idea of value was one of the most personal and possibly the most volatile of
all the categories of musical aesthetics discussed in music education. The divergent
views are the result of the steady and careful articulation of ideas and reflexively
considering music’s value in light of new developments in the field such as the orchestra
and appreciation courses, and the larger educational and historical contexts. The question
of why music matters has been a constant one for music educators. Mursell writes “as
applied to our own field, it takes the form of asking why music should be taught in
schools.”45 Music’s inclusion in the general curriculum has been supported using
numerous arguments, which rest on four distinct ways of understanding value: intrinsic,
inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian. Mark’s interpretation would have us believe that
for a thousand years the answer to the question “why music matters” rests solely on
utilitarian claims.46 Mark’s assertion would have us believe that aesthetics has no
concern with extramusical associations whatsoever. While utilitarian claims are present
in the evidence, they are by no means the only ones. It is in the category of value where
some of the deeper probing of ideas from musical aesthetics occurs, which in part
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explains the divergent views. It is also in relation to value where music educators display
they are beings in time, subjects who question ideas to better understand the present.
The question of why music matters has persisted and will continue to persist.
Therefore, music educators have often relied on contemporary influences that are either
accepted or rejected to argue a point for the value of music, and, by extension, music
education. These writers and thinkers have at times observed the effects of the
intensification of industrial production and have commented upon the positive
development of the industrial age as well as problems stemming from an obsession with
materialism, especially during the Depression years. Other threads exist in the evidence
such as ideas of value tied to the integration movement and the performing versus
listening debate. Additionally, there are utilitarian claims for music during World War II
and the Cold War years, yet here too are a group of music educators who reject those
claims. While there are pregnant internal questions related to value such as whether
music be considered “art or science”? or whether its basis is “intellectual or emotional”?
these questions are nevertheless anchored in the explicit material and the subtext of
evidence. Perspectives on intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian value are both
plain to see and underlie the arguments presented by music educators.
Much like the previous section on evaluation, there is a negligible difference in
the evidence on the topic of value that makes any pointed distinction between the
performance and non-performance categories superfluous. Any noteworthy difference
on a specific topic relating to value between the performance and non-performance
categories I bring to the reader’s attention when a point needs to be emphasized.
Problems and theories of musical aesthetics have overlapping elements on the question of
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value. The Moralist using an argument from correlation, for example, suggests that for a
work to be adjudged as having merit it must have a moral component. If the moral
component of the work is high, then its value is high. In this instance the quality of the
work—an evaluative statement—is inextricably linked with notions of why music is
important, why we should care about it—a normative statement. To put it another way,
the judgment of the quality of the work is related to its inherent, instrumental and/or
utilitarian value. It is not enough simply to judge the work according to its own merits;
there is necessarily an extramusical component attached to its worth, and how far that
extramusical component is extended depends on the theorist’s take on value.
Moralism, because of its connection to evaluation and explanation of value, is a
good place to transition from the first section of this chapter to the last section on the
subject of value in music education. Echoing Plato’s ethos theory, which suggests music
could be valued for its emotional and ethical effects, Ralph Baldwin argues, “the teaching
of music in the public schools should exert an influence in the upbuilding of character
and affect for good the conduct of the children.”47 He continues by suggesting music
“should have a restraining and refining influence upon character and conduct, and thus
certain ethical value should accrue.”48 Baldwin’s argument assumes music is a moral
force and as such is one that sees music as having utilitarian value. Bruno Ussher writes,
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“believing as I do in the educational, character-forming mission of music”49 leaving little
doubt of his Platonic view of music. McConathy expressed similar sentiment by
asserting, “Music should inspire to noble thoughts and feelings.”50 And for McConathy
the idea of moral uplift was utilitarian. He suggests that since the Depression was having
such a negative effect on the lives of people “music can contribute to the upbuilding of
morale, to the steadying of nerves, to the welfare of our community.”51 The emphasis
here is on the good that can be achieved through music.
Another example showing the issue with judgment that incorporates the moralist
perspective is given by J.F. Messenger. His argument in “Living Humanities” is for
music teachers to teach music to help students lead better, fuller, richer, and deeper lives.
Music is part of our human nature and as such is a means to individual and societal
improvement. Messenger writes, “I recognize the value of listening to good music, but
that is not its greatest value…help me to develop a larger and nobler and sweeter
personality. If music will do that, then music is good.”52 Messenger’s moralist bent
moves away from utilitarianism toward instrumentalism. True, there is still the hint of
having a noble mind, but his view is more general than the preceding perspectives of
Baldwin and McConathy. The effect music has on the personality may lead to benefits
for the individual and society, but he does not go so far as to propose a view that is fixed
and final, he leaves it open. This is not the case for Baldwin and McConathy who make
direct and practical connections to life. McConathy sees music being helpful in tough
economic times and Baldwin speaks of ethical values as if they are currency stored up to
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be spent in a practical manner. Messenger’s moralist stance is more instrumental and less
utilitarian because the focus is in line with the argument from reduction. That is, the
feelings aroused by contact with the object (music) causes good feelings, therefore, the
object is good. Subsequently, the effect on the personality and feeling may be for good,
but the good is not necessarily predetermined. The emphasis is on the idea that music
can be moral rather than what the moral specifically leads to. Admittedly, this distinction
between utilitarian and instrumental value is very fine, especially since moral issues are
linked with utilitarianism. The distinction here is due to Messenger’s moralist position as
it is proximally related to evaluation.
Mursell gives us one of the most developed arguments relating to music and
morality in his Human Values in Music Education. In chapter five “Music as a Moral
Force” Mursell’s basic claim is there must be a moral component to music education. He
deviates, however, from an outright acceptance of a straightforward Platonists view. As a
matter-of-fact he question’s Plato’s supposition in The Republic that “the Ionian and
Lydian modes [were] lax, effeminate and convivial.”53 Instead, Mursell asserts, “no
music, good, bad or indifferent, has in itself any direct intrinsic magic, moral power.”54
For him “music is a moral force in education simply because it lends itself to the creation
of morally and socially significant situations.”55 Mursell’s treatment of the topic of
music and morality is thoughtful and well developed. He presents what he sees as
fallacies on the topic and systematically undermines each view that he sees as incorrect.
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After he completes his critique of the subject of music and morality he advances his own
view that shares elements from the argument from reduction, and inherent and
instrumental explanations of value.
Mursell’s assertion regarding music and morality is “that music properly
organized and presented is a constructive factor in human life. Music favors the kinds of
attitudes leading to constructive and creative social adjustment and effective selfexpression in a social medium.”56 Mursell takes from the argument of reduction the
notion there are certain attitudes generated from contact with music, but this is as far as
he develops his line of thinking here. From instrumenalism he assumes that there is some
social and personal “adjustment” derived from the experience with music. Finally, in
relation to inherent value, he follows his claim with a portion of the chapter that deals
with the evaluation of music. For Mursell, it is only through music, more specifically
“superior music,” that a certain type of experience is had. It is “superior music,” that
favors “the kinds of attitudes” that can have a moral dimension; not mathematics for
example.57 Music is a specific kind of moral agent, a view linked with inherent value.
Mursell was not alone in his cautious attitude and perspective on music and
morality. William Finn argued in 1917 that since music is “sense-impressive” it can, at
least, relate to morality indirectly. Furthermore, “it must be concluded that great as the
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potentialities of music may be, there is no definite ethical significance in its essence.”58
In arriving at that conclusion, Finn questions the argument from reduction. For him,
“there is no law of music structure by which a specific idea on a particular mood can be
unvaryingly generated by specific sounds.”59 As an example he states, “there is no
patriotism in ‘patriotic’ music save by association…there is no vernacular in the sayings
of music. Nor can a lexicon be found for defining her speech.”60 So, for Mursell,
Bennett, and Finn the analogy of the music/moral relationship is false, which is akin to
Beardsley’s contention that “an analogy is not a causal connection,” further proof that
philosophical matters were a part of the discourse of music educators from 1907 to 1958.
Philosophical perspectives also appear in the evidence in relation to the various
ways of explaining value—intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian. To some
extent these ways of explaining value appears in the discourse on moralism, specifically
in the work of Messenger and Mursell. Quite often, however, arguments regarding
intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian value surfaced that were unrelated to
evaluation and went beyond the notion of music as a moral force. One view in particular
rejected connection with any extramusical association.
The point of view that argues music has not extramusical associations is referred
to variously as the position of the aesthete or the formalist or the absolutist. Aestheticism
and formalism are views which insist the value of music is intrinsic. In other words
music is for music’s sake, music has value “independently of any means-end-relation to
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other objects.”61 Purely formalistic statements regarding the intrinsic value of music are
curiously absent. The cause of this paucity of material is due in part to music as
necessarily relating to education. These writers and thinkers did not have the luxury of
considering music as wholly separate from what was undertaken as a larger project, the
education of students. It simply was not expedient for music educators in the public
schools to make arguments in terms of value that music was only attached to itself.
While these teachers could get away with making such statements on the topics of nature
and meaning, the view of music only having intrinsic value is difficult to maintain in the
school setting. Some music educators mention Bell and Hanslick in their writings but
only in correlation to the nature and meaning of music. There is, in some cases, an
awareness of the formalist perspective of value, but rarely are these positions advanced.
Rather, when acknowledged, the view of intrinsic value is merely to call attention to
another more practical and realistic perspective. Two brief examples follow. First,
Earhart comments on the development of sensitivity to tone in music appreciation. The
percipient ought to understand “the factors in music that make it music,” in order to better
comprehend “the intrinsic value of compositions as compositions.”62 Second is from a
resolution adopted by the MENC in New York, NY on April 2, 1936. In regard to the
position of music in integration it was
resolved…that its greatest power lies in the intrinsic feeling and beauty and that
the values peculiar to music should be carefully safeguarded whenever music is
integrated with any other subject…such connections should always be used to
enhance the meaning of music itself.63
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Sometimes it is what is absent that gives us insight into what is present. Music for
music’s sake is a challenging view to maintain in public school education.
Do not be fooled into thinking that the lack of evidence supporting the formalist
or aesthetes point of view on value substantiates blanket utilitarian claims in music
education. There is a middle ground between intrinsic and utilitarian perspectives where
there is absolutely no shortage of evidence. In fact there are a number of instances where
music educators make explicitly anti-utilitarian arguments on the topic of value. The
philosophical working through of these ideas in the area between the intrinsicality and
utility of music is no simple matter. Russell Morgan shows the difficulty by making an
attempt to explain how music can aid the positive development of social values but does
so while adhering to his “point that music can contribute its own worth-while values to
human living without attempting to tie it up specifically with outward events.”64 Morgan
even goes on to rank the purposes of music education as “(1) Aesthetic Experience (2)
Emotional Development (3) Creative Attitude (4) Social Values (5) Skills and
Knowledge.”65 Inherent and instrumental notions of value occupy the middle ground
between the aesthete and the utilitarian. The inherent position relies on a couple of key
arguments to support claims of value for music in the classroom. First, music’s
infungibility, or what Beardsley labels a “function class.”66 Music educators’ views on
value as they are used to argue for music as important in education rest on the notion that
it is only music that can accomplish what it does (whatever that may be) in the way it
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does. Music cannot be replaced by math, literature, or the visual arts in this view.
According to a number of music educators, music is unique.
Charles Lake asks, “What is it that music may do that cannot be done better by
some other subject?”67 For him music occupies a unique role in education because of its
capacity to foster expressive and emotional growth. Much the same can be said about the
views of Lewis Hilton. In addition to expressive and emotional growth, Hilton adds
spiritual growth and the social nature of participation. In regard to possible social
benefits of music Hilton questions whether the social benefits that may exist relating to
participation are as great as those who support the notion claim they are, especially “since
they may be equally attributable to membership in the pep squad, or playing with the
Swiss handbell society.”68 He makes a case for the infungibility of music because “of the
intrinsic values in music itself, not its byproducts.”69 Music as infungible, or function
class, is one type of argument, and it connects with the second, which is music’s
“immediate function is only to provide a certain kind of experience that can be enjoyed in
itself.”70 The “certain kind of experience” may be moving, a spiritual connection, a type
of sensuous excitement, or imaginative discovery; regardless, it is the specific nature of
music that ensures the unique experience is had. For an adherent of inherent value, the
experience is largely self-contained.
At the 1915 MSNC conference Gehrkens delivered a paper titled “Ultimate Ends
in Public School Music Teaching” to which there were follow up addresses to his initial
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report on the topic. Gehrkens lays out a number of normative questions with the aim of
encouraging the field to be more reflexive and to wrestle with issues of value that
hopefully lead to a clearer statement of purpose. One of the main topics of discussion
was where the emphasis on the teaching of music should be; intellectual, emotional,
aesthetic and cultural.”71 George Wilmot weighs in on the topic by asking “whether we
should devote very much time to the aesthetic side of music in the grammar schools, [sic]
if we have to sacrifice too much of the technical worth to do so.”72 Farnsworth disagrees.
For him the teaching of music should awaken feeling rather than emphasize how it is
constituted.73 More specifically, and in relation to inherent value, “the intellectual
element of analysis is in the aesthetic process merely as a means to the end of helping the
mind grasp all that we hear and see in an art-work.”74 Notice the implied difference in
his statement between intrinsic and inherent value. An educator of more formalist bent
sees the construction of music and its analysis as being intellectual, and in this case the
way music should be valued. To someone like Farnsworth, who thinks of music having
inherent value it is what the music generates as a result of that specific experience with it
that is to be valued, and therefore emphasized. Farnsworth’s “Ultimate End” of music
teaching is “stronger feeling, not further knowledge.”75 His suggestion that music
teaching should emphasize stronger feeling precedes Langer’s assertion that the inherent
71
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value of music is “the education of feeling, as our usual schooling in factual subjects…is
the education of thought,”76 ideas which would be incorporated into the MEAE
movement. Additionally, Farnsworth’s use of the term aesthetic implies nature, meaning,
and value are elements in the process of musical analysis and understanding. Discussion
and debate on the topic of value did not end here.
Julia Crane’s answer to the question of music’s “ultimate end” squarely placed
her in the utilitarian camp. Her response on the value of music was “to produce a higher
quality citizenship.”77 Not all of the panel discussants agreed, however, and each
subsequent response backs slowly away from Crane’s claim. Thaddeus Giddings, for
example, who acknowledges that education in general is to make productive citizens
asserts, “the ultimate end of school music is to make the pupil as musical as possible.”78
He backs away from pure utilitarian claims for music by infusing a hint of
instrumentalism. Yes, citizenship is important, but it is through a child’s study of music
that he will, according to Giddings, also understand and appreciate music as music apart
from specific fixed ends-in-view.79 I am not arguing that Giddings was an instrumentalist
but merely suggesting that his statement begins to back away from a purely utilitarian
motive for music education because he makes a distinction between music and general
education where musical ends are also valued.
Backing still further away from Crane’s purely utilitarian perspective is
Farnsworth who, once again, states that music teaching’s ultimate end “is that music
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should do for the child musically what training in the other branches of study does with
reference to those subjects.”80 He continues, “Music teaching should prepare the child
for his present and future musical needs.”81 His focus is on inherent value in music, not
citizenship or better math students. George Bowen echoes Farnsworth’s basic premise
but does so from an instrumentalist perspective. Bowen argues the ultimate ends “are the
cultural, the ethical, the educational values which are secured through a proper
appreciation of value.”82 In the body of his response Bowen shows support for each of
the components of his thesis. One example of music being instrumentally valuable is in
relation to “the cultural.” The cultural allows for spiritual development and “a fuller
understanding of things which pertain to the soul.”83 The notion of spiritual development
does not necessarily inhere in the music, but it is through contact with music in the
experience that music becomes a means to an end that is not fixed, final, or even
practical. In this case the amorphous end is spiritual development. The differences
between inherent and instrumental value as I mentioned in chapter two are blurry.
Spiritual development, for Bowen and the German idealists, is an instrumental value
because music “is a means to the production of an object [spiritualness] with inherent
value.”84 Thus, the production of spiritualness or spiritual development comes as a result
of contact with music, and for Bowen spiritual development and spiritualness also have
inherent value. If Bowen embraced the inherent value of music, then spiritual
development would have to be something found in music; it would have to be something

80

Charles Farnsworth comment on “Ultimate Ends,” 68.
Ibid.
82
George Bowen comment on “Ultimate Ends,” 71. Bowen restates his thesis on page 74 and
exchanges the word “proper” for “intelligent.”
83
Ibid., 71.
84
Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 547.
81

233
that could not be separated from the substance of music itself. The instrumental value of
music is due to music’s being a medium through which emotions, feelings, and moods
can be expressed. Instrumental value implies there is an outward movement a value
emanating from the music with the music being necessary for such a projection to
happen. Inherent value has the experience of music moving inward and becoming
inseparable with the qualities in the music itself. The discussion in music education
certainly did not clear up perspectives on the type of value music has.
What the debate did encourage was further discussion and articulation of the
ultimate ends of public school music. At the conclusion of the paper, panel discussion,
and audience discussion Gehrkens crafted a statement sure to generate papers and
discussions on what is important in music education.85 For this early group of music
education scholars
the ultimate aim of music teaching in the public schools is to cause children to
know, to love and to appreciate music in as many forms as possible, and thus to
bring added joy into their lives and added culture and refinement into their
natures.86
Finally, what music teachers were to emphasize was the “emotional and aesthetic phases
of music which constitute the real essence of the art; in other words that it is the art side
of music with its somewhat intangible influences which we are seeking to cultivate.”87
Gehrkens concluding proclamation rests on inherent and instrumental notions of value. It
is not a declaration infatuated with utilitarianism.
Statements made by music educators supporting inherent and instrumentalist
value positions often argued against utilitarian claims for music. Frank Beach’s 1922
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presidential address was about the relationship between music and “new education.” The
“new education” he refers to consists of ideas pulled from the pedagogical progressive
education movement, which generally saw the value of education in instrumental terms.
That is, the ends-in-view of education were not fixed or final. Beach’s examination and
acceptance of the “new education” led him to assert “a narrow utilitarian view of
education stunts the growth of those brought under its influence.”88 Implying music
education he says of so-called new education, it “stresses the importance of education for
itself rather than as a means to an end, commercial or otherwise.”89 Echoing a similar
sentiment Earhart, quoting Ruskin, writes the focus of education is so-often
“advancement in life…it never seems to occur to the parent that there may be an
education which, in itself, is advancement in Life.”90 Music is more than a worthy use of
leisure or a handmaiden for other utilitarian interests, according to Earhart. Music will
not achieve its highest aims until it shakes itself loose from such base ideas.91 Earhart
sees the theory that relates the teaching of music to “social needs or social utilities”92 as
inadequate. He asserts that this view offers a static conception of life instead of a
progressive one where movement “come[s] from men who had visions of principles far
above utility.”93 Earhart is also critical of music as a worthy use of leisure. Other than an
indictment of a societal disconnect between work and interests, Earhart says music “is not
merely the pastime of an occasional hour but is an influence that may persist in the whole
88
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affective state of an individual.”94 It is reference to the idea of music as a worthy use of
leisure that Earhart applies the idea of music as a function class or infungible. If music is
only for leisure, how is it any different than billiards?95 These comments on the place of
music in life and music as an art whose influence is intangible and difficult to measure
questions the wisdom of the efforts by so called administrative progressives who sought
to manage schools using Fordist efficiency models.
Another instance of the debate over the value of music occurred at the 1927
Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association Discussion Group
on Music Education meeting. The reprint of the meeting is included in the 1927 MSNC
Yearbook published later that year. The discussion topic was “A New Evaluation of
Music in the Curriculum.” Dykema gave opening remarks highlighting the instrumental
and utilitarian values used by music educators since 1838, and eventually asked, “What
are the values of music?”96 Some members of the committee had already assumed at this
point that music’s place in the schools was important as a “citizenship developing
medium,”97 an overtly utilitarian claim. The most philosophical treatment of the subject
of value in music came from Earhart, who mentions by name Schopenhauer, Bergson,
James, Bell, and Gurney. He argues “that whenever we speak of value at all we must
speak in terms of subjective testimony.”98 While he mentions music as a socializing
force, a utilitarian value, and vocational value, also utilitarian, these are not the most
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important kinds of value, although they do contribute to the greater value.99 Relying on
his broader notion of value and using the work of Vernon Lee, he makes a distinction
between the good and the useful in relation to the beautiful, which is a highly
philosophical question. Basically, his analysis highlights the difference between
utilitarianism and the inherent and/or instrumentalist views on the value of music.
Without belaboring the point too much, good implies a usefulness, but that may not be
the case for beauty since beauty may have no use; it may simply be enjoyed in the
moment. “The beautiful is thus distinguished by the fact that it holds not future
advantage but present value.”100 This statement alone throws into question the idea of
utilitarian value because this view of value relies on consequences which follow the
experience. The instrumentalist, however, can accept this position based on the doctrine
of immediacy, that is, it is “something that is immediately experienced and known.”101
Earhart’s view also reflects aspects of inherent perspectives on value because the
experience with the object, music in this case, “has taken us utterly into it”102 Echoing
beauty theory, Earhart asserts music has a particular kind of value. It is of the beautiful
“but instead of being understood as beauty [it] has been popularly conceived as
emotion.”103 Earhart also gives a pointed critique of utility. He asks, “shall we continue
to believe that utilitarian thought and labor, if only spurred more feverishly so as to
produce more tonnage, will bring about the millennium it so long has promised? Do we
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not know that self-interest breeds self-interest, that utilitarianism breeds utilitarianism,
even as war breeds war?104
Anton Embs, president of the North Central Music Educators Conference, is also
dismayed with the pervasive administrative progressive’s view of musical utility. He
relates a story of a superintendent who considered the school band primarily as “an
adjunct of athletics.”105 Embs’ response to this view of the band was “public school
music is thus reduced to the status of mere utility; it is not an educational factor at all but
a ‘servant in the house,’ tolerated only for the service it can render!”106 In the same
yearbook there is a paper by Dykema titled “The Re-Evaluation of School Music.” In
this document he references four views on the value of music to show how ill-defined,
understood, and vague the notion’s of music’s ultimate purpose in schools is. Dykema’s
paper is a call to action. “It is time that we started to study what music is doing to affect
life and that we stated the results of our study in definite convincing form.”107 What he
wanted from such a study was already concluded in his mind, and it is quite the opposite
of what Embs and Earhart rejected, which is no surprise since Dykema’s work in music
education focused a great deal on the administrative side of schooling. For Dykema
music is part of the educational scheme for what it could allegedly do. More specifically
the
final standard of value is the connecting of music with life, with citizenship—
those are the means by which we will justify our subject and ourselves, by
showing that music can help to develop finer men and women who will aid in
carrying out the purpose for which these United States were founded.108
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Dykema’s views on value, then, are more consistent with administrative progressives,
which are utilitarian.
The debate over value is ubiquitous. During the Depression years the tenor of the
debate did not vary much. To put it another way the ongoing back and forth that had
ensued between the pedagogical progressives, who largely embraced instrumentalist
and/or inherent views on value, and administrative progressives, who embraced utilitarian
views, continued to focus on the question of whether art had “social value or artistic
value.”109 While it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that the Depression led to
more acceptance of inherent and instrumentalist views of music what comes across in the
evidence of some music educators is disillusionment with the obsession that music could
help generate more productive citizens. Some writers used the challenges of the time to
make certain claims for valuing music in a particular way, but there were just as many
supporting one side of the debates as there were the other even as much of the industrial
world sagged. Music for some was an escape; it offered solace, and, therefore, brought
about questions relating to value in a way that drew attention away from an overbearing
focus on material concerns. It is during the Depression that Earhart begins his book The
Meaning and Teaching of Music with a critique of modern industrial society. This
lengthy quote encapsulates Earhart’s concerns in context:
The disarray with which the world now faces a partial retreat from a robust
industrial faith, and the sense it gives us turning from a full and vivid world to one
that is somewhat empty and very strange, may possibly be thus explained. In the
rational and mechanistic world to which we have become accustomed, we have
not been thinking primarily of men as human beings, but have rather considered
them as employees and employers, producers and consumers, as an abstraction
called the ‘economic man’—in short as industrial and economic units. The
thinking, feeling, willing, human being, full of desires, imaginations, aspirations,
109
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impulses both fine and foolish, has not been foremost in our thought. Now we
must become acquainted with him again. It will probably take a long time.110
Earhart’s take on value in this book reflects his earlier views on the subject, so it would
be difficult to argue that the Depression altered his perspective. In Earhart’s case the
Depression was used to place his argument in greater relief, the argument that music’s
value is inherent.
Published in 1934, Mursell’s Human Values in Music Education has a largely
instrumentalist take on value. Unlike Earhart the views in Mursell’s book, also written
during the Depression, display his notion of “human values” with an instrumentalist and
sometimes utilitarian bent. Mursell writes, “music in a vacuum, music for itself alone,
music as a show, loses enormously in artistic values. In proportion as it becomes woven
into the texture of our daily living it acquires a new artistic significance.”111 For Mursell
the human value of music “enables one to live more richly and completely; to be a
stronger, better, happier, more cooperative person; to succeed more fully in the business
of being human.”112 The specific “human values” he systematically evaluates are
individual, moral, and social.113 In relation to the individual music is to be valued
because it is a cultural inheritance and it is an emotional experience, that is “education in
and through music must mean, first of all, participation in noble and humanizing
emotion.”114 He also asserts that music ought to be a means to “educate children for
emotional stability and permanent happiness.”115 The effects of musical experience on
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the individual bring about a certain emotional and cultural relevancy. The end-in-view
presented by Mursell here has the quality of being wide-ranging as well as particular.
The ends-in-view from Mursell’s perspective of the social value of music are also
practical. It is on the topic of social value, specifically the notion that music is a worthy
use of leisure, that Mursell’s thoughts differ from Earhart’s. Earhart saw the idea of
music as a worthy use of leisure as problematic and a disconnect between work and life.
Furthermore, social utility theories and ideas that support the view music is a worthy use
of leisure neglect that life is a unified whole, and the affective influence of music is far
more than just on occurrence during leisure time.116 Mursell, while using similar
language, sees the leisure time activity of music as socially valuable.
Music can do much to meet the social needs and the personal problems created by
the growth of routine jobs…it is one of the human occupations best adapted to
such a use because of its great personal richness as an individual experience, and
also because it is enjoyed on such a wide variety of occasions.117
The differences between Mursell and Earhart highlight each scholar’s distinctive take on
the importance of music. Each claims that music is important in human life. Mursell’s
view places music as a kind of adjunct for what really matters in life, work. Music’s
value, then, is utilitarian because it helps the worker cope with the drudgery of the daily
routine. Earhart’s view on this topic is instrumental because it seeks to fuse music into
everyday life, into a unified whole.
Earhart also had more to say on the topic of social value. In his “What Place Have
Cultural Values in Education” from 1933, he states the difference between materialistic,
utilitarian, technological and rational, on one hand, and the cultural and aesthetic on the
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other, lies in a fundamental difference of views about man and his world.”118 For Earhart
the aesthetic cannot be utilitarian. The “materialistic, utilitarian, and technological” are
“valued because of their power to bring us something else that they themselves are
not.”119 This is not the case for music because it is “one direct and immediate satisfaction
of higher human needs.”120 Again, the doctrine of immediacy places his ideas on why
music matters in the instrumentalist camp.
Farnsworth also addresses the question of social value. In “How Music Educates”
he posits “what its value is to the race.”121 He philosophically questions if the value of
music is pleasure that is attached to it. While pleasure is a value, it is not the ultimate
aim of music at least in terms of “sensuous pleasure felt.”122 The ultimate value of music
according to Farnsworth is its “ministering to the spiritual side of our natures.”123 His
explanation of music’s value is one where music possesses inherent value. Connection
with our spiritual nature, in the German idealist tradition, is both a valuable end and a
means in which the spiritual nature of music is internal to that end. Similarly, Gehrkens
writes in his 1923 president’s address, “the chief value of music lies in its effect upon the
spiritual life of the individual.”124 Again, an espousal of the inherent value of music. In
fact, he makes a statement distinguishing his view on value from instrumentalist and
utilitarian views. Gehrkens argues, “Music must not, however, be thought of principally
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as a mind trainer, as a therapeutic agent, or as a religious or socializing force.”125 Music
for many of these music educators occupies a unique role in education.
Just what unique role music has is at the heart of the issues on value. Perspectives
have been influenced by contemporary events. The debate over a particular value of
music continued throughout the period uninterrupted, but it is during World War II and
the post war years that the voice of those arguing music’s value, especially in education,
was primarily utilitarian. Arguments from the utilitarian perspective were present in the
field ever since 1838, but it is during the war that there was a definite, intensified, and
concerted effort to justify music’s value along these lines. In fact, there were various
projects such as the Victory Corps Project, and The Schools at War Project where the
value of music was based on utilitarian claims.126
Utilitarian claims for music education during WWII were omnipresent. Even
before the United States officially entered the war music educators were taking notice of
the pressures of an ensuing war. In response to the developing events of the time, the
Board of Directors of the MENC adopted as their theme in 1940 for the current two year
period “Unity Through Music.” By 1941 the idea developed into “American Unity
Through Music.” A general outline of this project is in the March-April 1941 issue of the
Music Educators Journal. In a baldly utilitarian statement the committee responsible to
the writing of this article said
On the vast tidal surge of patriotic fervor now swelling to every nook and corner
of our country, our people can be united positively and idealistically through
music, thus averting the inculcation of base or even beastly thoughts that
accompany hate, hysteria, and fear. With music we can help to generate and
mobilize the thoughts and feeling which spring from deserved pride in our
country. With music we can build and sustain morale. Such building for better
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citizenship on the part of our entire populace, in and out of training camps, is
quite as important as man power, machines, and guns.127
This statement is followed by an outline of “specific music activities for defense,” which
includes such things as singing patriotic songs “fervently,” and arranging parades “using
music in keeping with the unity themes.”128 Tucked in near the end of the report is an
acknowledgement that these aims for music are “practical and nationalistic,” but music
educators are also encouraged to remember “that without providing a measure of joy and
beauty to which these other ends must be subservient, we defeat the very purpose we set
out to achieve.”129 This group of music educators hoped to have it both ways in terms of
value. As if to say “We understand that music can have utilitarian value, but even at this
time we do not want it to have too much.”
The work of the committee and that of other music educators, however, continued
to contain strong utilitarian value claims for music. For instance, Glenn Gildersleeve,
chairman of the MENC Committee on American Unity Through Music, encourages
teachers to submit material to the MEJ that may be helpful to others so they might be “led
to think, feel, and act together.”130 He asserts, “Only through organized effort on our part
will music be made most effective in sustaining morale and promoting National
Unity.”131 Pitts, another committee member argues “music performs its greatest service
127
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when used by all of a people to communicate and to further their common purpose and
ideals.”132 And L. Bruce Jones in “How Can the School Band Serve in Defense?” writes,
“We must, for instance, include more music in our rehearsal and concert repertories that
express patriotism, love of country, and the ideals for which this nation stands.”133
Charles Dennis even goes so far to suggest that a soldier is more valuable if he is
musical.134 As part of the Schools at War Project the Music in the Service of Schools at
War Committee printed in the 1944 MEJ an excerpt from a Treasury Department bulletin
that encouraged the MENC to figure out ways schools could contribute to the cause.
What the committee encouraged in essence was hyper-utilitarianism. The charge given
was to use music to help sell war bonds. This would be achieved “directly, through the
concert admission charge of a bond or stamp. Indirectly, through helping build a sense of
community solidarity.”135 These are just a few of the documents during the World War II
era that answer the question of music’s importance with utilitarian claims.
The utilitarian perspectives on value were prevalent in the literature, of which
these are a mere smattering. There was, however, the occasional cautionary voice who
questioned the degree to which music was being put in service to support the war. In
1941, just before the start of the war Hanson anticipated the demands and expectations
society would place on music education in the very near future. His request of music
educators was to be true to the values of music education, especially since he saw it as
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“the greatest educator of the emotions.”136 In a measured tone with hints of German
idealism Hanson advises music educators to carefully adhere to music’s primary aims.
He writes
As we go into the program of national defense which is occupying so much of our
thought, we must see to it that the emphasis upon national defense does not leave
us spiritually bankrupt. We must preserve our ideals…in saving our bodies we
must not lose our souls.137
Hanson’s statement shows far less of a utilitarian mindset than those of his fellow
committee members on the American Unity Through Music project.
Also unsure about values adopted for music in music education during the war,
Lillian Baldwin calls for continuity that links pre-war, war, and post-war perspectives on
the importance of music. In other words music educators ought to continue to emphasize
the emotional and spiritual aspects of music, which is extremely important for children
growing up during these tumultuous times.138 Using the war as a backdrop Charles
Seeger is curious to see what music programs will look like in schools at war’s end.
Seeger’s historical assessment of the value and purpose of music in the United
States during the last century runs counter to Mark’s thesis that the philosophy of music
education was the culmination of a thousand years of utilitarianism. Seeger writes of the
purpose and value that
after a century of music as a ‘good in itself,’ we swing into a program of music as
‘good for something’…in one decision the supreme criteria of ‘beauty for
beauty’s sake,’ ‘music for aesthetic pleasure’…have been, at least temporarily,
held in abeyance or proved false.139

136

Hanson, “The Democratization of Music,” 14.
Ibid. Italics in the original.
138
Lillian Baldwin, “Thoughts on Music Education in Wartime,” Music Educators Journal 29, 6
(May-June 1943): 21.
139
Charles Seeger, “Wartime and Peacetime Programs in Music Education,” Music Education
Journal 29, 3 (January 1943): 12-14, 12.
137

246
Seeger’s comments are not meant to lament the change but rather to show the influence
the war had and will continue to have on culture and music education in the United
States.
Although the combat ended in World War II, utilitarian views on the value of
music continued. Furthering utilitarian perspectives were due in part to the new conflict
that emerged following WWII, the Cold War. The hyper-utilitarian views held over from
WWII were slightly transformed with ideology that stressed the United States’ way of
life was in jeopardy. The United States had just concluded four years of armed struggle,
and it appeared as if the country was moving from one crisis to another. Like many other
citizens music educators were aware of the newly perceived challenge even with the
relative calm in the immediate post-war years. Making adjustments to utilitarian
perspectives on value merely required slight reorganization of the existing view to meet
the new conflict. One particular adjustment during this period is the emphasis placed on
utilitarianism in relation to democracy. That is, democracy is identified and considered
to be specifically attached to utilitarianism and utilitarian goals.140
Earnest Melby explores how the term freedom is used in contemporary language
as compared to how it is applied, specifically as it relates to creativity. After lamenting
the affects of McCarthyism and the present fear of the Soviet Union, he lauds the ideas of
John Foster Dulles.141 What did this mean for music? For Melby this meant a rejection
of aestheticism. For him, “the preservation of freedom is everybody’s job.”142
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Ralph Rush, outgoing president of the MENC in 1954, wrote an article titled
“Music Education in a Democracy.” In it he discussed “the task of developing music
education for democratic participation and leadership.”143 For Rush “Music, like
democracy, is a way of life; both are expressions of an inner vision of an ideal in peaceful
happy living.”144 Music, for many of these music educators was necessarily attached to
ends which were practical and had social, political, moral and/or economic effects for the
participant.
Much like the utilitarian claims for music that persisted after the war, so too did
questions about this kind of value for music. Immediately following the war James
Nickerson examines music programs during the war and offers a critical evolution of his
findings with the aim of drawing on lessons learned to advance music’s future.
Nickerson was concerned with what he saw as “an uncritical acceptance of wartime
music.”145 This so-called uncritical acceptance “revealed many careless judgments and
careless practices.”146 Furthermore, he argues, “There has been a tending to emotionalize
about the power of music. As teachers we have plead the cause of music as a morale
booster.”147 Nickerson is critical of these utilitarian associations for music because he
recognizes the value of music from an instrumentalist bent. For him, “Music as a factor
in personal adjustment can stand on its own merits and does not need extravagant
statements.”148
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Karl Ernst acknowledges the difficult position music has in general education by
highlighting two perspectives on music’s value. Citing material from two different
journals, Educational Music Magazine and Musical America, he brings to the attention of
the reader that school administrators criticize music teachers for not placing enough
emphasis on the social values of music, and musicians criticize music teaching for
focusing too much on the extramusical.149 Picking up on an aspect of the above problem,
Ernst recognizes that groups such as the National Association of Secondary School
Principals have argued music contributes to good citizenship and a fuller life.150 He
rhetorically asks, “Does it? Are students in our classes better integrated than those who
are not?”151 He asks the question in such a way that the reader is supposed to understand
he wants music educators to accept responsibility for teaching the subject both as a
unique subject and as an integrated part of a larger whole. His view moved him away
from a solely utilitarian perspective on value to one that includes the inherent and
instrumentalist outlooks. It is not enough to teach music for its social, moral, or political
effects; music must, if taught properly also coincide with values that are inherent in it
such as sensuous excitement or imaginative discovery.
The issue of the purpose and importance of music and music education were at
the heart of the work of The Commission of Basic Concepts. One member of that
commission, Benn, dealt directly with the topic of aesthetics and value two years prior to
the publication of Basic Concepts of Music Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the
National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1. In her “Esthetics for the Music
Educator: The Maturation of the Esthetic Sense” she asks, “whether or not art exists for
149
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its own sake or for the sake of man?”152 Her development of a partial answer is a
complete rejection of utilitarianism. For her,
Music must remain music…if music is in the schools as a subject to be taught, as
mathematics, or literature, or science are subjects to be taught, we are not
permitted to change its nature from that which all musicians recognize as music.
If we do so change it, we are morally, ethically, esthetically, and pedagogically
suspect…we must stimulate children toward more musically impressive
performance, making them aware of musical ends involved.153
She concludes her paper with a look to the future. The future of music education for her
is one where “musical sensitivity” and “esthetic discrimination” are at the heart of the
endeavor, there is absolutely no mention of teaching for political or social improvement.
William Schumann struck a chord by taking a stand on the value of music as
being specifically musical. Like Benn, but more specific, Schumann questions the value
of music along social and therapeutic lines. He criticizes music teachers for focusing too
much on the extramusical. What he sees as an overemphasis on a misguided perspective
of the value of music has resulted in declining standards of musicianship and
performance. He asserts, “Any performance of a piece of music which is unmusical in its
projection, and falls below acceptable technical and aesthetic standards, does harm to the
art of music.”154 For Schumann it is the music that is important in a formalist sense, and
the teacher who claims to be a musician will ensure its value is properly placed.
Theodore Normann’s rebuttal to Schumann rested on an understanding that music
is in the schools “because of what it can do for, in, and to people in terms of human
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values.”155 Normann cites the existing difference on value as being rooted in two
differing philosophies of music. The first he calls isolationist (aestheticism in this
dissertation). The second philosophy is contextualist, or those who assert “art for
people’s sake.”156 The second position is in line with the instrumental views on value.
For Normann, “We should not be so concerned with the isolationist’s concern with
‘doing a disservice to the art of music’ but more importantly with the contextualist’s
position of doing service to our students through music.”157 His statements about the
value of music are instrumental.
Since music was an established component of the general curriculum, arguments
for its value focused on both keeping it there and the best way to achieve that. The
evidence presented thus far has included intrinsic, inherent, instrumentalist, and
utilitarian views on both aspects of the place of music, that is, first as an important
subject among the other school subjects but also on what basis its value genuinely
existed. To put it another way, music should be in the schools because of X where the
varieties of X (intrinsic, inherent, instrumental or utilitarian value) were debated as to
which was the most appropriate for X. In addition to the issues relating to value already
mentioned, there are additional arguments that warrant distinction.
Beyond the argument of the moralist, the aesthete, and in the German idealist
tradition—seen in inherent and instrumental theories of value in music education of the
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time—other specific views require attention as distinctive cases on the intrinsic/extrinsic
spectrum. While each falls somewhere on the spectrum, these additional arguments draw
on the work of specific theories proposed by philosophers who considered the value of
music. The ideas of Aristotle, Collingwood, and from socioaesthetics occupy the final
section in this chapter.
Catharsis has value because particular emotions could, through the music as
representation of an emotion, be purged and released. Aristotle’s inherent view on value
is an early break from the utilitarian views of Plato. Catharsis is a response to a direct
revelation of reality, and as such has inherent value. One example of this particular
notion of value is seen in Paul Diederich’s evaluation of the Eight Year Study at its first
quarter mark. Diederich remarks, “One of the original purposes of this study was to
permit the arts, which had been crowded out of the program by college requirements, to
assume their proper role in the education of adolescents.”158 One of the aspects of the
program as it relates to the arts, including music, is to evaluate three primary “objectives
of work in the arts.”159 The three objectives the research sets up as being integral,
important, and valuable to study in the arts are: “(1) sensitivity to beauty…(2) the
creative process, and its results in the discovery and clarification of new meanings in
nature and in art…(3) emotional adjustment, resulting from the release of tensions.”160
Unfortunately it is in the third “objective” that “we have nothing very tangible yet to
report.”161 However, the fact that this third so-called objective is in the study is evidence
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that Aristotelian catharsis was important enough for these researchers to include in their
work trusting it has value.
Catharsis is also one of several values Carleton Stewart argues coincides with the
playing of an instrument in orchestra. First on his list of value is that music is an
“emotional outlet that is essential for well balanced living.”162 Stewart’s examples reflect
rather than develop particular philosophical views on value. In “Music Education for
Health” catharsis is the basis on which E. Thayer Gaston promotes the value of teaching
music. Citing a number of sources that are from the discipline of psychology, Gaston
concludes that music education helps students “to look to music for catharsis of undue
tension and relief from worry.”163 The premise for his argument is as follows: “the basic
reason for the arts [music] throughout the history of mankind has been the resultant
mental hygiene benefits.”164 Music’s inherent value is in part psychological, an idea that
goes as far back as Aristotle.
Aristotle’s influence resurfaces in a class discussion led by Pitts. The class
discussed different kinds of value music has for “young people.”165 The value of music
as seen in the notes is “Recreation,” “Amusement,” “Release,” “Solace and Comfort;” it
also has value as an “experience,” “creative self-expression,” Group activity,” and
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“feeling.”166 The notes made on the value of music as release include the idea that music
is a “release from the irksome, the factual, the humdrum and commonplace.”167 While
not well developed (the class discussion itself may have given further clarity) notions of
music having cathartic value exist in the evidence. Here, again, is an example where
philosophical views underpin conversations about value.
Aristotle’s theory on the value of music as catharsis is often connected with
inherent value. Collingwood’s assertion that music is valuable because it leads to selfdiscovery and self knowledge of our emotional state, like catharsis, also arises in the
evidence. Collingwood’s point of view places his ideas in line with those supporting the
idea that music’s value is inherent, or at most instrumentalist. In 1910, in a paper that
predates Collingwood’s The Principles of Art but is in no way nearly as developed, J.S.
Collins writes that the value of music lies, in part, in its “power to translate the
conventional symbols of musical notation into the sounds they are intended to represent
[which] means the power to read into one’s own mind and life the thought and feeling of
another.”168 The majority of uses of self-knowledge as a value, however, appear in the
evidence after the publication of Collingwood’s first edition of The Principles of Art in
1938.
Using Collingwood-like arguments, Francis Horn writes the value of music is
beyond Platonic notions of worth.169 Horn asserts, “Music does more: it contributes to
one’s knowledge of himself and his fellow-men, to his sense of values about life and its
166
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meaning.”170 It is on this basis that music deserves a place in general education, claims
which go against the standard interpretation that music justified its place in the
curriculum only in conjunction with utilitarian thought. With a similar sentiment to Horn
Raymond Reed espouses, “The arts that embody emotional participation come the
nearest…to man better understanding himself.”171 Again, the alignment with
Collingwood is reflected in the work, but it could stand further development especially
since he includes elements from German idealism and other hints of instrumental value.
The most developed material that relates to Collingwood comes from Pitts.
Likely written between 1938 and 1954 is a paper with the heading “How-to
(Know-How).” Pitts explores “keeping ends and means in proper relationship”172 in the
education of children. With reference to the former she asks two questions: are music
educators “to nurture and develop the latent musical expressive power that is born in
every child” or is “the end in music to be that of equipping children and young people
with fixed amounts of knowledge?”173 Her answer to the first question uses an idea from
Collingwood in explaining what the means are to the ends of “developing the latent
musical expressive power.” The art of making music is a child’s “only means of
exploring and discovering themselves—of finding out (or acting out) the meanings of life
and themselves.”174 In relation to this comment, she continues by talking about general
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human values in music.175 For her the arts are a “means of cultivating sympathetic
insight into one’s own relations to life.”176 Again, echoes of Collingwood surface, but it
is unclear if she ever read Collingwood and much of her work in music education did not
follow these ideas here which reflect a view that art is valued because it is selfknowledge.
It is also not clear if Carroll Reed read the work of Aristotle or anything in
socioaesthetics, but ideas of each, especially the latter, arise in his “Difficulties in
Comparative Measurement of Factual and Aesthetic Values.”177 Reed refers to the
Seashore test and the Kwalwasser-Rush test that can adequately measure a student’s
understanding of basic concepts in music such as pitch, rhythm, and recognition of tunes
from note reading. Reed suggests, however, that while items such as pitch and rhythm
are factual and as such can be measured, there is another set of values, the aesthetic, that
“evade measurement but which always seem to be a driving force behind general
aesthetic understandings and expression.”178 For Reed the teaching of music ought to
contain both sets of values, the factual and the aesthetic. He argues this point because
one cannot exist in isolation from the other. So, even though a teacher or administrator
cannot measure such things as “personal enjoyment,” “depth of personal feeling,” or
“creative stimulation which carries out into life,”179 it does not mean these should be cast
aside. To support his argument Reed relies on the socioaesthetic perspective. He writes,
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“Any artistic expression must be understood as a personal reaction to a social pattern.
The teacher must be intelligent about the society in which he is teaching, and sensitive to
the ideals and emotional expression of times and place.”180 Therefore, the teacher must
be aware that “great art has sprung from social conditions where these factors [aesthetic
values of the personal and social nature] were best accommodated.”181 In teaching
music, then, “art may exist for art’s sake in the studio or in the sophisticated circles of the
intelligentsia, but in school it exists for its contribution to the lives of children.”182 Music
matter’s because it can serve a dual purpose. For some circles it is rooted in the social
situation even though it does not have a direct social function. But in other circles such
as the school it does have a role in contributing to the lives of children where even these
young people should be exposed to how society and music interact.
The social is inextricably linked with music and creativity in socioaesthetic
doctrine. In a highly philosophical work John Mueller examines “The Social Nature of
Musical Taste,”183 a topic that unites the first and last sections of this chapter. He
conflates the idea of what is good music, an evaluative use of the term, with what good is
music, a normative question. His purpose is to “discuss the problem of music…from the
standpoint that music is one of many forms of human behavior with norms set up by
society.”184 Mueller wholeheartedly embraces the socioaesthetic position as a way of
understanding the value of music. He criticizes the German idealist standpoint he sees in
the field as it connects to ethos theory and does so by referencing an ambiguous phrase in
180
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the Music for Childhood Committee Report contained in Music In American Education:
Music Education Source Book Number Two.185 His rejection of German idealism and
ethos theory is also a rejection of the instrumental, moralist, and utilitarian conceptions of
value.186 He wants to believe that individuals and societies can be improved through
contact with music but he simply cannot accept that point. He asserts “I am dubious of
the premised intrinsic ethical linkage. Music is no more moral than a card game
immoral.”187 Not only does Mueller question the moralist he does so in relation to the
infungibility question.
Mueller relates a story about a neighbor of his. Each spent his leisure hours
differently, one doing chemistry and the other practicing his instrument. Both, according
to Mueller, stayed out of trouble in their youth and each went on to successful and
respectable careers. Why was music any more valuable than chemistry in this instance?
He asserts no substantive difference could or should be made—“we are making claims
for music which will not hold up…they raise hopes and expectations which cannot be
fulfilled.”188 Music educators, in his view, are generating problems for the field.
Confusion for the field does not stop with the issue of infungibility and leisure time
either, according to Mueller.
The next ambiguous element of value he addresses is the notion of good music.
For him, making determinations of good are confused because of the ways in which the
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term is used. Here he outlines four ways good is used in the field of music education,
many of which I already addressed in this chapter. What he does is problematize notions
of good. Each view of what “good” is systematically evaluated and dismissed leaving the
idea that “good” is socially subjective. That is, the answer to “what is good music? may
differ from epoch to epoch, from person to person, and even from time to time within the
same person, as well as the particular occasion.”189 The concept of good music is
mutable, which Mueller acknowledges “is very distressing to many musicians.”190 The
changing nature of society, however, does not lead to evaluative judgment as being
relativistic. Norms are “reinterpreted” but still “present plateaus of stability.
Furthermore, the social nature of taste falls under Beardsley’s argument from
variability.191 Mueller argues that evaluation and normative statements are
manifestations of social conditions. Quoting at length and implying socioaesthetic
doctrine, Mueller concludes
esthetic tastes display a broad consensus, they are codified; they are the
foundations of a system of theory, are culturally transmitted through school, the
church, the home, and other social avenues. They are the beneficiaries of an
esthetic conscience—analogous to moral conscience—which labels discrepant
tastes as wrong and resist radical intrusion of new codes and systems of taste…it
reflects the vicissitudes of society and of the social organism. But its social
functions are pluralistic.192
His point is that the value of music and notions of taste, rather than being “dogmatic,
mystical finalities,”193 are mutable and should simply lead to a better understanding of
music for the field of music education.
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Both the normative and evaluative uses of the term value, are frequently
mentioned topics in the field of music education. Furthermore, like perspectives on the
nature and meaning of music there is not nearly as much consensus as the standard
interpretation asserts. Not all conversations on value focused on music’s utility. Notions
of evaluation which codify good music, for example, do so not on the basis of one point
of view but for genetic, psychological, and objective reasons. Even the moralist
perspective that good inheres in the music and good music has a moral component was
not accepted by everyone, least of all Mueller. In fact, there was not even consensus on
the infungibility of music, an idea it seems all music educators would willingly advance.
Additionally, views on the intrinsic, inherent, instrumentalist, and utilitarian value of
music range from German idealism, to Aristotelian catharsis, to self-knowledge, Platonic
ethos, and socioaesthetics, not just utilitarianism. The last chapter brings to a close the
multiplicity of ideas and conceptions regarding musical aesthetics as seen directly and
indirectly in the evidence of music education discourse from 1907 to 1958.

CHAPTER 6
CODA
Mark and Gary argue that Basic Concepts and Foundations and Principles of
Music Education “are significant because they expose the music educator to aesthetics,
the philosophical field devoted to examining the value of the arts.”1 My evidence proves
that their assertion is incorrect. As a matter of fact, Clippinger mentions that he studied
aesthetics more or less seriously for twenty five years, and his explanation of the
aesthetic sense is “the sense of discrimination and judgment,”2 the basis of what we call
artistic taste, which holds to a tradition in aesthetics that it is the study of how and on
what basis such judgments can be made. In other words his statements explicitly show he
had, in fact, studied and understood aesthetics, an idea that subverts current
interpretations of the writing that occurred during this time. Not only were music
educators aware of aesthetics and gave papers displaying an astute awareness of the
discipline of philosophy but Mark’s and Gary’s notion of aesthetics is also too narrow.
Value is merely one aspect of aesthetics—nature and meaning round out the study of
musical aesthetics. Further, philosophy is not necessarily a self-contained and restricted
idea existing only between the front and back cover of a book or journal article.
Philosophical ideas can be worked out systematically over time, an allowance Mark and
Gary do not make. Philosophical conversations can just as easily take place across
decades as they can in the pages of a Platonic dialogue.
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What I found in the evidence was not only that music education discourse on and
relating to aesthetics existed but also that the material of the conversation was varied,
noteworthy, insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators.
The music educators of the time who were concerned with the field of music education
generally in the hopes that practice would be influenced by their ideas incorporated
numerous theoretical stances on the nature, meaning, and value of music. In fact, the
evidence ranged from a simple grasp of aesthetic perspectives and ideas to citations of
philosophers and aesthetic theories and even further still to independent thought that
incorporated and critiqued aesthetic positions for the purpose of supporting one view over
another or advancing an argument of one’s own. Clark and Earhart, especially Earhart,
were much more than mere “forerunners of the aesthetic education movement that began
in the late 1950s.”3 There were far more music educators who deserve mention as
contributing to aesthetic discourse in music education in the period prior to the MEAE
movement. Scholars like Pitts, Hanson, Farnsworth, Gehrkens, Miessner, Mursell, Benn,
Bernasconi, Finn, Sutherland and many others, contributed to the philosophical
development of music education prior to 1958.
The real issue for music education in relation to aesthetics is not that the period
prior to 1958 was barren or only included rationale. Quite the opposite. It was as if there
were too many perspectives that called for attention. The range of views on aesthetic
principles, problems, and theories spawned disagreement. Talks on the nature of music,
for example, in music theory and music appreciation, frequently revealed formalist views,
while expressivist and significationist perspectives were ubiquitous in the discourse on
meaning, with much attention being directed toward music’s relation to language. Music
3
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educators fixated on evaluation and the elevation of taste using the German idealist
standpoint. Thoughtfully examining the aesthetic/moral correlation led some, such as
Mursell and Finn, to conclude that great as the potentialities of music may be, there is no
definite ethical significance in its essence.”4 Several other music educators saw the value
of music through the lens of utilitarianism. But it is untenable to assert that these were
the only claims music educators made reading music’s value. Opposing value based on
the utilitarian perspective was a group of music educators who rejected the point of view
that music’s value had extramusical benefits such as enhanced political, social, or
economic life. This group who rejected utilitarian views supported the notion that
music’s value was intrinsic or inherent.
Utilitarian views, however, exploded in the period immediately preceding World
War II, and during the war years there was a hyper-utilitarianism that pervaded the
discourse. One area for possible future research is to further develop the relationship
between the hyper-utilitarian views emanating from WWII and the Cold War with the
MEAE movement. That is, the MEAE movement was a reaction to the resounding and
intensifying hyper-utilitarian claims during WWII and the early Cold War years. Music
educators such as Britton, Leonhard, and House, perceived the field to have moved
enough away from its predominantly musical roots to generate concern. A select group
of music educators intuited a problem which offended their sensibilities regarding
music’s aim. Reemphasizing notions of inherent and intrinsic value in music was their
way of getting back to basic principles. They even attempted to insulate and protect the
field from groups questioning its purpose in education. For example, if music had a
privileged language of its own like math and science, then it may also appear to outsiders
4
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to be a viable subject in the curriculum. Making explicit the connections between the
MEAE as a reaction to the WWII hyper-utilitarian views of WWII era music education
would be valuable. Seeger’s 1943 paper is one example of a link between the everpresent hyper-utilitarianism in music education discourse of the war years and the
departure of the position of “a century of music as a ‘good in itself.’”5
This study also opens up additional areas of research within the period of the
study as well as for earlier periods. One examination could be the extent to which the
integration, as tied to pedagogical progressivism, was itself a so-called philosophy of
music education prior to the MEAE movement. The integration movement generated a
number of philosophical and thoughtful questions about the purpose of education
generally and music specifically. Scholars like Pitts, Miessner, and Simpson infused
questions dealing with the nature, meaning, and value of music into arguments for and
against integration. Another possible study could focus specifically on the historical
continuity between pre 1958 philosophy and the MEAE movement using this study as a
basis for comparison (since the MEAE movement was not the focus of this work – my
assertions of continuity are inferred). Research could also be conducted on the extent to
which expressivist views are seen in the writings of early music educators like Lowell
Mason or Charles Aiken.
Finally, additional research may lead to a continuation of this study or the outright
rejection of it. In terms of a continuation there were a few sources that may have had an
important bearing on sections of this dissertation that were either not included because of
an oversight or other important material I had trouble locating. One particular example is
a reference in the 1936 Music Education Research Council’s (MERC) biennial report
5
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which states a concern “with four studies during the past biennium.”6 Number three on
the list of four is “A Philosophy of Music Education.”7 There was no mention of the
content of the study other than the committee’s statement “The report on Philosophy has
been discussed and agreement as to the desirable direction and scope of the study has
been reached by the council.”8 By 1938 the MERC did not appear to make any progress
on the study. In Russell Morgan’s biennial report the philosophy of music education
study is still in the preparation and development stages.9 The next clue regarding this
study’s initiative is seen in the May 1940 issue of the Music Educators Journal. In the
article “Straight from Los Angeles” is the announcement of the forthcoming Research
Council Bulletin No. 20. This bulletin “contains an outline of ‘A Program for Music
Education, which is the general title for the course of study on which the MERC has been
working for several years.”10 The program, which included “(a) Philosophy and
Psychology of Music Education”11 was supposed to be published in one volume. Even
after enlisting the support of three outstanding research librarians, Vincent Novara and
Leahkim Gannett from the Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library and Kirstin Dougan
of the Music and Performing Arts Library at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampagne, the closest material to this report were basic outlines in 1965 (beyond the
scope of this study). The conclusion drawn between these researchers and myself is that
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Bulletin 20 was not ever published, even though the committee had set a date to publish
the piece over six months prior to the United States entering World War II.
History and philosophy are inherently replete with gaps and lost arguments, which
makes the job of researching complicated. It is my hope, however, that the material
presented in this dissertation—gaps, omissions, and other problems notwithstanding—is
seen as an honest, accurate, and sincere appraisal of the philosophical work of music
educators on the topic of musical aesthetics from 1907 to 1958. The idea of the nature of
aesthetics as a “vaporous, far flung quintessence of problems and points of view”12
permeates music education discourse during the period just as it does general
philosophical discourse since the eighteenth century. If anything, the diverse nature of
the subject should be a lesson to music education philosophers and historians that
pluralism need not necessarily be negative or problematic. In the pursuit of wisdom it is
possible that more voices can generate more varied discussion. Soundings from various
perspectives invite introspection and can lead to more informed conversation. The aim of
examining past and present music education discourse is to enable better understanding
of the field. Simply put, music, as a human creation and endeavor, is worthy of study
because it is one more way we, individually and collectively, can better understand
ourselves.
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